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THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
OUTSIDE THE HOME, TAKE TWO: HOW WE GOT 
HERE AND WHY IT MATTERS 
PATRICK J. CHARLES* 
ABSTRACT 
Since the late twentieth century, the Second Amendment has been increasingly 
promoted as the unfettered right to carry firearms in the public concourse. This 
expansive meaning, however, lacks historical support. Historical evidence reveals a 
disparity between the Anglo-American origins of armed carriage laws and present-
day interpretations of the Second Amendment. The historical backdrop also reveals 
the impact pro-gun organizations have had on the expansion of armed carriage. 
Differences in state armed carriage laws, analyzed from both historical and regional 
perspectives, will one day require the Supreme Court to determine which version of 
history should dictate the meaning of the Second Amendment.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller,1 the Second Amendment has reached new heights in American 
discourse.2 This includes the extent to which the right to “keep and bear arms” 
                                                           
 * Patrick J. Charles is the author of numerous articles and books on the Constitution, legal 
history, and standards of review. Charles received his L.L.M. in Legal Theory and History 
from Queen Mary University of London with distinction, J.D. from Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law, and his B.A. in History and International Affairs from George Washington 
University. Charles currently serves as a historian for Air Force Special Operations Command 
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 1  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2  See generally Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: 
What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1143 (2015). 
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extends outside the home,3 and the perception is growing that it protects the 
preparatory armed carriage of firearms for self-defense within the public concourse. 
Consider that there are a growing number of states modifying their constitutions to 
protect a right to carry firearms outside the home for self-defense.4 Meanwhile, other 
states have taken the legislative route to ensure individuals may carry firearms in the 
public concourse with virtually no legal impediments.5 Otherwise known as 
“constitutional carry,” advocates for these types of laws firmly believe the “Second 
Amendment is my gun permit.”6 Then there are states such as Georgia that have 
amended their laws so that individuals may carry loaded firearms almost anywhere 
                                                           
 3  For some post-Heller legal commentary addressing this point, see Michael C. Dorf, 
Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225 
(2008); Brian Enright, The Constitutional “Terra Incognita” of Discretionary Concealed 
Carry Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 909 (2015); John R. Frazer, Home, Sweet Home: The 
Second Amendment and the Right to Carry Arms in Public, 4 REGENT J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 
(2012); Joseph A. Gonnella, Concealed Carry: Can Heller’s Handgun Leave the Home?, 51 
CAL. W. L. REV. 111 (2014); Justine E. Johnson-Makuch, Statutory Restrictions on Concealed 
Carry: A Five-Circuit Shoot-Out, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2757 (2015); Robert Leider, Our Non-
Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014); Owen McGovern, The 
Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance and Novel Textual Questions About the Second 
Amendment, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471 (2012); Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for 
All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 1587 (2014); Darrell 
A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1278 (2009); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh 
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2012); Nicholas Moeller, 
The Second Amendment Beyond the Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1401 (2014); Ryan Notarangelo, Carrying the Second Amendment Outside the Home: A 
Critique of the Third Circuits Decision in Drake v. Filko, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 235 (2014); 
Michael O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial 
Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2012); 
Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of 
Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 85 (2010); 
Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An 
Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009). 
 4  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Alabama Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Strengthened, by 
72%-28% Vote, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 5, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/05/alabama-
constitutional-right-to-bear-arms-strengthened-by-72-28-vote.  
 5  See, e.g., Mark Emmert & David Hench, Concealed-Carry Law Might Not Put Maine 
Under the Gun, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/06/05/concealed-carry-law-might-not-put-state-under-the-
gun; Jeff Guo, These States are Poised to Allow People to Carry Hidden Guns Around 
Without a Permit, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/02/these-states-are-poised-to-
allow-people-to-carry-hidden-guns-around-without-a-permit; Maya Rhodan, New Kansas Law 
Will Allow Concealed Carry Without Gun Permit or Training, TIME (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://time.com/3770182/kansas-bill-constitutional-carry-concealed-guns.  
 6  See, e.g., Dana Loesch: Hands Off My Gun(s), GUNS & AMMO, June 2015. 
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except college campuses, certain government buildings, and past airport security 
checkpoints.7 
The perception that the Second Amendment guaranteed an unfettered right of 
indivdiuals to carry firearms in the public concourse grew to prominence in the late 
twentieth century. Indeed, prior to the late twentieth century there were individuals 
that asserted broad Second Amendment rights both publically and privately.8 
However, such a view was not embraced by either Americans or pro-gun supporters 
at large.9 It was not until 1985, when the National Rifle Association (NRA) initiated 
its nationwide campaign to revise “restrictive carry” laws that the Second 
Amendment, outside the home, began to take on an expansive meaning.10 In 
particular, the NRA lobbied state legislatures to change their firearms carry licensing 
regimes from “may issue” to “shall issue,” with the primary justification being the 
desire to arm law-abiding citizens for self-defense.11 Today, however, the 
justification for individuals to carry firearms in the public concourse is perceived a 
bit differently. Armed carriage is no longer just about self-defense. It is now 
associated with the First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly, and 
therefore it has become common to witness gun rights activists carrying firearms as a 
means to bring attention to their cause.12 
Take for instance the example of Jim Cooley, who carried a fully loaded AR-15 
with a 100-round drum through the Atlanta International Airport terminal. In light of 
Georgia’s “guns everywhere” law, at no point was Cooley committing even a 
misdemeanor. As to why Cooley thought it necessary to carry a fully loaded AR-15 
in an international airport, he answered: “If you don’t exercise your rights, the 
                                                           
 7  See The Safe Carry Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. 
(Ga. 2014); see also Niraj Chokshi, What Georgia’s Expansive New Pro-Gun Law Does, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/04/23/what-georgias-expansive-new-
pro-gun-law-does. For more on states acting to expand armed self-defense beyond the home, 
see Logan A. Forsey, State Legislatures Stand Up For Second Amendment Gun Rights While 
the U.S. Supreme Court Refuses to Order a Cease Fire on the Issue, 37 SETON HALL LEG. J. 
411 (2013). 
 8  See infra pp. 401-30. 
 9  See infra pp. 430-65. 
 10  David Conover, To Keep and Bear Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1985, at 40-41. 
 11  See G. Ray Arnett, …Sincerely, GRA, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1986, at 7; see also Dr. 
Alonzo H. Garcelon, The President’s Column, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1985, at 46. Although the 
movement began in 1985, it was not until 1987 that the first state—Florida—adopted all of 
NRA’s suggested changes. See David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Shall Issue: The New 
Wave of Concealed Handgun Laws, 63 TENN. L. REV. 679 (1995); Ted Lattanzio, Florida Gun 
Owners and Lawmen Stand Together, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1987, at 42; Gun Owners Win 
Significant Legislative Fights in 1987, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1987, at 66. For more on the 
legislative shift from “may issue” licensing schemes to “shall issue,” see Megan Ruebsamen, 
The Gun-Shy Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in Post-Heller 
Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 66-76 (2013); see also Steven W. 
Kranz, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small Changes Help Reduce the 
Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 646-49 (2006). 
 12  Charles, supra note 2, at 1172-73. 
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government doesn’t have any hesitation taking them away.”13 Another example 
occurred in St. Louis, Missouri, where gun rights activists, in an act of civil 
disobedience, planned to march through the St. Louis Zoo with firearms to protest 
the Zoo’s policy of prohibiting weapons on its premises.14 
While instances like these are largely symbolic in advocating for Second 
Amendment rights outside the home, the same cannot be said of Jon Ritzheimer’s 
“Freedom of Speech” rally in front of the Islamic Community Center of Phoenix, 
Arizona. As part of the rally, Ritzheimer held a “draw Mohammed” contest to 
“expose the true colors of Islam” and protestors were encouraged to exercise their 
Second Amendment rights.15 When Ritzheimer’s rally was finally held, 250 armed 
protestors, some carrying two to three firearms, were met by largely unarmed 
counter-protestors.16 As a justification for the armed rally the protestors claimed that 
they needed to be armed in case the First Amendment came “under much anticipated 
attack.”17 Here, Ritzheimer was referencing events that took place weeks earlier, 
where Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi, both of whom prayed at the Islamic 
Community Center of Phoenix, attacked a “draw Mohammed” contest being held in 
Garland, Texas.18 Although the Simpson and Soofi attack was thwarted by law 
enforcement, there was clamoring among gun rights activists that the Second 
Amendment is there to protect the First Amendment.19 
                                                           
 13  Man Raises Eyebrows Carrying Rifle Through Atlanta Airport, WSB-TV 2 ATLANTA 
(June 2, 2015), http://www.wsbtv.com/news/news/local/man-raises-eyebrows-carrying-gun-
through-atlanta-a/nmTFS. 
 14  Kevin Killeen, Zoo Takes Legal Action to Block Gun Protestors, CBS ST. LOUIS (June 
12, 2015), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2015/06/12/gun-protesters-plan-to-march-through-st-
louis-zoo; Gun-Rights Activist Questions Saint Louis Zoo’s Firearms Ban, CBS ST. LOUIS 
(June 9, 2015), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2015/06/09/gun-rights-activist-questions-st-louis-
zoos-firearms-ban. 
 15  Sara Sidner & Ed Payne, Mohammed Cartoon Contest: Protest Held Outside Phoenix 
Mosque, CNN (May 30, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/29/us/mohammed-cartoon-
contest/index.html.  
 16  Evan Wyloge, Hundreds Gather in Arizona for Armed Anti-Muslim Protest, CNN (May 
30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/05/30/hundreds-
gather-in-arizona-for-armed-anti-muslim-protest.  
 17  Sidner & Payne, supra note 15. 
 18  Catherine Shoichet & Michael Pearson, Garland, Texas, Shooting Suspect Linked 
Himself to ISIS in Tweets, CNN (May 4, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/04/us/garland-
mohammed-drawing-contest-shooting/index.html; Holly Yan, Texas Attack: What We Know 
About Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi, CNN (May 5, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/texas-shooting-gunmen/index.html.  
 19  See, e.g., Michael Cantrell, This Cartoon Explains the Reason the Second Amendment 
Exists PERFECTLY, YOUNG CONSERVATIVES (May 29, 2015), 
https://www.youngcons.com/this-cartoon-explains-the-reason-the-second-amendment-exists-
perfectly. The Second Amendment Foundation has presented a similar line of argument in 
Second Amendment litigation. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary and/or Permanent Injunction at 9-10, Shepard v. Madigan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 774 
(S.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 11-cv-00405) (“Blackstone classified the right of British subjects ‘of 
having arms for their defence’ as among ‘auxiliary’ rights ‘which serve principally as barriers 
to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, 
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Ultimately, what the “draw Mohammed” rally demonstrates is how drastically 
the right to “keep and bear arms” has transformed. From the perspective of the 
armed protestors and many contemporary gun rights advocates, the Second 
Amendment was placed in the Bill of Rights to ensure all other constitutional rights 
and civil liberties were followed.20 Gun rights advocates also perceive the Second 
Amendment as guaranteeing the right to repel force with armed force should the 
force occur in private or public. As NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre 
often quips, “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a 
gun.”21 
What this Article sets forth to uncover is how we got to this point. It does so by 
exploring historical developments in the law and armed carriage from the fourteenth 
century to the present. Part I provides the historical backdrop of the law and armed 
carriage from the fourteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century.22 Part II 
discusses developments in the law and armed carriage throughout the nineteenth 
century.23 Part III continues the discussion from the early twentieth century to the 
modern era, with a particular focus as to how pro-gun organizations and supporters 
came to view the Second Amendment as embodying a right to armed carriage in the 
                                                           
personal liberty, and private property.’ . . . Inasmuch as threats to liberty, security, and 
property know no bounds, a right to arms limited to the home plainly would have been 
insufficient to meet its high purposes.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 20  See, e.g., Nick Wing, Louie Gohmert: Second Amendment Is Necessary Because . . . 
Sharia Law?, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/louie-gohmert-second-
amendment_n_2735971.html. This kind of rhetoric began appearing in the 1990s. See, e.g., 
Wayne LaPierre, America’s First Freedom, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1997, at 8 (“I say that the 
Second Amendment is, in order of importance, the first amendment. It is America’s First 
Freedom, the one right that protects all the others. Among freedom of speech, of the press, of 
religion, of assembly, of redress of grievances, it is the first among equals. The right to keep 
and bear arms is the one right that allows ‘rights’ to exist at all.”). 
 21  David Nakamura & Tom Hamburger, Put Armed Police in Every School, NRA Urges, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/put-armed-police-
officers-in-every-school-nra-head-says/2012/12/21/9ac7d4ae-4b8b-11e2-9a42-
d1ce6d0ed278_story.html (emphasis added); see also Sheriff Calls on America’s “Good 
Guys” to Shoot “Bad Guys,” CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-sheriff-wayne-ivey-arming-citizens-goes-viral 
(Brevard County, Florida, Sheriff Wayne Ivey calling on armed citizens to take an active role 
in shootings “until the cavalry arrives.”). 
 22  See infra notes 26–154 and accompanying text. Part I is a supplement to and 
consolidation of previous scholarship on the law and armed carriage from the fourteenth 
through the late eighteenth century. Part I also contains corrections and clarifications to any 
errors in previous scholarship.  
 23  See infra notes 155–288 and accompanying text. Part II is a supplement to and 
consolidation of previous scholarship on the law and armed carriage during the nineteenth 
century. Part II also contains corrections and clarifications to any errors in previous 
scholarship. 
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public concourse.24 Lastly, Part IV brings together Parts I through III and addresses 
why the history of the law and armed carriage matters today.25  
I. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ORIGINS OF THE LAW AND ARMED CARRIAGE  
In virtually any discussion as to the Constitution’s meaning, purpose, and scope, 
it is common to explore the intentions and understanding of those that drafted it.26 
This exploration is usually accomplished by interpreting the contemporaneous 
meaning of the text in question, understanding the remedy or restriction the text 
sought to provide, and examining historical practice both before and after the 
Constitution’s ratification.27 Such an exploration also requires understanding the 
Anglo origins of American constitutionalism, as well as the development of the 
Anglo-American common law.28 
As it pertains to the Second Amendment, understanding the Anglo origins is of 
particular significance given that Article VII of the 1689 Declaration of Rights29 was 
in part the inspiration for including the right to “keep and bear arms” within the Bill 
of Rights.30 Logically, given that the Framers borrowed the right to arms from their 
                                                           
 24  See infra notes 289–561 and accompanying text. 
 25  See infra Parts I, II & III. 
 26  This enterprise has been categorized under many subheadings, to include historicism, 
intentionalism, interpretivist history, historical narrative, and originalism. For different 
scholarly approaches, see, for example LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (1988); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF 
HISTORY (1969); JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1996); John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and 
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1977); Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (1997); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965); Paul Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of 
American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64 (1963); William E. Nelson, History 
and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986); H. Jefferson 
Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); John Philip Reid, Legal History, 
1966 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 669; Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599 (2004); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court 
and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1987); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., History 
and Law, U. CHI. L. REV. 237 (1959). 
 27  For the most recent Supreme Court opinions applying this approach, see Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015); NLRB v. Noel-Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 28  See, e.g., Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925) (stating “the language of the 
Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to 
British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted”); Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 52 BOS. U. 
L. REV. 212 (1972). For recent scholarship discussing the importance of the common law when 
exhuming the Constitution’s historical meaning, see Kunal M. Parker, Law “In” and “As” 
History: The Common Law in the American Polity, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. POL’Y 587 (2011); 
Lorianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-Originalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 277 (2012). 
 29  1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) (Eng.) (“That the Subjects which are 
Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by 
Law.”). 
 30  See generally ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS [1803] 238–39 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1999); 2 ST. GEORGE 
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English ancestors, one would assume they also borrowed and understood the 
ideological and philosophical restrictions on the right.31 At the same time, one must 
proceed cautiously when importing English law into American constitutionalism.32 
The fact of the matter is there were instances where the Framers sought to remedy 
the defects of the English system.33 
However, this problem does not seem to present itself in terms of the law and 
armed carriage, for the Statute of Northampton’s prohibition on carrying dangerous 
weapons in the public concourse was alive and well in American law both before 
and after the Constitution’s ratification. Initially signed into law in 1328, the Statute 
of Northampton stipulated that no person—except government officials and those 
under the license of government—shall “go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day in 
Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part 
elsewhere . . . .”34 Violation of the Statute was a misdemeanor resulting in forfeiture 
of arms and up to thirty days imprisonment.35   
The Statute of Northampton was of such importance that its tenets survived for 
over 500 years, with states such as Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia 
recognizing it after the ratification of the Constitution.36 In Massachusetts, for 
                                                           
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 143 n.40 (Phila., William Young Birch & Abraham Small 
1803); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
126 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829); James Madison, Member of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), 
http://consource.org/document/notes-for-speech-in-congress-1789-6-8. It is worth noting there 
is historical disagreement as to what extent the English Declaration of Rights influenced the 
American Bill of Rights, particularly the Second Amendment. See Kenneth R. Bowling, “A 
Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and the Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988); see also Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The 
English Perspective, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 207, 225 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000). 
 31  See, e.g., James Stoner, Why You Can’t Understand the Constitution Without the 
Common Law, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-
forum/why-you-cant-understand-the-constitution-without-the-common-law. 
 32  See Richard L. Aynes, McDonald v. City of Chicago, Self-Defense, the Right to Bear 
Arms, and the Future, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 181, 195 (2011); see also WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975). 
 33  Perhaps the greatest distinction between the English and the United States Constitution 
is the latter’s republican structure. See Patrick J. Charles, Restoring “Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness” in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 523-32 (2011). 
 34  See 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); accord 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.). 
 35  Id.  
 36  The first appearance of the Statute of Northampton in Massachusetts’s law dates back 
to 1692. See ACTS AND LAWS PASSED BY THE GREAT AND GENERAL COURT OF ASSEMBLY OF 
THEIR MAJESTIES PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY 18 (1692) (“That every Justice of the 
Peace . . . may cause to be Staid and Arrested all . . . [that] shall Ride, or go Armed 
offensively before any of Their Majesties Justices, or other Their Officers or Ministers doing 
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instance, the law reaffirmed the Justice of the Peace’s common-law power to stay 
and arrest “all affrayers, rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the peace, and such as 
shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens of this 
Commonwealth . . . .”37 North Carolina’s restatement of the Statute of Northampton 
began by listing the common exceptions to the rule—government officials in 
performance of their duty and the hue and cry—then stipulated that no one shall 
bring “force in an affray of peace, nor to go nor ride armed by day nor by night, in 
fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no 
part elsewhere . . . .”38 Meanwhile, Virginia’s restatement of the Statute differed 
                                                           
their Office, or elsewhere, By Night or by Day, in Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege 
People . . .”). Virginia and North Carolina seem to have adopted the Statute of Northampton in 
light of their legislatures importing English law into their respective legal systems. See 
PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE USE AND ABUSE 
OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 74-75 (2014). Before the American Revolution, 
New Hampshire also recognized the Statute of Northampton. See ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS 
MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE IN NEW-ENGLAND 2 (1759) (“And every justice of 
the peace within this province, may cause to be stayed and arrested, all . . . who shall go 
armed offensively . . . And upon view of such justice, concession of the offender, or legal 
proof of any such offence, the justice may commit the offender to prison, until he or she find 
such surities of the peace and good behavior . . . and cause the arms or weapons so used by the 
offender, to be taken away . . . .”). 
 37  2 THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 
1798 259 (Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1799). 
 38  FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF 
ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 60–61 (Newbern 1792) (emphasis 
added). In a recent article, David B. Kopel contests whether in fact North Carolina adopted the 
Statute of Northampton and asserts that the only restriction on going armed was applicable to 
slaves. See David B. Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2016). What Kopel overlooks is that in 1776 the North Carolina adopted 
a resolution stipulating that, “all such Statutes, and such Parts of the Common Law . . . not 
destructive or, repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the Freedom and Independence of this States 
. . . shall endure, continue, and be in Force . . . .” THE JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF NORTH CAROLINA, HELD AT HALIFAX THE 12TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 
1776 73 (James Davis ed., 1776). One of these statutes would have been the Statute of 
Northampton, which was born out of the common law. See, e.g., JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE 
AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (1774); JAMES IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
NORTH-CAROLINA 70 (1791) (showing the legal tenets embodied by the Statute of 
Northampton were part of the constable’s oath). 
  Kopel’s criticism of this author is not limited to the North Carolina statute. It extends to 
all of this author’s historical findings on the Statute of Northampton. According to Kopel, the 
Statute of Northampton was “primarily concerned with armed nobles frustrating the judicial 
process,” and in no way restricted the general carriage of dangerous weapons in public. Kopel, 
supra note 38, at 7. However, in coming to this conclusion, Kopel omits the Statute of 
Northampton’s subsequent enforcement and over 300 years of history—history that directly 
contradicts Kopel’s narrow characterization. An examination of this evidence reveals the 
Statute was enforced as a prohibition on carrying dangerous weapons in the public concourse. 
Compare id., with Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: 
History Versus Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 12-23 (2012) (text 
accompanying footnotes). There are indeed other methodological and accuracy problems with 
Kopel’s history on the Statute of Northampton and those are addressed throughout Part I. 
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slightly. Drafted by Thomas Jefferson and presented to the General Assembly by 
James Madison,39 Virginia began with the exceptions to the rule, but incorporated 
different operative language by stipulating that no one should bring “force and arms” 
to government officials, “nor go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in fairs or 
markets, or in other places, in terror of the Country . . . .”40 
When the ideological, philosophical, and political origins of the American 
Revolution are considered it is not at all surprising that some state governments 
expressly recognized the Statute of Northampton.41 It was immediately following the 
publication of the Declaration of Independence that the constitutions of Maryland, 
Delaware, New Jersey, and New York each declared the common law of England 
was still in force, as well as those English statutes not repugnant to the respective 
state’s constitution or laws.42 North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia enacted similar 
laws to this effect.43 Simply put, much of the English legal system was alive and well 
in the early republic. 
Given the survival and existence of the Statute of Northampton in American law, 
even after the ratification of the Constitution, one would logically presume the 
Founding generation did not perceive the preparatory carrying of firearms for self-
defense in public places to be a constitutional right.44 This presumption is amplified 
by the fact that late eighteenth-century law dictated a duty to retreat and the need to 
prevent needless death.45 But those that subscribe to the Standard Model view of the 
Second Amendment proclaim the Statute of Northampton can only be read as 
applying to the “carrying arms in ways that caused public terror.”46 In making this 
claim, Standard Model writers have never provided sufficient evidence, at least in 
                                                           
 39  72 A Bill Forbidding and Punishing Affrays, Comm. of the Va. Assembl. (June 18 
1779), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0072.  
 40  A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF PUBLIC 
AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (Augustine Davis, 1794) (emphasis added). 
 41  The American Revolution was a largely a dispute over English rights, privileges, and 
liberty. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1956). 
 42  CHARLES, supra note 36, at 73-74. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Of course, the Founding generation understood self-defense to be a natural right. This 
is not to say, however, they viewed the preparatory carrying of dangerous weapons in public 
places a constitutional right—that is the legislature could not regulate the carriage of 
dangerous weapons in the public concourse to prevent affrays and injuries. 
 45  See Patrick J. Charles, The Statute of Northampton by the Late Eighteenth Century: 
Clarifying the Intellectual Legacy, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 10, 25-26 (2013); see 
also RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY AND SOCIETY 3-5 (1991); Garrett Epps, Any Which Way But Loose: Interpretive 
Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat 
Rule,” 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 303, 307-08 (1992).  
 46  See, e.g., David T. Hardy, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago: The Present as Interface of the Past and Future, 3 NE. L.J. 199, 205 (2011); David B. 
Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, State Standards of Review for the Right to the Keep and Bear 
Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1127, 1133-34 (2010); Eugene Volokh, The First and 
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009). 
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total historical context, to support it. It is due to this faux-historical characterization 
that Standard Model writers have concluded that by the late eighteenth century there 
were no laws regulating “peaceful carrying [of firearms] for self-defense or 
otherwise.”47 
However, historical claims such as this contradict the evidentiary record.48 To 
begin, it should be noted that prohibitions on going armed in the public concourse 
actually predated the Statute of Northampton and developed out of the common law 
in the mid-thirteenth century.49 In the years that immediately followed, a number of 
royal proclamations were issued to enforce this rule of law.50 In 1320, one 
proclamation was issued in the town of Oxford following armed assaults on the 
university’s clerks, scholars, and masters. The chancellor requested the “King’s 
peace” be enforced and the “bearing of arms should be completely forbidden, by the 
laity as well as clerks, and that the chancellor, in default of the mayor, may punish 
them on all occasions which are necessary.”51 The king’s council replied and 
instructed the Mayor to “forbid any layman except town officials to wear arms in the 
town.”52 On April 28, 1326, another proclamation was issued by Edward II 
“prohibiting any one going armed without his licence, except the keepers of his 
peace, sheriffs and other ministers, willing that any one doing the contrary should be 
taken by the sheriff or bailiffs or the keeps of his peace and delivered to the nearest 
galos . . . .”53 
                                                           
 47  Amicus Brief of Academics for the Second Amendment in Support of Petitioners at 16-
17, Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-845); see also 
Brief of Amici Curiae Historians, Legal Scholars, and CRPA Foundation In Support of 
Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 4, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 808 F.3d 81 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 15-7057); Nelson Lund, No Conservative Consensus Yet: Douglas 
Ginsburg, Brett Kavanaugh, and Diane Sykes on the Second Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 30, 30 
(2012). 
 48  The laws touching upon the discharging of firearms alone shows the emphasis the 
Founding generation placed on preventing injury and ensuring the public safety. See Patrick J. 
Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply 
to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW. L. REV. 1821, 1833-35 (2011). 
 49  2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 583 (1895).  
 50  Charles, supra note 38, at 11-13 and accompanying footnotes. 
 51  Petition of the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford to the 
King and King’s Council (1320) (Manuscripts Division, British Library, London, UK) (on file 
with author). The petition was translated and transcribed by the joint efforts of Tessa Webber 
and Judy Weiss, both of whom are faculty at the University of Cambridge. 
 52  Id. (emphasis added); see also COLLECTANEA: THIRD SERIES 119 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 1896). 
 53  See 4 CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS, EDWARD II, 1323-1327 559-70 (Apr. 28, 1326, 
Kenilworth) (H.C. Maxwell-Lyte ed., 1898). Edward II issued a similar proclamation a month 
earlier. See id. at 547-52 (March 6, 1326, Leicester) (ordering the sheriff of York to arrest 
“any man hereafter [that] go armed on foot or horseback, within liberties or without”); see 
also 1 CALENDAR OF THE PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, 1323-1364 
11-37 (A.H. Thomas ed., 1926) (“no man go armed by night or day, save officers and other 
good men of the City assigned by the Mayor and Aldermen in their wards to keep watch and 
preserve the peace, under penalty of forfeiture of arms and imprisonment”); id. (“The bearing 
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Edward II would end up fleeing in the midst of social and political turmoil.54 But 
two years later, Parliament codified these proclamations as part of the Statute of 
Northampton.55 The Statute was crucial in extending the King’s courts of justice and 
provided the basis of English legal reform for centuries to come.56 It purged 
corruption within local government, unified the kingdom under a body of law, and 
ensured the public peace was kept.57 In terms of the Statute’s enforcement, it was 
enforced to prevent crime, murder, and breaches of the peace.58 It prohibited both 
bringing force in affray and the carrying of dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse.59 The prohibition on being armed in the public concourse was 
particularly enforced throughout London and its suburbs.60 In 1351 for instance, 
                                                           
of arms is forbidden, except to the officers of the City assigned by the Mayor and Alderman to 
keep watch in the Wards, and to the Hainaulters of the Queen, who are accustomed to go 
armed in the manner of their country.”). 
 54  For a history discussing this, see Claire Valente, The Deposition and Abdication of 
Edward II, 113 ENG. HIST. REV. 852, 853-81 (1998). 
 55  2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
 56  Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order During the Early Years of Edward 
III, 108 ENG. HIST. REV. 842, 850 (1993). 
 57  See Bertha Haven Putnam, The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into the 
Justices of the Peace, 12 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 19, 21-48 (1929) (discussing the 
legal reforms to ensure the peace at the local level as the result of the Statute of Northampton). 
 58  Charles, supra note 38, at 12-16.  
 59  This is stipulated within the text of the Statute of Northampton itself. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 
(1328) (Eng.) (“That no Man great nor small, of what Condition soever he be, except the 
King’s Servants in his presence, and his Ministers in executing of the King’s Precepts, or of 
their Office, and such as be in their Company assisting them, and also [upon a cry made for 
Arms to keep the Peace, and the same in such places where such Acts happen,] be so hardy to 
come before the King’s Justices, or other of the King’s Ministers doing their office, with force 
and arms, nor bring no force in affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by 
day, in Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere . . . .”) (emphasis added). Here lies the main distinction between this author’s 
history and those scholars that adhere to the Standard Model. Take for instance Standard 
Model scholar David B. Kopel, who asserts that the Statute of Northampton was only intended 
to apply to “noblemen who appeared before the king or his ministers wearing armor.” Kopel, 
supra note 38, at 7. However, the Statute of Northampton’s text and accompanying record of 
enforcement contradicts such a narrow construction. See Charles, supra note 38, at 12-16 and 
accompanying footnotes.  
 60  See MEMORIALS OF LONDON AND LONDON LIFE, 272-73 (H.T. Riley ed., 1868); see also 
id. at 192 (“it is ordained and granted by the Mayor, Alderman, the Commonalty, of the City 
of London, for maintaining the peace between all manner of folks in the said city, that no 
person, denizen or stranger, other than officers of the City, and those who have to keep the 
peace, shall go armed, or shall carry arms, by night or by day, within the franchise of the said 
city, on pain of imprisonment, and of losing the arms”); id. at 172 (“no person, native or 
stranger, shall go armed in the same city, or shall carry arms by day or by night, on pain of 
imprisonment”); 1 CALENDAR OF THE PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, 
1323-1364, at 143-64 (Dec. 19, 1343). For the first legal treatise summarizing prohibitions on 
going armed in London and its suburbs, see LIBER ALBUS: THE WHITE BOOK OF THE CITY OF 
LONDON 229, 335-36, 555, 556, 558, 560, 580 (Henry Thomas Riley ed., 1861). 
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Edward III issued a proclamation reminding his subjects it was unlawful to “go 
armed” with dangerous weapons “within the City of London, or within the suburbs, 
or in any others places between the said city and the Palace of Westminster . . . 
except the officers of the King, according to the form of the Statute made at 
Northamptone.”61   
In 1396, the Statute of Northampton was reaffirmed and slightly amended by 
Richard II, with the penalty being the forfeiture of arms or a fine and possible 
imprisonment.62 After Richard II’s death the Statute was reissued in one form or 
another by subsequent monarchs to include Henry IV, Henry VI, Elizabeth I, and 
James I.63 Elizabeth I’s reign is particularly significant given the Statute’s 
prohibition extended to modern weaponry, and included firearms, pistols and 
concealable weapons.64 James I reinforced this rule of law,65 but it was Elizabeth I’s 
                                                           
 61  “Royal Proclamation as to the Wearing of Arms in the City, and at Westminster; and as 
to Playing at Games in the Palace at Westminster,” MEMORIALS OF LONDON AND LONDON 
LIFE, supra note 60, at 268-69, 273.  
 62  20 Ric. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.). In a previous article, this author wrote Richard II 
amended the Statute of Northampton by “expressly exempt[ing] government officers from 
carrying arms . . . .” See Charles, supra note 38, at 15. This statement needs correction and 
qualification. The exemption for government officials was already in the Statute of 
Northampton. 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). However, Richard II did reaffirm it, and therefore 
both the Statute of Northampton and Richard II’s statute provided an exemption for 
government officials and those assisting them in executing their duties.  
 63  Charles, supra note 38, at 16-17, 20-23. 
 64  See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: ELIZABETH, 1601-3, WITH ADDENDA 1547-
65, at 214 (June 1602) (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., 1870); see also BY THE QUENNE 
ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE CARRIAGE OF DAGS, AND FOR REFORMATION OF 
SOME OTHER GREAT DISORDERS 1 (Christopher Barker, London 1594); BY THE QUENNE 
ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE COMMON USE OF DAGGES, HANDGUNNES, 
HARQUEBUZES, CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (Christopher Barker, London 1579); 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONSTABLES OF RYE UPON THE LATE PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE 
COMMON USE OF “DAGGES, HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUTS, CALIVERS AND COATS OF DEFENCE” 
(The National Archives, East Sussex Record Office 1578-1579) (on file with author) (“Ye are 
to have a dilligent care to suche as ye shall see to carry any dagges, pistolles, harquebusies, 
calivers and suche leike in the stretes or other places within the liberties (excepte at the days 
of common musters and to the places of exercise for the shot) and if ye fynde eny to carry eny 
such peces to staie them and to cease the said peces, and them to present to Mr. Maior or one 
of the jurates of your ward.”); BY THE QUENE [ELIZABETH I], FOR AS MUCH AS CONTRARY TO 
GOOD ORDER AND EXPRESSED LAWES MADE BY PARLIAMENTE IN THE XXXIII YERE OF THE 
RAIGNE OF THE QUENES MAJESTIES MOST NOBLE FATHER OF WORTHY MEMORY KYNG HENRY 
THE EIGHT 1 (1559) (“Many men do dayly…ryde with Handgonnes & Dagges, under the 
length of three quarters of a yarde, whereupon have folowed occasions for sundrye lewde and 
evyll persons, with such unlawfull Gonnes and Dagges now in time of peace to execute greate 
and notable Robberies, and horrible murders…Her Majestie consyderying, witht he advyse of 
her Counsayle, howe beneficiall a lawe the same is, and specially at this tyme moste nedefull 
of dewe execution, and howe negligently it is of late observed: Strayghtly therefore chargeth 
and commandeth, not onely all maner her loving subjects fro[m] henceforth to have good and 
specyall regarde to the due execution of the same Statute, and of every part thereof . . . .”). 
 65  See BY THE KING JAMES I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE USE OF POCKET DAGS 1 
(Robert Barker, London 1612) (“Whereas the bearing of Weapons covertly, and specially of 
short Dagges, and Pistols . . . hath ever beene, and yet is by the Lawes and polic[y] of this 
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amendment in particular that legal commentators took notice of from the late 
sixteenth century through the eighteenth century. For instance, William Lambarde, 
arguably the most prominent lawyer of the Elizabethan period, described the Statute 
of Northampton in the following terms:   
[I]f any person whatsoever (except the Queenes servants and ministers in 
her presence, or in executing her precepts, or other offices, or such as 
shall assist them and except it be upon Hue and Crie made to keep the 
peace, and that in places where acts against the Peace do happen) shall be 
so bold, as to go, or ride armed, by night, or by day, in Faires, Markets, or 
any other places: then any Constable, or any other of the saide Officers, 
may take such Armour from him, for the Queenes use, & may also 
commit him to the Gaole. And therefore, it shall be good in this behalf, 
for the Officers to stay and arrest all such persons as they shall find to 
carry Dags or Pistols, or to be appareled with privie coates, or doublets: as 
by the proclamation [of Queen Elizabeth I] . . . .66 
Lambarde’s understanding of the Statute of Northampton proved influential. He 
was cited, reprinted, or paraphrased by a number of prominent commentators 
including Abraham Fraunce, Michael Dalton, Edward Coke, William Hawkins, and 
others.67 In the case of Michael Dalton’s The Countrey Justice, it was the first 
restatement to use the word “offensively.”68 The word aptly spoke to how the Statute 
                                                           
Realme straitly forbidden as car[r]ying with it inevitable danger in the hands of desperate 
persons . . . And some persons being questioned for bearing of such about them, have made 
their excuse, That being decayed in their estates, and indebted, and therefore fearing 
continually to be Arrested, they weare the same for their defence against such Arrests. A case 
so farre from just excuse, as it is of itselfe a grievous offence for any man to arme himselfe 
against Justice, and therefore deserves . . . sharpe and severe punishment. But besides this 
evill consequence…we have just cause to provide also against those devilish spirits, that 
maligning the quiet and happiness of this Estate, may use the same to more execrable endes. 
And therefore by this Due Proclamation, We doe straitly charge and command all Our 
subjects and other persons whatsoever, that they neither make, nor bring into this Realme, any 
Dagges, Pistols, or other like short Gunnes”); see also BY THE KING [JAMES I], A 
PROCLAMATION AGAINST STEELETS, POCKET DAGGERS, POCKET DAGGES AND PISTOLS 1 
(Robert Barker, London 1616) (“Wherefore it being always the more principall in Our 
intention to prevent, then to punish, being given to understand the use of Steelets, pocket 
Daggers, and Pocket Dags and Pistols, which are weapons utters unserviceable for defence, 
Militarie practice, or other lawfull use, but odious, and noted Instruments of murther, and 
mischief; we doe straightly will and command all persons whatsoever, that they doe not 
henceforth presume to weare or carie about them any such Steelet or pocket Dagger, pocket 
Dagge or Pistoll . . . .”). 
 66  WILLIAM LAMBARDE, THE DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, TYTHINGMEN, AND 
SUCH OTHER LOW AND LAY MINISTERS OF THE PEACE 13-14 (1602). For Lambarde’s earlier 
restatement, see WILLIAM LAMBARDE, EIRENARCHA: OR THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE 
PEACE, IN TWO BOOKES 134-35 (1582). For more on William Lambarde, see Wilfrid Prest, 
William Lambarde, Elizabethan Law Reform, and Early Stuart Politics, 34 J. BRITISH STUD. 
464 (1995). 
 67  Charles, supra note 45, at 11-17. 
 68  MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICES OF THE 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 30 (1618). For the influence of Dalton’s 
writings, see THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, SHAPING THE COMMON LAW 136-51 (2008).  
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of Northampton encompassed both bringing force in affray and carrying dangerous 
weapons in the public concourse, to include pistols and firearms.69 As Dalton put it: 
[The peace may be enforced to] All such as shall go or ryde armed 
(offensively) in Fayres, Markets, or elsewhere; or shall weare or carry any 
Dagges or Pistolls charged: it seemeth any Constable seeing this, may 
arrest them and may carrie them before the Justice of the Peace. And the 
Justice may binde them to the peace, yeah though those persons were so 
armed or weaponed for their defence; for they might have had the peace 
against the other persons: and besides, it striketh a feare and terror into the 
Kings subjects.70 
What Dalton and Lambarde’s restatements illuminate is that the act of carrying 
dangerous weapons was sufficient to amount an affray, “strike a feare”71 or “striketh 
a feare.”72 As Ferdinando Pulton, the prominent Elizabethan legal editor put it, the 
Statute of Northampton intended “that he which in a peaceable time doth ride or goe 
armed, without sufficient warrant or authoritie so to doe, doth meane to breake the 
peace, and to doe some outrage” because the law will “always [be] ready to defend 
every member of the common weal[th], from taking or receiving of force or violence 
from others . . . .”73 In other words, the Statute of Northampton served “not onely to 
preserve peace, & to eschew quarrels, but also to take away the instruments of 
fighting and batterie, and to cut off all meanes that may tend in affray or feare of the 
people.”74 
                                                           
 69  In the 1619 edition of Dalton’s treatise the word “Gunns” was added to the list of 
dangerous weapons as to read “Gunns, Daggs, or Pistols.”  MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY 
JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICES OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 
31 (1619). Dalton’s treatise Officium Vicecomitum does not mention firearms in its Statute of 
Northampton restatement. See MICHAEL DALTON, OFFICIUM VICECOMITUM: THE OFFICE AND 
AUTHORITIE OF SHERIFS 14 (1623) (“Also everie sherife . . . may and ought to arrest all such 
persons as goe or ride armed offensively, either in the presence of the sherife, or in Faires or 
Markets or elsewhere in affray of the Kings people, and may commit them to prison to 
remaine at the king’s pleasure…and also the Sherife may seize and take away their armour to 
the Kinds use, and prize the same by the oaths of some present . . . . And yet themselves (fcz. 
The Sherife and his officers) may lawfully beare armour and weapons.”). However, Dalton 
did cite to his treatise The Countrey Justice where firearms are listed as prohibited. Id.  
 70  DALTON, supra note 68, at 129. David Kopel oddly criticizes this author for not citing 
Dalton. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 10 n.49. In doing so, it seems Kopel failed to read this 
author’s other writings on the Statute of Northampton where Dalton is cited extensively. See 
Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the Supreme 
Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1727, 1803, 1835-37 (2012); Charles, supra note 45, at 14-16, 18-19. Additionally, it 
is worth noting that Dalton’s restatement on the Statute actually undercuts Kopel’s historical 
assessment. See DALTON, supra note 68, at 30, 129 (showing that the Statute applied to 
firearms and the act of carrying by itself “striketh a feare”).  
 71  LAMBARDE, supra note 66, at 134-35. 
 72  DALTON, supra note 68, at 129. 
 73  FERDINANDO PULTON, DE PACE REGIS ET REGNI VIZ 4 (1609).  
 74  Id. For more on Ferdinando Pulton’s background, see Virgil B. Heltzel & Ferdinando 
Pulton, Ferdinando Pulton, Elizabethan Legal Editor, 11 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 77 (1947).  
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Although Dalton and Lambarde would go on to influence a number of 
subsequent restatements, citations to their work are noticeably absent from Sir 
Edward Coke’s The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England discussion 
“Against going or riding armed.”75 Coke merely restated the Statute of 
Northampton’s text.76 He did not employ the word “offensively,” nor did he list 
firearms as being prohibited in the public concourse. Instead, Coke differentiated 
between “force and armed,” bringing “force in affray of the people,” and the act of 
going and riding armed.77 Still, there is nothing to suggest that Coke maintained a 
different view from Lambarde and Dalton given Coke correctly distinguished 
between the misdemeanor Statute of Northampton and the 1351 Treason Act,78 
which maintained a mens rea element and was to be “adjudged . . . according to the 
laws of the realme of old time used, and according, as the case requires.”79 
Moreover, Coke understood and applied the general exceptions to the rule—
government officials, military duty, and the hue and cry.80 He even proceeded to list 
the castle doctrine as an exception twice, but emphasized that preparatory armed 
carriage did not qualify: “But he cannot assemble force, though he be extreamly 
threatened, to goe with him to Church, or market, or any other place, but that is 
prohibited by this Act.”81 
                                                           
 75  EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160 
(1644). 
 76  Id.  
 77  Id. 
 78  Compare 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), with 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) 
(“And if percase any Man of this Realm ride armed [covertly] or secretly with Men of Arms 
against any other, to slay him, or rob him, or to take him, or retain him till he hath made Fine 
or Ransom for to have his Deliverance . . . shall be judged Felony or Trespass, according to 
the Laws of the Land of the old Time used, and according gas the Case requireth.”). 
 79  COKE, supra note 75, at 160. 
 80  Id. at 161. 
 81  Id. at 161-62. Coke even provided a 1350 case where Sir Thomas Figet wore armor in 
Westminster to “safeguard” his life, yet was prosecuted under the Statute of Northampton. Id. 
at 162. At no point did Coke characterize Figet as having worn the armor recklessly, 
unusually, with the intent to terrify or otherwise. Instead Figet forfeited the armor due to the 
act of wearing it concealed and was imprisoned. Id. As John Rushworth summarized the case 
in 1659: “Sir Thomas Figet went armed in the Palace, which was shewed to the Kings 
Councell; wherefore he was taken and disarmed before the chief Justice, shard and committed 
to the prison, and he could not be bayled till the King sent his pleasure; and yet it was shewed, 
that the Lord of T. threatened him.” JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF PRIVATE 
PASSAGES OF STATE WEIGHTY MATTERS IN LAW, Appendix 26 (1659); see also PULTON, supra 
note 73, at 4 (“And shortly after, the [Statute of Northampton] was put in execution; so a 
knight was attached and arraigned in the Kings Bench, for that hee did weare armor under his 
upper garment in the kings palace, and in Westminster hall; who pleaded that there was debate 
between him and another knight, who did that weeke strike him, and yet did menace him, and 
that for feare of further peril, and to save his life hee did weare the same armour; But this was 
adjudged no plea, for the court did award, that hee should forfeit his armour, and be 
committed to the marshalsey.”). Of note in the Figet case was a procedural error. It seems that 
Figet was fined and imprisoned before ever being arraigned, indicted, and convicted. See 
JOSEPH KEBLE, AN EXPLANATION OF THE LAWS AGAINST RECUSANTS, &C. ABRIDGED 91 
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(1681); see also WILLIAM CAWLEY, THE LAWS OF Q. ELIZABETH, K. JAMES, AND K. CHARLES 
THE FIRST CONCERNING JESUITES, SEMINARY PRIESTS, RECUSANTS, &C. 97-98 (1680).  
  David B. Kopel arrives at a much different understanding of Figet’s case. Relying on a 
sixteenth-century English treatise written in French, titled Office et Aucthoritie de Justices de 
Peace, Kopel infers that the case was understood as making concealed carry permissible 
because it did not terrify the people. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 11 n.50. Until 1538, the 
treatise was compiled, written, and updated by Anthony Fitzherbert. However, beginning in 
1583, Richard Crompton became the editor. In the 1584 edition, Crompton published the 
following summary of Figet’s case: 
Tho. Figet Chivaler ale armed south les drapes al Welt. sur que fuit attache, et il dit 
que un Sir J. Trevet luy manace, et pur sa vie saver il estoit arme, et non obstant ses 
armes fueront forf. per agarde, et fuit prise, et il fuit commaunde al Marshal, et cestuy 
que luy manace vient, et fuit commaund sur quant que il poit forfait, que il ne ferra 
male al dit Sir Thomas, 24. C.3.fo.33. per hoc il appert, que home ne alera armed 
overtment, comment que soit pur son defence: Mes il semble que home poit aller 
armed oue privie coate de plate south son coate, ou &c. car ces ne poit encuter ascun 
feare al people, Quere tamen. 
ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, L’OFFICE ET AUCTHORITIE DE JUSTICES DE PEACE 58 (Richard 
Crompton ed., 1584). Curious of Kopel’s historical find and claim, this author reached out to 
historian Elisa Jones for a full translation. Here is what she provided: 
Thomas Figet Chivaler went clad in armor under his welted garment, whence coming 
unclasped, and he said that one Sir J. Trevet threatens him, and in order to save his life 
he was armored, and not withstanding that his armor will be forfeited per observation, 
and avoids arrest, and he avoids being committed to the charge of the Marshal, and 
this man that threatened him approaches, and avoids arrest in regard to inciting crime, 
as he will not hurt the aforementioned Sir Thomas, 24. C.3.fo.33. per hoc [through 
this] it seems, that a man will not go in armor publicly, even if it is for his defense: 
But it appears that a man is able to go armored in the private coat of plate under his 
coat, or etc. because this is not able to incite any fear in the people, Quere tamen. 
Elisa Jones to Patrick J. Charles, Translation of L’Office & Aucthority de Justices de Peace, 
December 7, 2015 (on file with author). The translation is significant for a number of reasons. 
First, Crompton’s restatement of Figet’s case contradicts that of Coke, Rushworth, and Keble, 
and therefore seems to have been written in error. This error is amplified by the fact that the 
law regulated the carriage and use of concealable weapons, both before and after the 
publication of Crompton’s 1584 edition. See supra notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text. 
Second, despite Crompton concluding that wearing armor concealed did not violate the Statute 
of Northampton, no subsequent legal commentator arrived at a similar conclusion. Third, in 
the early sixteenth-century English translations of Fitzherbert’s treatise, the Statute of 
Northampton was restated in broad terms, with no concealable exception. See ANTHONY 
FITZHERBERT, THE NEWE BOKE OF JUSTICES OF PEAS, MADE BY ANTHONY FITZHERBARD JUDGE, 
LATELY TRANSLATED OUT OF FRENCHE INTO ENGLYSHE 47 (1538) (“The Shyreffe may arrest 
men rydyng or goyng armyd, and comitte them to pryson, there to remayne at the kynges 
pleasure.”); see also ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, THE NEWE BOKE OF JUSTYCES OF PEAS, BY 
A.F.K. LATELY TRANSLATED OUT OF FRENCHE INTO ENGLYSHE 64 (1541) (“None shal go nor 
ryd armid by day nor by nyght, and payne to lea[ve] their armour to the king”); id. at 346 
(“Constables in the towne where they beare office, may arrest me[n] that go or ryde armed in 
rayres, or markettes by daye or by nyght, and take their armour as forfayt to the kyng, and 
empryson them at the kynges pleasure.”); ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, IN THIS BOKE IS 
CONTEYNED THE OFFYCES OF SHYREFFES, BAILLYFFES, OF LIBERTYES, ESCHETOURS, 
COSTABLES AND CORONERS 2 (1543) (“The shyreffe may arreste men rydying or goyng armyd, 
and comytte them to pryson, there to rmayne at the kynges pleasure”); id. at 97 (“Constables 
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Coke was not the only seventeenth-century legal commentator to make the 
important legal distinction between armed self-defense in public and private. Joseph 
Keble, an English barrister and law reporter, expressed a similar understanding:  
[I]f a Man, hearing that another will fetch him out of his House and beat 
him, do assemble company with force, it will be no unlawfull Assembly, 
for his House is his hold and Castle. . . . But if he be only threatened that 
he shall be beaten, if he go to the Market, then may he not assemble 
Company for his aid [i.e. raise the hue and cry], because he needeth not to 
go thither, and he may provide for himself by Surety of the Peace [i.e. an 
appeal to sheriff, constable, or justice of the peace for protection] . . . .82 
As it pertained to the law and armed carriage, Keble borrowed primarily from 
Lambarde and his first restatement of the Statute of Northampton was as follows: 
Yet may an Affray be, without word or blow given; as if a man shall 
shew himself furnished with Armour or Weapon which is not usually 
worn, it will strike a fear upon other that be not armed as he is; and 
therefore both the Statutes of Northampton (2 Ed. 3. 3.) made against 
wearing Armour, do speak of it, by the words, Affray del pais & in 
terrorem pouli, surety.83   
Keble’s reference to arms “not usually worn” did not mean that individuals 
maintained a right to go armed with “common weapons” as some Standard Model 
writers have concluded.84 Instead, the phrase “not usually worn” conveys that there 
were instances where a person was permitted to carry arms in public, the most 
common being when “the Sheriff, or any of his Officers, for the better Executing of 
their Office . . . carry with them Hand-guns, Daggers, or other Weapons, invasive or 
defensive,” notwithstanding such prohibitions.85 There were indeed other 
                                                           
in the townes where they beare office may arreste me[n] that goo or ryde armed in fayres, or 
markettes by daye or by nyght, and take theyr armour as forfayt to the kyng and imprison 
them at the kiges pleasure.”); ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, IN THIS BOKE IS CONTEYNED THE 
OFFYCE OF SHYREFFES, BAILLIFFES OF LIBERTIES, ESCHETOURS, COSTABLES AND CORONERS 2 
(1545) (“The Shyreffe may arrestte men rydynge or goying armyed, and comyte them to 
pryson, there to remayne at the kynges pleasure.”); id. at 99 (“Constables in the townes where 
they beare office, may arreste me[n] that go or ryde armed in fayres, or markets by daye or by 
nyght, and take theyre armour as forfayte to the kyng and imprison them at the kings 
pleasure.”). The overall point to be made is Crompton’s interpretation of Figet’s case is 
historically unsubstantiated. Thus, the same is true of Kopel’s account of the law of armed 
carriage by the late sixteenth century. 
 82  JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE EASIER 
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 646 (2d ed., 1689). For the rule of law concerning a surety of 
the peace, see id. at 410 (Justices “will not grant any Writ for Surety of the Peace, without 
making an Oath that he is in fear of bodily harm. Nor the Justices of the Peace ought not to 
Grant any Warrant to cause a man to find Surety of the Peace, at the request of any Person, 
unless the Party who requireth it, will make an Oath, that he requireth it for safety of his Body, 
and not for malice.”).  
 83  KEBLE, supra note 82, at 147. 
 84  See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 46, at 101.  
 85  KEBLE, supra note 82, at 711. 
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exceptions—militia service, the hue and cry, and watchman duty—but all were 
regulated by statute and at the license of government. To read Keble’s treatise 
otherwise would make his reference to striking “a fear upon other that be not armed 
as he is” superfluous.86 It also conflicts with the second portion of Keble’s treatise 
describing the Statute of Northampton and the rule of law pertaining to armed 
carriage: 
Again, if any person whatsoever (except the Kings Servants and 
Ministers in his presence, or in executing his Precepts or other Officers, or 
such as shall assist them, and except it be upon the Hue-and-cry make to 
keep the peace, &c.) shall be so bold as to go or ride Armed, by night or 
by day, in Fairs, Markets, or any other places . . . then any Constable, or 
any of the said Officers may take such Armour from him for the Kings 
use, and may also commit him to the Goal; and therefore it shall be good 
in this behalf for these Offices to stay and Arrest all such persons as they 
shall find to carry Dags or Pistols, or to be appareled with Privy-Coats or 
Doublets . . . .87 
The English commentators that followed each restated the Statute of 
Northampton in different terms, but cited to or paraphrased from Lambarde’s, 
Dalton’s, and Coke’s treatises. For instance, William Sheppard included the 
prohibition on firearms, but omitted the word offensively.88 George Meriton and 
Robert Gardiner included the word offensively and referenced the prohibition on 
firearms.89 Meanwhile, John Layer omitted any reference to firearms, yet included 
                                                           
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 224. 
 88  See WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES AND DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, 
TYTHING-MEN, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY-STOCK, OVERSEERS FOR THE POORE, AND OTHER 
LAY-MINISTERS 39-40 (1641).  
 89  ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18-19 (1692); GEORGE MERITON, A 
GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR, SURVEYORS OF THE 
HIGHWAYS, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY STOCK, MASTERS OF THE HOUSE OF CORRECTION, 
BAYLIFFS OF MANNOURS, TOLLTAKERS IN FAIRS, & C. 22-23 (1669). David B. Kopel oddly 
criticizes this author for citing to George Meriton and Robert Gardiner’s restatements on the 
Statute of Northampton. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 12 n.54. What Meriton and Gardiner’s 
restatements confirm is that the Statute of Northampton prohibited the carrying of firearms in 
the public concourse without the license of government. To be clear, Meriton and Gardiner’s 
restatements coincide with other legal commentators such as William Lambarde and Michael 
Dalton. See DALTON, supra note 68, at 129; LAMBARDE, supra note 66, at 134-35. Kopel then 
inaccurately claims that the 1708 edition of Gardiner’s treatise did not require constables to 
disarm those that went armed with dangerous weapons in the public concourse. See Kopel, 
supra note 38, at 12 n.54. Yet Gardiner’s treatise clearly states that constables shall arrest 
“any Person [that] shall Ride or go Arm’d offensively . . . or wear or carry any Daggers, Guns 
or Pistols Charged . . . .” ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLEAT CONSTABLE 18 (1708). It seems 
Kopel made this mistake by conflating the 1662 Militia Act with the Statute of Northampton. 
The former afforded government officials the power to disarm dangerous persons and 
Catholics. Id. at 68; 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.3 (1662) (Eng.); Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their 
Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and 
Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 
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the word offensively.90 But even in Layer’s case it is important to note that he listed 
the legal exceptions—government officials, military muster, and the assembling of 
the hue and cry.91   
By the turn of the eighteenth century some commentators began substituting 
offensive weapons in lieu of offensively. The phrase, as understood in the eighteenth 
century, encompassed dangerous weapons such as pistols, firearms, hangers, 
cutlasses, and bludgeons.92 For instance, in the 1707 treatise A Compleat Guide for 
Justices of Peace, John Bond wrote the Statute of Northampton stands for the legal 
proposition that “Persons with offensive Weapons in Fairs, Markets or elsewhere in 
Affray of the King’s People, may be arrested by the Sheriff, or other the King’s 
Officers[.]”93 Bond made sure to clarify that the prohibition applied to persons “that 
carry Guns charged.”94 William Forbes also streamlined the legal principle, writing, 
“[b]y the English law, a Justice of Peace . . . may cause [to] Arrest Persons with 
offensive Weapons in Fairs, Markets, or elsewhere in Affray, and seize their Armour 
. . . .”95 
What makes these restatements so important is they would go on to influence 
writers like Hawkins, Blackstone, and American commentators. For instance, North 
Carolina jurist James Davis cited to Dalton and wrote in The Office and Authority of 
a Justice of the Peace the following: “Justices of the Peace . . . may apprehend any 
Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual and offensive Weapons, in an 
Affray, or among any great Concourse of the People . . . .”96 John Haywood 
borrowed from Blackstone’s Commentaries, writing “riding or going armed with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the 
good people of the land, and is prohibited by statute upon the pain of forfeiture of the 
                                                           
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 364-68, 376-78 (2009) (showing the 1662 Militia Act was enforced to 
disarm “dangerous” people and “papists”).  
 90  JOHN LAYER, THE OFFICE AND DUTIE OF CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS, AND OTHER 
THE OVERSEERS OF THE POORE 15-16 (1641). 
 91  Id. at 16. David B. Kopel asserts this author’s findings on the Statute of Northampton 
are inaccurate on the grounds that “watchmen” would have been armed during the night. See 
Kopel, supra note 38, at 10-11 n.49. Here, Kopel improperly conflates compulsory arms 
bearing—which were at the license of government—with a right to go armed in public. 
Compulsory arms bearing, to include watchman duty, was regulated by law. See Statute of 
Winchester, 13 Edw. I, St. 2 (1285) (Eng.); DALTON, supra note 68, at 140-41; Henry 
Summerson, The Enforcement of the Statute of Winchester, 1285-1327, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 232 
(1992).  
 92  See Charles, supra note 38, at 34 n.181; see also 2 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 14 (16th ed. 1788) (classifying “fire arms” as “offensive 
weapons”); 2 LORD HENRY HOME KAMES, SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY OF MAN 89 (1774) 
(distinguishing between “offensive weapons” of war and “defensive weapons”).  
 93  JAMES BOND, A COMPLEAT GUIDE FOR JUSTICES OF PEACE 42 (3d ed., London 1707); id. 
at 181 (“[a] person going or riding with offensive Arms may be arrested by a Constable, and 
by him be brought before a Justice”).  
 94  Id. at 43. 
 95  William Forbes, The Duty and Powers of Justices of Peace, in THIS PART OF GREAT-
BRITAIN CALLED SCOTLAND 26 (1707). 
 96  DAVIS, supra note 38, at 13. 
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arms . . . .”97 Meanwhile, James Wilson, in his lectures on the law, copied directly 
from Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, writing, “[i]n some cases, there may be affray, 
where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and 
unusual weapons, in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a terror among the 
people.”98   
Looking at this historical evidence in its entirety one can deduce three 
conclusions. First, regulations pertaining to going armed in the public concourse 
were deeply embedded in Anglo-American law for over 500 years. Second, such 
regulations applied to dangerous weapons and could include firearms. A 1686 New 
Jersey statute, entitled An Act Against Wearing Swords, &c., is one of many 
evidentiary sources that supports this proposition. The statute prohibited “Persons 
[from] wearing Swords, Daggers, Pistols, Dirks, Stilladoes, Skeines, or any other 
unusual and unlawful Weapons” in public because it would induce “great Fear and 
Quarrels” among the inhabitants.99 Third, both the Statute of Northampton and the 
common law dictated a person would be immune from prosecution if they were 
carrying dangerous weapons with the license of government. This included 
compulsory armed carriage for militia service, watchmen, security patrols, and the 
hue and cry.  
In contrast to these findings, those that subscribe to the Standard Model insist on 
a different reading of the Statute of Northampton and the common law touching 
upon armed carriage. They assert that the Statute only prohibited armed carriage 
with the “specific intent” of terrorizing the public.100 This interpretation was first 
surmised by David I. Caplan in a study paid for by the Indiana Sportsmen’s 
                                                           
 97  JOHN HAYWOOD, THE DUTY AND OFFICE OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, AND OF SHERIFFS, 
CORONERS, CONSTABLES, &C. 10 (1800).  
 98  2 JAMES WILSON, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1138 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark 
David Hall eds., 2007). 
 99  THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-
JERSEY 289 (1758). Ultimately, what the New Jersey statute confirms is that colonial 
legislatures regulated armed carriage in public. Nevertheless, David B. Kopel asserts this 
author misreads the New Jersey statute and it could not have applied to “larger handguns.” 
Kopel, supra note 38, at 13-14 n.59. The New Jersey statute curiously does not list such an 
exception, but certainly it would not have prevented colonists from traveling the frontier with 
arms, hunting, compulsory arms bearing or taking weapons into town for repair. See THE 
GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY, 
supra note 99, at 289-90 (“Whereas there hath been great complaint by the Inhabitants of this 
Province, that several Persons wearing Swords, Daggers, Pistols, Dirks, Stilladoes, Skeines, or 
any other unusual or unlawful Weapons, by reason of which several Persons in this Province, 
receive great abuses, and put in great Fear and Quarrels, and Challenges made, to the great 
abuse of the Inhabitants of this Province . . . BE IT FURTHER ENACTED by the Authority 
aforesaid, that no Person or Persons after Publication hereof, shall presume privately to war 
any Pocket Pistol, Skeines, Stilladers, Daggers or Dirks, or other unusual or unlawful 
Weapons within this Province . . . BE IT FURTHER ENACTED by the Authority aforesaid, 
that no Planter shall Ride or go Armed with Sword, Pistol, or Dagger, excepting all Officers, 
Civil and Military, and Soldiers while in actual Service, as also all Strangers, Travelling upon 
their lawful Occasions thro’ this Province, behaving themselves peaceably.”).  
 100  See supra note 46.  
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Council.101 Relying primarily on the incomplete case summaries of Rex v. Knight in 
the English Reports,102 Caplan asserted that although the Statute of Northampton 
originally “banned all carrying of arms by private persons,” by the late seventeenth 
century the Statute was given a “narrow reading” requiring specific intent.103 A year 
later, Caplan’s findings were consolidated, reorganized, and published in the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal.104 Caplan’s findings were then redistributed to the 
pro-gun masses through publications like the NRA’s American Rifleman.105 While 
Caplan must be credited for being the first to advance a rather limited construction of 
the law and armed carriage, it was not until historian Joyce Lee Malcolm published 
her findings106 that the “narrow reading” took firm hold in Standard Model circles.107  
                                                           
 101  DAVID I. CAPLAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BASIC UNDERPINNING IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES (1975) (on file with author). 
 102  Until the mid-eighteenth century, the English Reports were mostly incomplete and 
deemed unreliable for reconstructing cases or judicial precedent. They were neither intended 
to be nor viewed as comprehensive case studies. Rather, they served to instruct practitioners 
and students on the intricacies of pleading. See NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY 
OF PRECEDENT 52-56 (2008). For more on law reporting in England up through the 
seventeenth century, see L.W. ABBOTT, LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND 1485-1585 (1973); LAW 
REPORTING IN BRITAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 
(Chantal Stebbings ed., 1995). 
 103  CAPLAN, supra note 101, at 2. 
 104  David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 31 (1976). 
 105  See David I. Caplan, A Noted Legal Scholar Explains How . . . Gun Control 
Jeopardizes All Our Constitutional Rights, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1979, at 30; see also The 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms: An Analysis of the Second Amendment, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 
1977, at 16. 
 106  See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT 104 (1994) [hereinafter MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS]; JOYCE LEE 
MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN RESTORATION ENGLAND 7 
(1981) [hereinafter MALCOLM, DISARMED]; Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Creation of a “True 
Antient and Indubitable” Right: The English Bill of Rights and the Right to Be Armed, 32 J. 
BRIT. STUD. 226, 242 (1993); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear 
Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 293 (1983) [hereinafter 
Malcolm, The Right of the People]. In 1981, the NRA Institute for Legislative Action 
distributed a pamphlet on the history and meaning of the Second Amendment. In the 
pamphlet, the Statute of Northampton was discussed and, given the publication date, it is 
likely both David I. Caplan and Joyce Lee Malcom influenced its analysis on the English 
statute. See NRA INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 4 (1981) (“According to English Courts, Edward’s 
decree applied only when the individual bore his arms in such a way as to terrify the populace. 
The Statute presumed that the people have arms and that the occasion for their use may come 
at any time.”). 
 107  See David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: 
Support from Five State Supreme Courts, 68 ALB. L. REV. 305, 317 (2005) (relying on 
Malcolm’s research for contemporary legal analysis on the Statute of Northampton); David B. 
Kopel, It Isn’t About Duck Hunting: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 1333, 1347 (1995) (same); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist 
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There is a problem, however, with taking the Standard Model interpretation 
seriously—there is no historical evidence, at least in the historical context, to support 
it. Ultimately, the Standard Model interpretation relies on a rather strained reading of 
Rex v. Knight, where in 1686 Sir John Knight was acquitted of violating the Statute 
of Northampton.108 According to the Standard Model interpretation, James II 
prosecuted Knight under the Statute as part of a larger plan to disarm political 
dissidents, but the King’s Bench rejected interpreting the Statute in line with its text 
because it would “disarm law-abiding citizens.”109   
First, it must be noted that a close examination of the evidence provides no 
support for the claim that James II intended to use the Statute of Northampton as a 
vehicle to disarm all of England. There is not one historical document, letter, 
pamphlet, or secondary account that supports it. It is a finding that seems to have 
been created out of thin air.110 At best the finding is a historical guess. But what 
makes the Standard Model claim even worse is the history of Sir John Knight’s case 
cannot be remotely read to support a limiting construction of the Statute of 
Northampton. Further, no subsequent English or American legal commentator 
interpreted the case as narrowly as one Standard Model scholar has contended.111 
The King’s Bench held the intent of the Statute of Northampton was “to punish 
people who go armed to terrify the King’s subjects,” affirming the act of “going 
armed” was a “great offence at the common law, as if the King were not able or 
willing to protect his subjects; and therefore this Act is but an affirmance of that law 
. . . .”112 This legal definition takes nothing away from the prosecutorial scope of the 
Statute. If anything, it supports the proposition of the legal commentators stated 
earlier—going armed with dangerous weapons in the public concourse, without the 
license of the government, terrified the people.113   
More importantly, the King’s Bench stipulated that it could not inflict any other 
punishment than what the Statute directed. In Sir John Knight’s case, he committed 
the act of going armed in public with the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol in order to 
                                                           
Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1363-64 (2009) (same); Kevin C. Marshall, Why Can’t 
Martha Steward Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 716-17 (2009) (same). 
 108  90 Eng. Rep. 330 (1686).  
 109  MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 106, at 104-5. 
 110  The same holds true for other Standard Model claims pertaining to James II, 
disarmament and the 1689 Declaration of Rights. See Charles, supra note 70, at 1819-22. 
 111  David B. Kopel, in particular, attempts to connect the Standard Model’s limited 
construction of Sir John Knight’s case with prominent eighteenth-century legal commentators 
such as William Blackstone and William Hawkins. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 12-14. But 
neither Blackstone nor Hawkins referenced or cited Sir John Knight’s case, nor did they 
conclude there was a right to peacefully carry dangerous weapons in public. See 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 148-49 (1769); 1 WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136, ch. 63, §§ 1-10 (1716). 
 112  Sir John Knight’s Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (1686) (emphasis added). 
 113  See LAMBARDE, supra note 66, at 134-35; see also DALTON, supra note 68, at 129; 
JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE 
OF THEIR DUTY 146-47, 646, 749 (London, W. Rawlins, S. Roycroft, & H. Sawbridge 1689). 
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break up a Catholic conventicle at mass.114 Thus, under the terms of the Statute of 
Northampton, Knight would have qualified under the Statute’s government license 
clause and would have been exempted from punishment.115 This adequately explains 
why the jury acquitted Knight, and nothing further could be done.116   
At the trial itself the political nature of Knight’s prosecution was well known.117 
Although the Mayor and Aldermen accompanied Knight to the church armed and 
arrayed, the Attorney General acquitted them all. Knight was still prosecuted.118 In 
order to legally distinguish Knight from the Mayor and Aldermen, the Attorney 
General prosecuted Knight under the legal theory that he was disaffected to 
government, and therefore could not be exempt by law. As evidence, the Attorney 
General offered evidence that Knight had refused a “Commission to be a Captain in 
the time of Monmouth’s Rebellion,” and thus was outside the protective scope of 
governmental immunity.119 Knight countered with “very good proofe” that he only 
                                                           
 114  The evidentiary record affirms that the incident in question involved the participation 
of government officials. See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: JAMES II, 1686-7, at 118 
(May 1, 1686) (“The King, being informed that the Mayor and some other magistrates of 
Bristol lately seized upon a priest, who was going to officiate privately in a house there . . . 
and having received an account that Sir John night was not only the informer but a busy actor 
in the matter by going himself to search.”) (emphasis added); id. (June 7, 1686) (Sir John 
Knight to Earl of Sunderland) (“But in regard the Duke of Beaufort’s letter to the Mayor of 
Bristoll has helped me to one most considerable objection, not only against myself but against 
the Mayor and Aldermen, as if they acted by my influence, I think it not amiss to make a 
defence whilst with little trouble it may be cleared.”). Knight was originally arrested for 
“several seditious practices.” Id. (May 22, 1686). 
 115  See 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.) (exempting anyone “assisting” government officials in 
executing their duties); accord 20 Ric. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.). 
 116  Joyce Lee Malcolm contends the King’s Bench was unwilling to apply the statute. 
MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 106, at 105. This interpretation is 
unsupported. The King’s Bench clearly acknowledged the legality of the statute, but could not 
inflict any more punishment after the jury acquitted.  
 117  It is a historical point of emphasis that Sir John Knight, the Mayor, and Aldermen 
broke up a Catholic meeting of worship. See supra note 114. James II, a Catholic himself and 
supporter of religious liberty, was not pleased by this action. The fact of the matter is—
throughout 1686—James II witnessed an increase in Protestant prosecution of Catholics 
exercising their religion. James II did everything in his power to suppress such intolerance, 
and hoped to steer the nation in the direction of religious freedom. For more on this topic, see 
TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1685-1720, Chapter 
V (2006); J.P. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 377-78 
(2d ed., 1986); JOHN MILLER, JAMES II: A STUDY IN KINGSHIP 155-57 (1978). 
 118  Knight, the Mayor, and Aldermen were all called to the Hampton Court to answer for 
their actions. See 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE 1677-1691; see also THE REIGN OF 
JAMES II, 1685-1687 134 (Tim Harris ed., 2007). On June 12, 1686, the Mayor and Aldermen 
requested forgiveness for “any faults,” pled “ignorante of the Lawes in that Case,” and were 
“discharged, so that [the charges] will fall upon Sir John Knight[.]” Id. at 136. It is also worth 
noting that those in Bristol deemed the actions of Knight, the Mayor, and Aldermen favorable. 
Id. at 113 (stating Sir John Knight did “disturbe and imprison a Popish Conventicle that was at 
Mass, but they were suddenly after set at liberty, this is very wonderful they were disturbed 
once.”). 
 119  THE REIGN OF JAMES II, supra note 118, at 307.  
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refused the commission because of the distances involved.120 If anything, Knight felt 
his refusal of the King’s commission did more of a service in that he offered prudent 
advice to the crown’s ministers.121   
The indictment itself even accused Knight of being a “very disloyall and 
Seditious and ill affected man . . . [that] had caused Musketts or Armes to be carried 
before him in the Streets, and into the Churck to publick service to the terror of his 
Majesties Leige people.”122 While Knight admitted that he was armed the day he 
went to the church, Knight refused to concede that he was disaffected.123 Knight 
never rested his innocence or legal defense on preparatory armed self-defense or a 
legal right to carry arms in public.124 Knight even testified before the court that he 
generally did not enter Bristol armed.125 Knight stated that whenever he “had 
occasion to come to the Town [he] rode with a Sword and a Gun, [but] left them at 
the end of Town when he came in, and took them thence when he went out . . . .”126 
                                                           
 120  Id. at 307-08. 
 121  Id. at 308. 
 122  Id. at 141 (emphasis added). The indictment was presented on June 12, 1686. See 1 
NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS FROM SEPTEMBER 
1678 TO APRIL 1714, at 380 (Oxford 1857) (“sir John Knight pleaded not guilty to an 
information exhibited against him for goeing with a blunderbuss in the streets, to the 
terrifyeing his majesties subjects.”). Joyce Lee Malcolm does not include the indictment in her 
account, yet contends it occurred on June 10, 1686. See MALCOLM, supra note 106, at 104. 
The record to which Malcolm refers says nothing of a firearm or the Statute of Northampton. 
See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: JAMES II, 1686-1687, at 136 (June 10, 1686) 
(“information is preferring against Sir John Knight for creating and encouraging fears in the 
hearts of his Majesty’s subjects.”). 
 123  Knight talked about his defense in a June 7, 1686, letter to the Earl of Sutherland. He 
defended his actions by acting in conjunction with the Mayor and Aldermen. See CALENDAR 
OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: JAMES II, 1686-1687, at 122 (June 7, 1686) (Sir John Knight to 
Earl of Sunderland). The jury agreed with this defense, finding Knight to be “loyall.” See 1 
LUTTRELL, supra note 122, at 389 (“sir John Knight, the loyall, was tried at the court of kings 
bench for a high misdemeanor, in goeing armed up and down a gun att Bristoll; who being 
tried by a jury of his own citty, that knew him well, he was acquitted, not thinking he did it 
with any ill design . . . tis thought his being concerned in taking up a popish priest at Bristoll 
occasioned this prosecution.”) (emphasis added).  
 124  In explaining the turn of events prior to the day in question, Knight informed the 
King’s Bench of an assault and identifiable threat to his person. 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF 
ROGER MORRICE, supra note 118, at 307. Days earlier, two Irishmen had been waiting outside 
Knight’s home to assault his person. After waiting to no avail, the Irishmen approached a 
woman for Knight’s whereabouts, and brutally beat her for failing to reveal the location. Id. In 
addition to this incident, there was another involving Mack Don, who Knight claimed to have 
assaulted his person, although no charges were ever brought against Don. Id. at 142. 
 125  In two previous accounts on the history of Rex v. Knight, this author wrote that “Knight 
confessed to the court that he always ‘rode with Sword and Gun,’ and had a number of armed 
attendants . . . .” See CHARLES, supra note 36, at 135; Charles, supra note 38, at 30. This 
sentence was written in error and this Article serves as a correction. While Knight did in fact 
admit to riding with “Sword and Gun” to Bristol, Knight testified that he usually left them at 
“the end of Town.” 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 118, at 307. 
 126  3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 118, at 142. 
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Ultimately, what Knight’s testimony supports, if anything, is going armed in the 
public concourse with dangerous weapons was not permitted without the license of 
government. Why else would Knight leave his gun and sword “at the end of Town”? 
In the end, Knight ultimately defended and won his case on the grounds of 
“active Loyalty” to the crown.127 The King’s Bench agreed by doubting Knight’s 
conduct “came within the equity and true meaning of the Statute of Northampton 
about goeing armed[.]”128 The Chief Justice even scolded the Attorney General for 
the politically motivated indictment against Knight. The Chief Justice stated, “if 
there be any blinde side of the Kings business[s] you will al[ways] lay your finger 
upon it, and shew it to the Defendants[.]”129   
What the case of Rex v. Knight ultimately highlights is the ease in which false 
and unsupported historical claims can influence an entire strain of legal 
scholarship.130 The holding in the case was not that the “peaceable carry” of 
dangerous weapons was outside the scope of the Statute of Northampton.131 
                                                           
 127  Id. at 308. 
 128  Id.  
 129  Id. 
 130  This author has referred to this legal scholarship phenomenon as a “domino defect.” It 
takes place whenever one unproven historical claim is built upon another and so on. “It creates 
a historically self-perpetuating chain of ill-founded legal scholarship.” CHARLES, supra note 
36, at 90. 
 131  Kopel, supra note 38, at 8-13. David B. Kopel’s account of Sir John Knight’s case fails 
for a number of factual and methodological reasons. First, Kopel omits that the “three friends” 
accompanying Knight were actually the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol. Id. at 8. This is quite 
a significant omission. 3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 118, at 134, 136. 
Second, because Knight was accompanying and assisting the Mayor and Aldermen on official 
business the Attorney General prosecuted Knight on the grounds he, unlike the Mayor and 
Aldermen, was disaffected to government, and therefore carried arms unlawfully through the 
streets of Bristol. Id. at 307-08. Third, there is no evidence to even suggest that Knight 
defended his innocence on the grounds he was peacefully carrying weapons for private 
purposes. Compare id. at 134, 136, 142, 307-08, with Kopel, supra note 38, at 8-11 n.47 
(stating Knight defended his case on the grounds the Statute of Northampton only covered 
“heavily armed nobles who oppress the public” and “there is no basis . . . for [Patrick J. 
Charles’s] assertion Knight was acquitted because he was a government agent”). The 
historical record, if anything, conveys that Knight defended his case on the grounds of loyalty 
to the crown. Fourth, Knight told the court he generally left his weapons “at the end of Town.” 
3 THE ENTRING BOOK OF ROGER MORRICE, supra note 118, at 308. Fifth, following the 
conclusion of Knight’s case, not one legal commentator stated or inferred that the “peaceable 
carry” of dangerous weapons in the public concourse was now lawful or constitutionally 
protected. In fact, one of the historical treatises Kopel relies upon—a 1694 book by James 
Tyrrell—actually undercuts his overall position on the Statute of Northampton. See Kopel, 
supra note 38, at 12; see also David B. Kopel, English Legal History and the Right to Carry 
Arms, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/10/31/wrenn-history. While Kopel is correct that Tyrell wrote the Statute 
of Northampton would not have applied whenever English subjects were compelled by the 
government to take up arms “against Illegal Violence,” such arms bearing had to be done in 
“such manner as the Law directs,” i.e., at the license of government. JAMES TYRRELL, 
BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA: OR AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH 
GOVERNMENT BOTH IN RESPECT TO THE JUST EXTENT OF REGAL POWER, AND THE RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT 639 (1694) (emphasis added). Kopel omitted this qualifying phrase. 
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Historical claims such as this are quite odd in light of the evidentiary record,132 yet 
for four decades Standard Model writers have cited to and relied on incomplete 
historical analysis to produce a limiting construction of the Statute of 
Northampton.133 This in turn has propped up the myth that there were no laws 
regulating the carrying of arms for self-defense up to the early nineteenth century.134 
It is a costly mistake that even the first Second Amendment casebook made in its 
analysis of the Statute of Northampton: 
The 1328 Statute of Northampton imposed a very broad restriction on 
arms-carrying, although there appears to be little evidence of it actually 
been much enforced . . . . 
Over three centuries later, a charge under the statute was brought 
against a notable political opponent of the despotic King James II. The 
opponent had gone to church armed, and was acquitted by the jury . . . . 
The Chief Justice explained that the statute only applies to persons “who 
go armed to terrify the King’s subjects.” While the statute “is almost in 
desuetudinem,” it would apply “when the crime shall appear malo animo” 
(with evil intent). The Chief Justice noted “a general connivance to 
gentlemen to ride armed for their security.” The limiting construction of 
the case was treated as the authoritive rule thereafter.135 
Other than pointing out that the Statute of Northampton was enacted in 1328 and 
Sir John Knight was, in fact, prosecuted, the casebook’s statement is completely 
inaccurate. This particularly applies to the authors’ final sentence proclaiming the 
“limiting construction of the case was treated as the authoritive rule thereafter.”136 
As support for this proposition the authors cite to William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.137 However, at no point did Blackstone 
mention, reference, quote, or cite to Sir John Knight’s case, nor did he limit the 
Statute’s construction as the authors would have us believe.138 What Blackstone 
wrote was: “The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual 
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the 
                                                           
One also has to consider that the first publication of Sir John Knight’s case was not until 1700; 
that is six years after Tyrell’s treatise was published. See THE THIRD PART OF MODERN 
REPORTS, BEING A COLLECTION OF SEVERAL SPECIAL CASES IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH 
117-18 (1700). 
 132  See supra pp. 378-92. 
 133  See supra notes 46, 106 & 107. See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 101, at 2; STEPHEN P. 
HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 49-
50, 213 (1994). 
 134  See, e.g., Lund, supra note 107, at 1368. 
 135  NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 81-82 (1st ed. 2012) (citations omitted). It is worth noting 
that this casebook was written and compiled by only Standard Model scholars. 
 136  Id. at 82. 
 137  Id.  
 138  See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 111, at 148-49; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 136-39 (1765). 
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land, and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton.”139 Blackstone 
then illustrated the Statute of Northampton’s scope with a historical parallel. It was 
viewed as similar to the “laws of Solon” where “every Athenian was finable who 
walked about the city in armour.”140  
Here we learn that Blackstone did not deviate at all from the Statute of 
Northampton’s purpose—a prohibition on carrying dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse without the license of government because in such instances an 
individual’s security was vested with society and the laws governing it.141 This point 
is only strengthened upon examination of Blackstone’s other sections. For instance, 
when discussing the hue and cry—the doctrine applicable to pursuing criminals—
Blackstone wrote that any person raising it “must acquaint the constable of the 
vill[age] with all the circumstances which he knows of the felony, and the person of 
the felon” before the pursuit could be approved.142 The castle doctrine was the only 
exception to this rule.143   
William Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown also contradicts how the Second 
Amendment casebook summarizes the Statute of Northampton in law and history, 
thus further disproving the notion of a “limiting construction” being the “authoritive 
rule thereafter.”144 Writing in 1716, Hawkins stated that “any Justice of the Peace, or 
other person . . . impowered to execute” the Statute of Northampton may “seize the 
Arms” of “any Person in Arms contrary” to its provisions.145 This included the 
seizure of arms for preparatory self-defense in the public concourse. As Hawkins 
aptly put it, “a Man cannot excuse the wearing such Armour in Publick, by alledging 
that such a one threatened him, and that he wears is for the Safety of his Person from 
his Assault.”146 
There were three exceptions to the general prohibition. The first was home-
bound self-defense. The rationale being “because a Man’s House is . . . his Castle,” 
there shall be no penalty for a person “assembling his Neighbours and Friends in his 
own House, against those who threaten to do him any violence therein.”147 The 
second exception applied to persons carrying arms with the license of government. 
There was no legal presumption to “terrify the People” if a “Person[] of Quality,” 
i.e., person licensed for public carriage, wore “common Weapons” approved by 
                                                           
 139  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 111, at 148-49.  
 140  Id. at 149. 
 141  See Charles, supra note 38, at 11-27. 
 142  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 111, at 291. 
 143  Id. at 223. 
 144  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 135, at 82. William Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown provides 
citations in the margins. In the section discussing the Statute of Northampton, Hawkins cited 
William Lambarde, Michael Dalton, Edward Coke, and Joseph Keble—all of whom read the 
Statute according to its historical terms. See 1 HAWKINS, supra note 111, at 136, ch. 63, §§ 1-
5. 
 145  1 HAWKINS, supra note 111, at 136, ch. 63, § 5. 
 146  Id. at 136, ch. 63, § 8. 
 147  Id. 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
400 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:373 
 
law.148 And the last exception was the assembling of arms for the hue and cry, posse 
comitatus, or militia. In the words of Hawkins, there was no violation of the Statute 
of Northampton when a person “arms himself to suppress or resist such Disturbers of 
the Peace or Quiet of the Realm.”149 This last exception was not a free license to 
enforce the peace at an individual’s leisure. Instead, the assembling of the hue and 
cry, posse comitatus, or militia was solely at the discretion of government.  
Yet somehow supporters of the Standard Model version of the Second 
Amendment arrive at the opposite conclusion.150 They read the licensing exception 
as the general rule, which would swallow Hawkins’s other sections as superfluous 
and erase five centuries of history.151 Furthermore, in order for the Standard Model’s 
interpretation to even be plausible, historians would have to remove other legal 
commentators, such as William Lambarde and Michael Dalton, from the pantheon of 
history. But this is not history in context. It is mythmaking at its finest.  
The overall point to be made about the law and armed carriage at the close of the 
eighteenth century is the Statute of Northampton was a staple in Anglo-American 
law for almost 500 years. Its legal tenants remained active following the 1689 
Glorious Revolution, the 1776 American Revolution, and the ratification of the 
Constitution. During this period, no legal commentator, judge, politician, or even 
newspaper or journal article asserted that the Statute of Northampton was inviolate 
of the right to arms, whether that right originated from Article VII of the 1689 
                                                           
 148  Id. at 136, ch. 63, § 9. It is often overlooked that up through seventeenth century arms 
ownership and use in England was dependent on socio-economic status. See 1 Jac. 2, c. 8 
(1685) (Eng.); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1662) (Eng.); 4 & 5 Phil. & M., c. 2 (1557) (Eng.); 26 
Hen. 8, c. 6, § 4 (1534) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396) (Eng.); 7 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1383) (Eng.); 
25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2 (1351) (Eng.); 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 13 Edw., st. 5 (1285) (Eng.); 
13 Edw., st. 2, c. 6 (1285) (Eng.); 7 Edw. (1279) (Eng.). Article VII of the 1689 Declaration of 
Rights confirmed the status quo with the qualifying phrase “suitable to their condition . . .” 1 
W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, art. VII (1688) (Eng.). As it pertained to servants or laborers, they were 
not permitted to carry a dagger, buckler, or sword during their travels—that is unless they 
were accompanying someone of quality. 12 Rich. 2, c. 6 (1388) (Eng.); MICHAEL DALTON, 
THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICES OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF 
THEIR SESSIONS 36 (1630). 
 149  1 HAWKINS, supra note 111, at 136, ch. 63, § 10. 
 150  Take for instance the claims of Standard Model scholar Don B. Kates. In his mind, the 
right to arms “emerged from a tradition which viewed general possession of arms as a positive 
social good as well as an indispensable adjunct to the individual right of self-defense.” Don B. 
Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMM. 87, 93 
(1992). Kates comes to this conclusion by taking numerous commentators out of context, 
particularly Blackstone. According to Kates, Blackstone “described the right to arms . . . 
emphasiz[ing] both the individual self-protection rationale and the criminological premises, 
which are so foreign to the terms of the modern debate over the Second Amendment.” Id. 
(emphasis added). History in context, however, does not support such a conclusion. At no 
point did Blackstone describe the right in such terms. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 111, at 
291; see also Charles, supra note 70, at 1801, 1822-24 (rebutting the Standard Model claim 
that the right to arms was intended to thwart crime on an individualized basis). 
 151  See 1 HAWKINS, supra note 111, at 136, ch. 63, §§ 5, 8, 10. Compare Charles, supra 
note 38, at 7-36 (providing substantiated research on the Statute of Northampton in historical 
context), with Volokh, supra note 46, at 101-02 (selectively quoting Hawkins and other legal 
treatises). 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/5
2016] THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, TAKE TWO 401 
 
English Declaration of Rights, the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, or a state constitution “bear arms” analogue. This is not to say, 
however, there were not individuals that perceived the Statute of Northampton as a 
violating the right to arms. It just means such historical evidence is non-existent, and 
therefore inapplicable. 
Of course, this does not mean that the Statute of Northampton was enforced 
everywhere and anywhere.152 In accord with law enforcement practice up through 
the late eighteenth century, there was a substantial amount of discretion given to 
government officials.153 Certainly, as is stipulated in the Statute of Northampton, the 
prohibition on carrying dangerous weapons in the public concourse would not have 
applied during instances of compulsory arms bearing, i.e., when the government 
legally required its citizens to carry arms for militia service, security patrols, the hue 
and cry, or when individuals needed to take a weapon into town for repair. One must 
also consider that up through the late eighteenth century the majority of people lived 
outside city centers, towns, and other populated enclaves.154 Therefore, it would have 
been common for late eighteenth-century Americans to arm themselves when 
traveling on unprotected highways or through the unsettled frontier. People also 
carried weapons for hunting or to the town center for repair. But these historical 
observations do not negate the fact that it was within the purview of the government 
to regulate the public carriage of arms in the public concourse to prevent affrays and 
public injury. This was the entire purpose behind the Statute of Northampton and 
other late eighteenth-century laws touching upon dangerous weapons, none of which 
were called into question as a violation of the right to bear arms. 
II. THE LAW AND ARMED CARRIAGE DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
From the turn of the nineteenth century until its close, the law and armed carriage 
underwent somewhat of a transformation. This transformation can be attributed to a 
number of factors, including changes in constitutional drafting, the westward 
expansion of the United States, the cultural divide between the North and South, as 
well as the cultural divide between the settled East and the frontier West, the public 
discourse concerning armed carriage of dangerous weapons, and judicial 
interpretations as to the scope the right to arms afforded. Needless to say, the United 
States of the Antebellum and Reconstruction Eras was not that of the early republic.  
                                                           
 152  Charles, supra note 38, at 35-36. 
 153  For more on this topic, see J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS OF ENGLAND: 1660-
1880 (1996); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. AND T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) (1944); DOUGLAS 
GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK, 1691-1776 
(1976); Dietrich Oberwittler, Crime and Authority in Eighteenth Century England: Law 
Enforcement on the Local Level, 15 HIST. SOC. RES. 3 (1990); Joel B. Samaha, The 
Recognizance in Elizabethan Law Enforcement, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1981); Alan D. 
Watson, The Constable in Colonial North Carolina, 68 N.C. HIST. REV. 1 (1991). 
 154  See e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
SELECTED WRITINGS 44 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1803) (stating America was different from 
previous republics, like Athens and Rome, in that it consisted of “an agricultural people, 
dispersed over immense territory . . . whose population does not amount to one able bodied 
militia man for each mile square.”). 
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Throughout this period the tenets embodied by the Statute of Northampton 
remained somewhat relevant to the law and armed carriage.155 In fact, the Statute 
proved to be the baseline for drafting one of the first distinctly American versions of 
armed carriage laws. Dubbed the “Massachusetts Model” by historian Saul 
Cornell,156 these laws varied to a degree, but generally stipulated:  
If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an 
assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his family or 
property, he may on complaint of any person having reasonable cause to 
fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for 
keeping the peace.157  
Maine, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, Oregon, and Minnesota all adopted variants of the Massachusetts Model.158 
                                                           
 155  See, e.g., State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 
(1871); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 406 (8th ed. 1854) (“As the practice 
of carrying concealed weapons has been often so atrociously abused, it would be very 
desirable, on principles of public policy, that the respective legislatures have the competent 
power to secure the public peace, and guard against personal violence by such a precautionary 
provision”); 1 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE 
MISDEMEANORS 271-72 (2d ed. 1831); 1 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES 
AND MISDEMEANORS 392 (5th ed. 1877) (“a man cannot excuse the wearing such armour in 
public by alleging that a person threatened him”); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 527-28 (1846) (confirming its enforcement in several 
States and that “[a] man cannot excuse the wearing such armor in public, by alleging that such 
a one threatened him”). 
 156  Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside the Home: Separating Historical 
Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1719-26 (2012). 
 157  1835 Mass. Acts 750. 
 158  See THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, PASSED AT THE ANNUAL 
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE COMMENCING JAN. 13, 1858, AND APPROVED MAY 17, 1858, 985 
(1858) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or 
violence to his person”); see also 1870 W. VA. LAWS ch. 153, § 8; EDWARD C. PALMER, THE 
GENERAL STATUTES OF MINNESOTA 629 (St. Paul, Davidson & Hall 1867) (“Whoever goes 
armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, 
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his person”); JOHN 
PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN 
HUNDRED TO THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF MAY, ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTY-
ONE, at 250 (9th ed., Phila. 1862) (“If any person, not being an officer on duty in the military 
or naval service of the state or of the United States shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword 
or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault 
or other injury or violence”); THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MAINE PASSED 
OCTOBER 22, 1840, 709 (Augusta, William R. Smith & Co. 1841) (“Any person, going armed 
with any dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without a 
reasonable cause to fear an assault on himself”); THE REVISED CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 570 (D.C., A.O.P. Nicholson 1857) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, 
dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to 
fear an assault or other injury or violence to his person”); REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE, TO THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTY-TWO 333 
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In some cases it was cities,159 including those in the western frontier that adopted the 
broad prohibition.160  
In accord with the Statute of Northampton, the Massachusetts Model prohibited 
the act of carrying dangerous weapons in the public concourse,161 and even retained 
the common-law surety of the peace.162 What distinguished the Massachusetts Model 
from its English predecessor was that it provided a statutory exception if the 
individual was able to demonstrate an “imminent” or “reasonable” fear of assault or 
injury to his or her person, family or property.163 The respected jurist Peter 
Oxenbridge Thacher commented on the Massachusetts Model as follows:  
In our own Commonwealth [of Massachusetts], no person may go 
armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous 
weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an assault or violence to 
his person, family, or property. Where the practice of wearing secret arms 
prevails, it indicates either that the laws are bad; or that they are not 
executed with vigor; or, at least, it proves want of confidence in their 
protection. It often leads to the sudden commission of acts of atrocious 
                                                           
(Dover, W.B. Keen 1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested…all who 
go armed offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous”); 
THE STATUTES OF OREGON ENACTED AND CONTINUED IN FORCE BY THE LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY AS THE SESSION COMMENCING 5TH DECEMBER, 1853, 220 (Oregon, Asahel Bush 
1854). 
 159  Late nineteenth-century cities and municipalities adopted a variety of ordinances and 
laws to stop the practice of carrying dangerous weapons in the public concourse. Take for 
instance Baltimore, Maryland, which passed a rather unique ordinance to deter the practice of 
carrying concealed weapons. It added a monetary fine should a person be found with a 
concealed weapon following their arrest or having been charged with a crime or misdemeanor. 
See THE BALTIMORE CITY CODE 705 (Lewis Mayer ed., 1879). For more city ordinances and 
laws pertaining to armed carriage, see infra note 245. 
 160  See City Ordinances, HOPE PIONEER, Nov. 10, 1904, at 4, (ordinance stipulating that 
any “person found armed within the corporate[] limits of the City of Hope with a dirk, dagger, 
sword, pistol, revolver, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to 
fear an assault or other injury or violence to his person, or to his family or property, shall upon 
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding ten dollars”); see, e.g., DODGE CITY, 
KAN., ORDINANCE No. 16, § XI (Sept. 22, 1876); When and Where May a Man Go Armed, 
DAILY EVENING BULL., Oct. 26, 1866, at 5, (discussing San Francisco’s policy that “no person 
shall carry deadly weapons within city limits”). 
 161  Compare Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), with 1835 Mass. Acts 
750. 
 162  For more on the common law and surety for keeping the peace, see KEBLE, supra note 
82, at 410 (Justices “will not grant any Writ for Surety of the Peace, without making an Oath 
that he is in fear of bodily harm. Nor the Justices of the Peace ought not to Grant any Warrant 
to cause a man to find Surety of the Peace, at the request of any Person, unless the Party who 
requireth it, will make an Oath, that he requireth it for safety of his Body, and not for malice . . 
. .”). 
 163  See A PRACTICAL TREATISE, OR AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW APPERTAINING TO THE 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 184 (West Brookfield, C.A. Mirick & Co. 1841). For some 
examples of how such “reasonableness” was adjudged by nineteenth century courts, see State 
v. Barnett, 11 S.E. 735 (W. Va. 1890); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875). 
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injury; and induces the individual to rely for defence on himself, rather 
than on society. But how vain and impotent is the power of a single arm, 
however skilled in the science of defence, to protect its possessor from the 
many evil persons who infest society. The possession of a concealed 
dagger is apt to produce an elation of mind, which raises itself about the 
dictates both of prudence and law. The possessor, stimulated by a 
sensitive notion of honor, and constituting himself the sole judge of his 
rights, may suddenly commit a deed; for which a life of penitence will 
hardly, even in his own estimation, atone. When you survey the society to 
which you belong, and consider the various wants of its members—their 
numbers, their variety of occupation and character—their conflicting 
interests and wants . . . what is it, permit me to ask, preserves the common 
peace and safety? I know of no answer, but THE LAW:–it is the law, which 
makes every man to know his own place, compelling him to move in it, 
and giving him his due.164 
Thacher unambiguously interpreted the law as a prohibition on armed carriage in 
the public concourse. Thus, in Massachusetts and those states emulating its model, 
the statutory scope of the right to arm oneself defensively outside of the home was 
extremely limited.165 The perception was that state and local governments retained 
the police power to prohibit the carrying of dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse so long as there was an affirmative legal defense available when there was 
a clear and tangible threat to one’s person, family or property.166   
This legal understanding of the Massachusetts Model was on display during the 
1878 trial of George D. Moore in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, who was convicted of 
“going armed with a revolver.”167 Drunk at the time of arrest, Moore defended 
himself on the grounds that he had no intent to use the weapon and therefore was not 
a danger to the public. Judge James A. Mallory informed the jury that the statute 
only provided a defense for those that were “carrying weapons on the apprehension 
of violence.”168 The jury subsequently returned a guilty verdict and sentenced Moore 
to “hard labor at the House of Correction for one month.”169 A similar outcome faced 
                                                           
 164  PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF 
SUFFOLK FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF TERMS OF THE 
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836 AND ON 
MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A.D. 1837, at 27-28 (Bos., Dutton and Wentworth 1837). 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id.; see also The Public Peace, NORTH AM. & U.S. GAZETTE (Phila.), Apr. 30, 1850, at 
2 (arguing for a prohibition on the carrying of dangerous weapons in public unless the 
individual can “show that they carry them for [self-defense],” but that such a defense would 
not apply to “persons walking in the streets, or drinking at taverns, or going about their 
ordinary business. No man can be deemed to have a cause for defence—such defence as calls 
for the preparation of deadly weapons—who has not some reasonable grounds to expect the 
assault of an enemy . . . .”). 
 167  Dear Pistol Practice, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 1878, at 8. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Id. Some northern judges expressed dissatisfaction over the practice of carrying 
dangerous weapons in public in other cases. See, e.g., Multiple News Items, FRANK LESLIE’S 
ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (N.Y.C.), Sept. 20, 1879, at 35 (describing how Judge Cowing 
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George Babcock in Covington, Ohio, who failed to show “reasonable ground[s] to 
believe his person or the person of some of his family, or his property, to be in 
danger from violence or crime.”170  
Of course, the Massachusetts Model was not the only approach to regulating 
armed carriage in the nineteenth century. Alternatively there were laws that 
prohibited the carriage of concealed weapons, yet permitted the carriage of weapons 
openly. Thus, while the Massachusetts Model prohibited the carriage of all 
dangerous weapons in the public concourse, to exclude those rare instances where an 
imminent threat could be proven, armed carriage laws adopted in the South were 
more permissive. The southern states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia, as well as the northern states of Ohio and 
Indiana all passed such laws.171   
This raises an important historical question: Why did states predominantly in the 
South adopt concealed carry prohibitions and states in the North adopt the 
Massachusetts Model? The answer requires understanding the distinctive nature of 
southern violence.172 Throughout the nineteenth century in the South, armed crime, 
assaults, and murders were on the rise. What made this rise rather distinctive was its 
intimate relation to the institution of slavery, as well as southern notions of 
vengeance and honor.173 Furthermore, southern violence was a public spectacle, and 
therefore culturally acceptable by many living in the South. Take for instance the 
following account of a duel that took place in New Orleans, Louisiana: 
[On February 26, 1837] a duel was fought in [New Orleans], between 
Captain Shamburg and Mr. Cuvillier. The meeting took place with 
broadswords, on horseback. They paraded at the paper hour, on fine 
                                                           
sentenced a person for a year for firing a gun at an officer in public, and that he was of the 
opinion there “was no reason or excuse why any many should go through the streets armed 
with a bowie-knife or a pistol”); The Law in Regard to Homicide—Charge of the Chief Justice 
Appelton in the Case of James H. Williams, Indicted for the Murder of James McGraw, 
BANGOR DAILY & WHIG COURIER, Aug. 28, 1865, at 35 (“The right to take the life of an 
assailant in self-defence is a right only of the last resort, never existing until the party assailed 
has done all in his power to escape from or avoid this terrible necessity. Human life is sacred. 
It is not to be sacrificed for the mere point of honor or to avenge an insult. Men should not be 
permitted to carry deadly weapons in a civilized community. Their possession tends to induce 
their use.”). 
 170  The Wagoning System, NASHVILLE UNION & AM., Mar. 3, 1872, at 1. 
 171  See CLAYTON CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 143-51 
(1999); see also Act of March 18, 1859, 1959 OHIO LAWS 56. 
 172  Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing 
Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121, 124-28 (2015). 
 173  For some discussions, see EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., 
VIOLENCE AND CULTURE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979); Ryan L. Dearinger, Violence, 
Masculinity, Image, and Reality on the Antebellum Frontier, in 100 INDIANA MAGAZINE OF 
HISTORY 26 (2004); Jeff Forret, Slave-Poor White Violence in the Antebellum Carolinas, in 81 
THE NORTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL REVIEW 139 (2004); SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: 
LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS (2001); RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN 
HOMICIDE (2009); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN 
THE OLD SOUTH (1982).  
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looking geldings, armed with swords—took their positions, and waited, 
like knights of the old, the word was given for combat. The result was, 
that after some close cutting and thrusting, Shamburg had his hat cleft in 
twain, and his horse killed under him; and Cuvillier had a division made 
of his clothing across his whole front, leaving, it is said, a slight flesh 
wound; and here the affair terminated. The duel was at a public place, 
and, from the mode of fighting, a large number of persons were drawn to 
the spot to witness the combat.174   
From the perspective of outsiders, the level and frequency of southern violence 
was quite shocking.175 As a young Bostonian traversing through Tallahassee, 
Florida, observed: “The inhabitants here are rather quarrelsome. One must be very 
careful not to use any kind of offensive language, swearing excepted. A person’s life 
is not worth much here.”176 Some Southerners were equally disturbed over their state 
of affairs. “The evil [of violence and social disorder], has, indeed, reached such a 
height that it not only mars the harmonious working of our civil and political system, 
but threatens with danger the very elements of all social organization—the 
sacredness of human life and the security of private property,” wrote a correspondent 
with the Charleston Mercury.177   
In order to address the violence problem, a number of state legislatures sought to 
remove the carriage of dangerous weapons from the equation, particularly those that 
could be concealed.178 The legislatures’ rationale for prohibiting the carriage of 
                                                           
 174  Novel Duel, PENSACOLA GAZETTE, Apr. 22, 1837, at 1. 
 175  See, e.g., FREDERICK LAW OLMSTEAD, A JOURNEY THROUGH TEXAS; OR, A SADDLE-TRIP 
ON THE SOUTHWESTERN FRONTIER 158 (1857) (“The street affrays are numerous and 
characteristic. I have seen, for a year or more, a San Antonio weekly [newspaper], and hardly 
a number fails to have its fight or its murder. More often than otherwise, the parties meet upon 
the plaza by chance, and each, on catching sight of his enemy, draws a revolver, and fires 
away . . . it is, not seldom, the passersby who suffer. Sometimes it is a young man at a quiet 
dinner in a restaurant, who receives a ball in the head; sometimes an old negro woman, 
returning from the market who gets winged.”). 
 176  Advantages of Being Prepared for Self-Defence, LIBERATOR (Bos.), Feb. 21, 1840, at 4. 
 177  Prevention of Crime, CHARLESTON MERCURY, Oct. 8, 1857, at 2; see also Carrying 
Concealed Weapons, EVANSVILLE DAILY JOURNAL, May 12, 1855, at 2 (“It would be really a 
waste of time, to allude to the evil effects of this brutal propensity [of carrying concealed 
weapons]. It makes cowards of us and destroys all confidence in law. It leads us into 
temptation and fills us with a reckless desire to display our brutality at the expense of every 
feeling that ought to govern the actions of the christian . . . we trust another session of the 
legislature, will not pass by without giving us a law to prevent the carrying of concealed 
weapons”). 
 178  See Act of March 18, 1859, supra note 171; CRAMER, supra note 171; P.M. Butler, 
Governor’s Message to Legislature of South Carolina, EMANCIPATOR (Charleston), Dec. 20, 
1838, at 1 (“There are many subjects connected with the criminal code which urgently 
demand the attention of the legislature—Among these, is the habit of wearing concealed 
deadly weapons, which has become too common among the more unthinking part of the 
community. This practice is highly reprehensible, offensive to good taste, subversive of the 
peace of the country, and unworthy of an advanced stage of Christian civilization. Revenge 
and resentment are bad counselors under any circumstances, or for any age; but, when they 
operate on youthful inexperience, they have a peculiarly baneful and mischievous effect. To 
carry secret weapons for an unarmed adversary to be used on an anticipated occasion, is but to 
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concealed weapons, yet permitting their open carriage was essentially two-fold. The 
first was one of perceived morality. It was reasoned that only the criminal and 
unvirtuous elements within society carried concealed weapons.179 In contrast, those 
that carried arms openly were viewed as respectable and transparent.180 This is not to 
say that the open carriage of arms was unanimously deemed an acceptable societal 
norm.181 In some areas, the practice was certainly common, but it was not 
                                                           
arm revenge; and to provide them against a casual emergency, is to afford a criminal 
temptation to resentment . . . This vulgar and unmanly practice should not only be 
discountenances, as is by the virtuous and intelligent part of society, but it should in some way 
be inhibited by legal enactments. It would not perhaps be proper to prohibit the wearing of 
weapons about the person.”); Edmund J. Davis, Message from Governor, April 29, 1870, in 
HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE TWELFTH LEGISLATURE OF TEXAS: FIRST SESSION 19 (1870) (“I would, 
in this respect of prevention of crimes, call your attention to the provisions of section thirteen 
of the Bill of Rights, on the subject of bearing arms. The legislature is there given a control 
over the privileges of the citizen, in this respect, which was not in the old constitution. There 
is no doubt that to the universal habit of carrying arms is largely to be attributed the frequency 
of homicides in this State. I recommend that this privilege be placed under such restrictions as 
may seem to your wisdom best calculated to prevent the abuse of it. Other than in a few of the 
frontier counties there is no good reason why deadly weapons should be permitted to be 
carried on the person.”); John Pope, Governor’s Message to Arkansas General Assembly, 
ARK. GAZETTE, Oct. 5, 1831, at 1 (stating to the Arkansas legislature that a “man, conscious of 
his own integrity of purpose, unless he has special reason to apprehend danger, ought not to 
carry such [deadly] weapons, in the civil and social walks of life; and he who wears them, 
should be held to a rigid accountability for their use.”). 
 179  See, e.g., Prevention of Crime, CHARLESTON MERCURY, Oct. 8, 1857, at 2 (“The only 
conceivable object, of course, in thus carrying these dangerous instruments of death, is to kill; 
the violent, that they may perpetrate their misdeeds with impunity; the peaceful, under the 
plea that the habit, though originally reprehensible, has become a dire necessity under the 
reign of license and disorder.”). 
 180  See, e.g., Can It Be Prohibited, GA. WKLY. TELEGRAPH J. & MESSENGER (Macon), Aug. 
26, 1881, at 6 (“While [open carry] would undoubtedly render a man very conspicuous, it 
would nevertheless put his neighbor on guard”); Carrying Concealed Weapons, in DAILY 
EVENING BULL. (S.F.), Jan. 26, 1866, at 3 (“If a man carries arms openly he is seldom 
dangerous. Those whom he may intend to attack are soon notified and prepared. If he intends 
to prevent a crime, it may be prevented.”); Carrying Concealed Weapons: True Comment on 
the General American Custom, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE (Little Rock), May 26, 1877, at 6 (“The 
frontiersman, who holds his life in his hand, carries his weapon openly and gives fair warning 
to his enemy that he is prepared for an attack.”); Concealed Weapons, ALTA CAL. (S.F.), June 
1, 1854, at 2 (“[L]et them [carry weapons] openly, so that those with whom they come in 
contact may know with whom and what they are dealing.”). 
 181  See, e.g., Carrying Concealed Weapons: True Comment on the General American 
Custom, DAILY ARK. GAZETTE, May 26, 1877, at 6 (“[I]f our society young man was to walk 
down Charles street any sunny afternoon with his silver mounted derringer hanging from his 
waist-belt, he would expose himself to unlimited ridicule. The question would be asked what 
was his object in so doing and what danger he expected to meet in broad day-light and in a 
crowded thoroughfare”); Concealed Weapons, DAILY CLEV. HERALD, Apr. 19, 1859, at 3 
(“There is little or no necessity for going armed. Not one person in a hundred does it. The 
class that goes habitually armed are themselves men of violence or associates with those who 
are. The state of society that demands peaceable citizens to go armed for self-protection, is 
indeed deplorable.”). 
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applauded.182 Still, there was the perception that those who carried arms openly 
would at least place others on notice of the potential danger that awaited them. As 
historian Robert Ireland put it, in the South the “truly brave man either wore his 
weapons openly or [wore] none at all and certainly did not resort to sneak attacks 
that more resembled assassinations than fair and honorable confrontations.”183 
Some, particularly in the western frontier, viewed open armed carriage as being 
protected by the Second Amendment.184 For these individuals, while the carriage of 
concealed weapons fell outside the Second Amendment’s scope, the open carriage of 
arms was within it. As a San Francisco, California correspondent with the Alta 
California rationalized: “If the people consider it necessary for their safety and 
protection to carry pistols or bowie knives, or muskets, or even six pound brass field 
pieces, let them carry them [openly], for the Constitution of the United States 
guarantees to the people the right to keep and bear arms.”185   
What undoubtedly aided in the rise of the southern “open carry” view were two 
notable changes in American law: (1) a shift in constitutional language, and (2) the 
first American courts to address the constitutionality of armed carriage regulations. 
Starting with the modification of state constitutional language, during the 
Antebellum Era, Second Amendment analogues in new state constitutions began to 
reflect a more individualized perception of the right.186 Consider that at the time of 
the Constitution’s ratification only four of the thirteen states retained Second 
                                                           
 182  As Chief Justice James Jackson of the Georgia Supreme Court (1880-87) wrote in an 
opinion-editorial:  
The judiciary of Georgia strive to enforce [concealed weapons and dueling] laws, and 
day by day the evil lessens and crime diminishes . . . If men will take the law into their 
own hands, become themselves the judges of their own cases, and their own sheriff to 
execute the sentence they themselves pronounce, they must be certain that they judge 
the case according to law, and execute the sentence which that law pronounces, or 
they must suffer the consequences of their mistake of law . . . The people of the North, 
and of the world, may rest assured that life and limb and property are held as sacred at 
the South as elsewhere . . . The day of the grog-shop and of that which it produces—
the inflamed passion and the deadly weapon—is rapidly passing away. 
Editorial, The Deadly Duel: A Southern Lawyer’s Sensible Views on the Subject, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Den.), May 26, 1877, at 6; see also Self-Defence, ORLEANS GAZETTE, & 
COM. ADVERTISER, May 8, 1919, at 1 (questioning the southern practice of carrying dangerous 
weapons in public on moral and philosophical grounds). 
 183  ROBERT M. IRELAND, The Problem of Concealed Weapons in Nineteenth-Century 
Kentucky, in THE REGISTER OF THE KENTUCKY HISTORICAL SOCIETY 370, at 384 (1993). 
 184  See, e.g., On Wearing Concealed Arms, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (S.F., Cal.), Sept. 
9, 1820, at 2 (a grand jury supporting the “right of carrying arms,” yet questioning the practice 
of carrying concealed weapons); Carrying Concealed Weapons, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F.), 
Jan. 26, 1866, at 3 (showing political debate in California where Democrats objected to a 
concealed carry law on Second Amendment grounds). 
 185  Concealed Weapons, ALTA CAL. (S.F.), June 1, 1854, at 2. 
 186  See, e.g., Prevention of Crime, CHARLESTON MERCURY, Oct. 8, 1857, at 2 (“The moral 
causes of this cheap contempt of which human life is held among us, lie upon the surface, and 
are seen in the extravagant notions of personal rights and independence . . . And out of this 
extravagant theory of personal independence, thus perverted by early contact with vice and 
violence, has grown an equally extravagant notion respecting the right of self-defence”). 
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Amendment analogues in their respective constitutions, each of which reflected more 
of a communal view of the right to “bear arms,”187 and five state constitutions 
included analogues highlighting the significance of a constitutional “well-regulated 
militia.”188 Early on this trend continued as new states joined the Union and adopted 
their first constitutions or old states modified existing ones. Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and Ohio all included more communal language in their respective Second 
Amendment analogues.189 It was not until 1817 that the more individualized 
provisions were adopted. The first was Mississippi, followed by Connecticut and 
Alabama.190 This is not to say that each and every follow-on state Second 
                                                           
 187  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“The people have a right to 
keep and bear arms for the common defence”); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, art. XVII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of the State”); 
PA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (“That the people have a right to bear 
arms for the defence of themselves and the state”); VT. CONST. OF 1786, DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, art. XVIII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for defence of themselves and 
the State”). 
 188  DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES art. XVIII (Del. 1776) (“That a 
well regulated Militia is the proper, natural and safe Defense of a free government”); MD. 
CONST. of 1776, art. XXV (“That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of 
a free government”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XXIV (“A well regulated militia is the proper, 
natural, and sure defence of a state”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777 (“And whereas it is of the utmost 
importance to the safety of every State that it should always be in a condition of defence; and 
it is the duty of every man who enjoys the protection of society to be prepared and willing to 
defend it; this convention therefore, in the name and by the authority of the good people of 
this State, doth ordain, determine, and declare that the militia of this State, at all times 
hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be armed and disciplined, and in readiness for 
service”); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIII (Va. 1776) (“That a well-regulated militia, 
composed of the body of people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a 
free State”). 
 189  See e.g., KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 23 (“That the rights of the citizens to bear arms 
in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned”); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. 
VIII, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the 
state: and as standing armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be kept 
up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to the civil power”); TENN. 
CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26 (“That the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear 
arms for their common defence”). 
 190  See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence 
of himself and the State”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 17 (“Every citizen has a right to 
bear arms in defence of himself and the State”); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23 (“The right 
of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in the 
aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called into question, but 
the legislature may regulate or forbid the carrying of concealed weapons”).  
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Amendment analogue adopted the more individualized language,191 but by the 
Reconstruction Era a shift was certainly noticeable.192 
Coinciding with the shift in constitutional language were the first challenges 
questioning the authority of legislatures to regulate armed carriage. The first was 
Bliss v. Commonwealth, a constitutional challenge to Kentucky’s concealed carry 
law,193 where it was argued the law was unconstitutional on the grounds it violated 
article X, section 2 of the 1799 Kentucky Constitution.194 Ultimately the Kentucky 
Supreme Court ruled the concealed carry law was unconstitutional, but with rather 
unorthodox legal reasoning. Throughout the early republic the judiciary examined 
the constitutionality of laws under a presumption of constitutionality. It was only in 
those instances where the law conflicted with the core of the constitutional right that 
it was struck down.195 The Kentucky Supreme Court in Bliss, however, applied a 
presumption of liberty. From the court’s perspective, whenever the Kentucky 
legislature passes a law that “imposes any restraint on the right, immaterial what 
appellation may be given to the act, whether it be an act regulating the manner of 
bearing arms or any other, the consequence, in reference to the constitution, is 
precisely the same, and its collision with that instrument equally obvious.”196 In 
other words, although Kentucky’s concealed carry law did not actually prohibit 
                                                           
 191  See IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the 
defence of themselves, and the state; and that military shall be kept in strict subordination to 
the civil power”); LA. CONST. of 1812, art. III, § 22 (“The free white men of this State, shall 
be armed and disciplined for its defence; but those who belong to religious societies, whose 
tenets forbid them to carry arms, shall not be compelled so to do, but shall pay an equivalent 
for personal service”). 
 192  By 1868, seven of the thirty-six state constitutions retained such analogues. See ALA. 
CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 28 (“That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself 
and the State”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 17 (“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in 
defence of himself and the State”); KAN. CONST. of 1859, BILL OF RIGHTS, § 4 (“The people 
have the right to bear arms for their defence and security; but standing armies in times of 
peace are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated and the military shall be in strict 
subordination to the civil power”); MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XVIII, § 7 (“Every person has a 
right to bear arms for the defence of himself and the State”); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 15 
(“All persons shall have a right to keep and bear arms for their defence”); OHIO CONST. of 
1851, art. I, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security but 
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the 
military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power”); TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 13 
(“Every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defence of himself or 
the State, under such regulation as the legislature may prescribe”). For a full breakdown of 
every state “bear arms” provision in 1868, see Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment 
Standard of Review After McDonald, “Historical Guideposts” and the Missing Arguments in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 7, 51-52 (2011). 
 193  Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
 194  KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 23. 
 195  Charles, supra note 33, at 502-17. For a late eighteenth-century example showing the 
presumption of constitutionality being applied to the right to arms, see Charles, supra note 48, 
at 1822-29. 
 196  Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) at 92. 
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armed carriage altogether, the fact that it regulated any aspect of carrying arms 
required that it be struck down.197   
Subsequent Antebellum courts that examined the authority of legislatures to 
regulate armed carriage were essentially required to square their analysis with that of 
Bliss, and in every instance the court undertook a different approach. From this arose 
the southern open carry–concealed carry distinction in armed carriage jurisprudence. 
For instance in the Alabama case of State v. Reid, while the plaintiff relied on Bliss, 
the Attorney General countered that the State’s concealed carry law was 
constitutional on the grounds “[e]very man was still left free to carry arms openly . . . 
.”198 In its decision, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected Bliss and agreed with the 
Attorney General, stating that under the “bear arms” provision of the Alabama 
Constitution “the Legislature cannot inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly, 
because it authorizes him to bear them for the purposes of defending himself and the 
State, and it is only when carried openly, that they can be efficiently used for 
defence.”199 
What undoubtedly aided the Alabama Supreme Court in coming to its decision 
was the individualistic nature of article I, section 23 of the 1819 Alabama 
Constitution, which guaranteed: “Every citizen has a right to bear arms, in defence of 
himself and the State.”200 At the same time history of the law played a persuasive 
role. Relying on the text and structure of Article VII of the 1689 Declaration of 
Rights, the Alabama Supreme Court reasoned that since Parliament was permitted to 
“determine what arms shall be borne and how,” it was within the purview of the 
Alabama legislature to regulate the manner arms are worn and borne—that is so long 
at is does not amount to a complete destruction of the right.201   
In line with Reid, both the Georgia Supreme Court, in Nunn v. State, and 
Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Chandler, determined that their respective state 
legislatures could regulate the concealed carriage of dangerous weapons, but that 
open carry was protected.202 Meanwhile, both the Tennessee Supreme Court, in 
Aymette v. State, and the Arkansas Supreme Court, in State v. Buzzard, outrightly 
rejected any notion of such a right, whether it was concealed or open, unless it was 
in support of the common defense.203 From both courts’ perspective, to recognize a 
                                                           
 197  Id. at 91-92 (“But to be in conflict with the constitution, it is not essential that the act 
should contain a prohibition against bearing arms in every possible form; it is the right to bear 
arms in defence of the citizens and the state, that is secured by the constitution, and whatever 
restrains the full and complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of it, is 
forbidden by the explicit language of the constitution.”). The court’s rationale coincided with 
a treatise on the Kentucky common law published in the same year. See CHARLES 
HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 482 (1822). 
 198  1 Ala. 612, 614 (1840). 
 199  Id. at 619. 
 200  ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23 (emphasis added). 
 201  Reid, 1 Ala. at 616. 
 202  Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
 203  State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840). 
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right to armed carriage in the public concourse was an affront to the right’s intended 
purpose and ran counter to the principle of law and order.204 
What the aforementioned cases show is there was a variance of southern opinions 
as to whether the right to “bear arms” included a right to armed carriage, but there 
was a significant common denominator. In every case the respective state court 
failed to examine the history of the Statute of Northampton to determine the 
constitutionality of the right to armed carriage in public.205 Surprisingly, the only 
Antebellum court to rely on the Statute of Northampton was a jurisdiction that no 
longer retained a law regulating armed carriage in the public concourse—North 
Carolina—yet it was one of three states to recognize the Statute following the 
Constitution’s ratification.206 
In State v. Huntly, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that although the state 
legislature recently negated all English and Great Britain statutes as being in force, 
the legal tenets of the Statute of Northampton was an exception to the rule.207 The 
reason being the Statute did not create the offense of “riding or going about armed 
with dangerous and unusual weapons,” but was an affirmance of the common law.208 
Writing for the court, Judge William Joseph Gaston traced the origins of the law and 
armed carriage to the English common law: 
Indeed, if those acts [of going armed or committing affrays] be 
deemed by the common law crimes and misdemeanors, which are in 
violation of the public rights and of the duties owing to the community in 
its social capacity, it is difficult to imagine any which more unequivocally 
deserve to be so considered than the acts charged upon this defendant. 
                                                           
 204  See Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 24 (“But surely if the government does not possess the power of 
so regulating and controlling, by law, the acts of individuals, as to protect the private rights of 
others, preserve domestic tranquility, peace and order, promote the common interests of the 
community, provide for the common defence of the country, and the preservation of her free 
institutions, established for the common benefit of the people, and, in a great measure, 
committed to its fostering care, its powers are inadequate to the performance of the obligations 
imposed upon it.”); Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 159 (“To hold that the legislature could pass no law 
upon this subject, by which to preserve the public peace, and protect our citizens from the 
terror, which a wanton and unusual exhibition of arms might produce, or their lives from 
being endangered by desperadoes with concealed arms, would be to pervert a great political 
right to the worst of purposes, and to make it a social evil, of infinitely a greater extent to 
society, than would result from abandoning the right itself.”). 
 205  In Simpson v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court did examine whether the Statute of 
Northampton was applicable within the State. 13 Tenn. 356 (1833). The plaintiff William 
Simpson, who was charged with committing an affray with arms, argued the Statute of 
Northampton was not applicable in the State on the grounds it conflicted with article XI, 
section 26 of the 1796 Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 360; see also TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. 
XI, § 26 (“That the freemen of This State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their 
common defense”). The court never answered whether the Tennessee Constitution superseded 
the Statute of Northampton or whether there was a right to armed carriage in public. The court 
ultimately quashed the conviction on the grounds the indictment did not accurately describe 
the affray for which the plaintiff was charged and tried. Simpson, 13 Tenn. at 360-62. 
 206  See MARTIN, supra note 38, at 60-61.  
 207  25 N.C. 418 (1843). 
 208  Id. at 420. 
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They attack directly that public order and sense of security, which it is 
one of the first objects of the common law, and ought to be of the law of 
all regulated societies, to preserve inviolate—and they lead almost 
necessarily to actual violence. Nor can it for a moment be supposed, that 
such acts are less mischievous here or less the proper subjects of legal 
reprehension, than they were in the country of our ancestors. The bill of 
rights in this State secures to every man indeed, the right to “bear arms for 
the defence of the State.” While it secures to him a right of which he 
cannot be deprived, it holds forth the duty in execution of which that right 
is to be exercised.209 
Here, Gaston’s opinion coincides with the prosecutorial scope of the Statute of 
Northampton.210 It expressly conditioned armed carriage for lawful purposes such as 
“business or amusement” and did not mention any armed preparatory self-defense 
exceptions.211 Gatson’s reference to lawful purposes undoubtedly acknowledged the 
State’s police power over armed carriage to preserve the peace. In other words, 
Gatson foresaw instances where a person may have been carrying the firearm for 
transport to a residence or location, repair, hunting, or to attend a militia muster. It 
was for this reason that the carrying did not constitute a crime per se. However, the 
common-law offense of carrying dangerous weapons in the public concourse without 
the authority of government was still punishable by law. The question that the court 
had to ask before it determined a violation of the Statute of Northampton is: “Why 
was the person carrying the arm?” If the carrying was for a lawful purpose, there was 
no violation.212 If it was to merely carry arms among the public concourse it could be 
a violation of the Statute.213 
Gatson was not the only Antebellum Era legal mind that saw the continued 
relevance of the Statute of Northampton in the ongoing debate over the law and 
armed carriage.214 Citing to the Statute of Northampton, James Kent wrote in 
                                                           
 209  Id. 
 210  See supra pp. 392-401. 
 211  Huntly, 3 N.C. at 422. At no point is this author inferring the right to self-defense was 
non-existent in the Antebellum Era. However, it is important to point out that Judge Gatson 
did not list preparatory armed carriage as one of the “lawful” exceptions. 
 212  The North Carolina Supreme Court was not articulating a novel legal principle. In the 
early eighteenth century, the King’s Bench gave a similar rationale when interpreting the 1706 
Game Act. See 6 Ann., c. 16, § 6 (1706) (Eng.); Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman (1752), in 1 
REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF THE KING’S BENCH 1751-1756 15, 16 (Joseph 
Sayer ed., London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1775). The rationale being the possession of a 
gun did not automatically constitute a violation of the statute per se, for the person could be 
keeping or carrying it for a lawful purpose. See Charles, supra note 89, at 396-97. 
 213  David B. Kopel interprets State v. Huntly quite differently and criticizes this author’s 
reading. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 23-24. While Kopel is certainly entitled to disagree with 
this author, it seems Kopel’s interpretation is based on an unsupported reading of Sir John 
Knight’s case, which Judge Gatson cited for the proposition that the “Statute of Northampton 
was made in affirmance of the common law.” Huntly, 3 N.C. at 421. For the historical 
differences on Sir John Knight’s case between this author and Kopel, compare Kopel, supra 
note 38, at 6-14, with supra pp. 393-99 and accompanying footnotes. 
 214  See, e.g., WHARTON, supra note 155, at 528. 
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Commentaries on American Law, “the practice of carrying concealed weapons has 
been often so atrociously abused, it would be very desirable, on principles of public 
policy, that the respective legislatures have the competent power to secure the public 
peace, and guard against personal violence by such a precautionary provision.”215 
 Ultimately, what can be deduced from the Antebellum Era as a whole is there 
were two interpretations as to whether the right to bear arms included armed 
carriage. Courts in the South primarily perceived such a right as being embodied 
within either the Second Amendment or the respective state constitutional “bear 
arms” analogue. In contrast, courts in the North did not recognize such a right, 
particularly as it pertained to armed carriage in the public concourse. But as the 
United States came out of the Civil War and into the Reconstruction Era, two notable 
developments began to take shape. The first was that southern courts began to 
assimilate their jurisprudence of the law and armed carriage with that of the North. 
The second development was the arrival of newspaper opinion editorials debating 
the policy implications and effectiveness of armed carriage laws. 
Beginning with how southern courts assimilated some of the North’s views of the 
law and armed carriage, this development may be attributed to the general increase 
of lawlessness and violence in the Reconstruction South. Faced with this problem, 
southern states responded by modifying their respective constitutions so that the 
legislature’s police power was not called into question.216 This was followed by 
legislatures enacting strict legislation to curtail the practice of carrying dangerous 
weapons in the public concourse.217 Such legislation was even passed in states where 
their respective constitutions did not contain a police power or regulatory proviso.218   
These armed carriage laws were eventually challenged in the courts, but for the 
most part were upheld as a constitutional exercise of police power. Comparing and 
contrasting these Reconstruction Era decisions from their Antebellum Era 
counterparts, there developed a noticeable shift in legal doctrine. Again, during the 
Antebellum Era there were southern courts that held legislatures could ban the 
concealed carry of dangerous weapons, but could not ban open carry. However, 
these courts were generally silent as to the extent the state legislatures could regulate 
open carriage. In what manner could the state restrict the carriage of dangerous 
                                                           
 215  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 406 (8th ed. 1854). 
 216  See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 14; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 26; FLA. 
CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 20; TEX. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 13 (“Every person shall have the 
right to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defence of himself or the State, under such 
regulation as the legislature may prescribe.”). New states also included such provisions. See 
IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. of 1896, art. I, § 6. 
 217  Brief of Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 15-18, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-
1521) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief of Historians]; see also Some Oil and Vinegar, 
ANDERSON INTELLIGENCER (S.C.), Jan. 13, 1881, at 1 (“Carrying concealed weapons is 
essentially a cowardly practice, and severe laws to punish it should not only be enacted, but 
relentlessly enforced. It is a very vicious part of a highly vicious American practice, which 
originating in the necessities of a rude border life, and strengthened in the South by the 
institution of negro slavery, and in the West by the preponderance of daring, swaggering or 
reckless men, has grown and spread, through all of this boasted nineteenth century, until it has 
become not only a national reproach, but an unbearable evil.”). 
 218  Amici Curiae Brief of Historians, supra note 217, at 15-18. 
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weapons even if carried openly? Did it matter whether the law restricted carriage in 
private, public, or both? 
The Reconstruction Era courts began providing the answers, and there developed 
a consensus that legislatures could restrict the carrying of dangerous weapons in the 
public concourse.219 Take for instance the Georgia Supreme Court, where previously 
in Nunn v. State the court was forthright in declaring the legislature could not 
prohibit the carriage of arms openly, but was silent as to how the legislature could 
regulate any facet of open carriage.220 Nearly three decades later, the court addressed 
the matter in Hill v. State. At issue was an 1870 law that prohibited any person from 
carrying “any dirk, Bowie-knife, pistol or revolver, or any kind of deadly weapon, to 
any court of justice of any election ground or precinct, or any place of public 
worship, or any other public gathering . . . except militia muster grounds.”221  
By the time the Georgia Supreme Court was presented with Hill, the judges 
became cognizant to the problem of southern violence through the practice of armed 
carriage. “I have always been at a loss to follow the line of thought that extends the 
guarantee to the right to carry pistols, dirks, Bowie-knives, and those other weapons 
of like character, which, as all admit, are the greatest nuisances of our day,” wrote 
Judge McCay.222 But more importantly, the court curtailed its pronouncement in 
Nunn.223 What the court ultimately rationalized is that any right to carry weapons did 
not supersede the right to peacefully assemble, vote, and worship in the public 
concourse “unmolested by terror, or danger, or insult.”224 For it to be the other way 
around or for the right to carry arms in public to be the equivalent of the right to 
peacefully assemble, vote, and worship would mean the “whole scheme of law and 
order, and government and protection, would be a failure, and that the people, 
instead of depending upon the laws and the public authorities for protection, were 
                                                           
 219  See, e.g., JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 152-53 (1868) (“But all such provisions, all such guarantees, must be 
construed with reference to their intent and design. This [Second Amendment] is certainly not 
violated by laws forbidding persons to carry dangerous or concealed weapons, or laws 
forbidding the accumulation of quantities of arms with the design to use them in a riotous or 
seditious manner.”); JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
394 (1867) (the “right in the people to keep and bear arms, although secured by . . . the 
constitution, is held in subjection to the public safety and welfare.”); see also John Forrest 
Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private Defense, 1 CENT. L.J. 259, 
287 (1874) (“[T]he peace of society and the safety of peaceable citizens plead loudly for 
protection against the evils which result from permitting other citizens to go armed with 
dangerous weapons.”).  
 220  Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846). 
 221  Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 474 (1874). For the full statute, see PUBLIC LAWS PASSED BY 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, AT THE SESSION OF 1870, WITH AN 
APPENDIX 42 (Augustus Flesh ed., 1870). 
 222  Hill, 53 Ga. at 475. 
 223  It is worth mentioning that the Reconstruction Era Georgia Supreme Court would have 
dismissed the case outright if it wasn’t for the precedent set in Nunn. Id. at 474. (“Were this 
question entirely a new one, I should not myself hesitate to hold that the language of the 
constitution of this state, as well as that of the United States, guarantees only the right to keep 
and bear the "arms" necessary for a militiaman.”). 
 224  Id. at 478. 
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each man to take care of himself, and to be always ready to resist to the death, then 
and there, all opposers.”225 
In Andrews v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court arrived at a similar 
conclusion.226 At issue was a law that prohibited the carriage of a “dirk, sword-cane, 
Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol or revolver” in both public and private.227 As it 
pertained to the carriage of such arms in private, the court concluded the law was 
unconstitutional because it would have punished individuals that purchased such 
weapons and carried them to their residence.228 In other words, the law was deemed 
unconstitutionally broad because it needlessly intruded into the right to “keep” such 
weapons.229 But as it pertained to the prohibition in public, the court found the law to 
be a constitutional exercise of government police power.230 As Judge Freeman 
wrote:  
While the private right to keep and use such weapons as we have 
indicated as arms, is given as a private right, its exercise is limited by the 
duties and proprieties of social life, and such arms are to be used in the 
ordinary mode in which used in the country, and at the usual times and 
places. Such restrictions are implied upon their use as are thus 
indicated.”231  
Even Texas, known for its frontier way of life, concluded that the it may prohibit 
the carrying of dangerous weapons in the public concourse. In English v. State, 
relying on precedent, contemporaneous legal commentary, and the historical genesis 
of the Statute of Northampton, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the state’s 
armed carriage law did not violate the Second Amendment.232 Rather, the court 
reasoned restrictions promoted civil liberty and public safety: “It is useless to talk 
about personal liberty being infringed by laws such as that under consideration. The 
world has seen too much licentiousness cloaked under the name of natural or 
personal liberty; natural and personal liberty are exchanged, under the social 
compact of states, for civil liberty.”233 
Then there was the Missouri Supreme Court case of State v. Reando. At issue 
was the constitutionality of an 1874 state law that prohibited the concealed carriage 
of any firearms or dangerous weapons into: 
                                                           
 225  Id. 
 226  Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 179-182 (1871). 
 227  Id. at 171. For the full statute, see 2 A COMPILATION OF THE STATUTE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF TENNESSEE 91 (Seymour D. Thompson & Thomas M. Steger eds., 1873). 
 228  Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 178. 
 229  Id. at 179. 
 230  Id. at 182. 
 231  Id. at 181-82. 
 232  English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 475-81 (1872). The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the 
Statute of Northampton broadly and cited to William Blackstone and Sir John Knight’s case 
as legal authority. Id. at 476. 
 233  Id. at 477. 
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[A]ny church or place where people have assembled for religious 
worship, or into any schoolroom or into any place where people may be 
assembled for educational, literary or social purposes, or to any election 
precinct, on any election day, or into any court room, during the sitting of 
court, or into any other public assemblage of persons met for other than 
militia drill . . . .234  
The law was subsequently challenged on the grounds it violated article I, section 8 of 
the Missouri Constitution of 1865, which provided the “right of the citizens to bear 
arms in defence of themselves and the lawful authority of the State.”235 Judge Elijah 
H. Norton, a delegate to the Missouri Constitutional Convention of 1861 and the 
father of the Missouri Constitution of 1875,236 upheld the law as a constitutional 
exercise of government police power.237 First, Judge Norton determined that the law 
did not prohibit the carriage of arms openly and therefore was entirely consistent 
with precedents set in other southern courts.238 Second, although the Missouri 
Supreme Court was not presented with an open carriage restriction of dangerous 
weapons in public places, Judge Norton noted the practice was so repugnant to the 
“moral sense of every well-regulated community” that society would be “shocked by 
any one who would so far disregard it, as to invade such places with fire arms and 
deadly weapons[.]”239 Judge Norton then concluded the opinion by noting the 
presumptive constitutionality of public firearm regulations in general:  
The statute in question is nothing more than a police regulation, made 
in the interest of peace and good order, perfectly within the power of the 
legislature to make. Such, or similar statutes, have been upheld in all the 
States, so far as we have been able to ascertain . . . . 
[O]r rather making it an offense to use them in certain ways and 
places, have never been questioned . . . . 
The constitution protects a person in his right of property, and 
instances are numerous where the legislature has assumed to regulate and 
control it. A person has a right to own a mischievous or dangerous 
                                                           
 234  1 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI 1879, at 224 (1879). The law also 
prohibited the general carriage of firearms or dangerous weapons “when intoxicated or under 
the influence of intoxicating drinks . . .” Id. 
 235  MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 8. 
 236  See generally 2 A HISTORY OF NORTHWEST MISSOURI 1915 (Walter Williams ed., 
1915). 
 237  The Supreme Court: On Carrying Concealed Weapons, ST. J. (Jefferson City, Mo.), 
Apr. 12, 1878, at 2. This is the only copy of the opinion that seems to have survived. The case 
cannot be found in the Missouri Supreme Court Historical Database, but was briefly reported 
in a contemporaneous issue of The Central Law Journal. See Abstract of Decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Missouri: October Term, 1877, 6 CENT. L.J. 16, 16 (1878) (“The act of the 
legislature prohibiting the conveying of fire-arms into courts, churches, etc. . . . is 
constitutional. It is a police regulation not in conflict with the provisions of the organic law . . 
. State v. Reando.”). 
 238  The Supreme Court: On Carrying Concealed Weapons, ST. J. (Jefferson City, Mo.), 
Apr. 12, 1878, at 2. 
 239  Id. 
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animal; yet under our statute, if the owner thereof, knowing its 
propensities, unlawfully suffer it to go at large or shall keep it without 
ordinary care, and such animal while so at large and not confined, kill any 
human being, such owner is liable to be punished as for manslaughter in 
the third degree. It is provided in the constitution of the United States that 
the freedom of speech and of the press shall not be abridged by any law of 
Congress, and yet this provision has never been so construed as to deny to 
Congress the power to make it offence for libelous matter to be published, 
rendering the offender liable to prosecution and punishment for the libel 
so published . . . .240 
The important point that Judge Norton made was that all rights are subject to 
regulation in the interest of the public good. This was particularly the case when the 
exercise of the right could have negative impacts on the community at large. 
Ultimately, what the decisions in Hill, Andrews, English, and Reando collectively 
showed was, as the United States progressed into the Reconstruction Era, even the 
violent South gradually came to accept firearm restrictions in public as a 
constitutional exercise of government police power. This is not to say each and every 
southern court explored the legal contours of government police power and armed 
carriage within the public concourse. In a number of cases, the respective court was 
only faced with the constitutionality of a concealed carry prohibition, and swiftly 
upheld the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that it did not prohibit all 
forms of armed carriage.241 But as states’ armed carriage laws evolved to encompass 
aspects of open carriage, so, too, did their jurisprudence.  
By the close of the nineteenth century the general consensus was that state and 
local governments retained the police power to regulate armed carriage in the public 
concourse—that is so long as the legislature did not utterly destroy the right or fail to 
provide for self-defense exceptions in extreme cases.242 As the eminent jurist John 
Forrest Dillon summarized the issue in the first law review article on the subject:  
It is within common experience that there are circumstances under which 
to disarm a citizen would be to leave his life at the mercy of a treacherous 
and plotting enemy. If such a state of facts were clearly proven, it is 
obvious it would be contrary to all our notions of right and justice to 
punish the carrying of arms [in that instance], although it may have 
infringed the letter of some statute.243  
In all other cases, however, Dillon noted the state legislatures were acting within 
their authority “to regulate the bearing of arms in such manner as [they] may see fit, 
or to restrain it altogether.”244 
                                                           
 240  Id. 
 241  See, e.g., Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 559-62 (1876); Ex Parte Cheney, 27 P. 436, 437-
38 (Cal. 1891); State v. Wilmorth, 74 Mo. 528, 530-31 (Mo. 1881); State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 
697, 700 (1882). 
 242  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McNulty, 28 Leg. Intel. 389 (Pa. 1871); Andrews v. State, 
50 Tenn. 165, 188-89 (1871). 
 243  Dillon, supra note 219, at 286. 
 244  Id. at 296. 
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At the same time southern courts were assimilating to northern views of the law 
and armed carriage, a number of cities across the United States, including 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Wheeling, West Virginia, and New York, New York 
adopted some of the first “good cause” or “may issue” licensing regimes.245 In the 
                                                           
 245  See, e.g., ORDINANCES OF THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN AND COMMONALTY OF THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK, IN FORCE JANUARY 1, 1881, at 214-15 (Elliott F. Shepard & Ebenezer B. Shafer 
eds., 1881); LAWS AND ORDINANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF WHEELING, WEST 
VIRGINIA 206 (1891) (1881 ordinance requiring a “permit in writing from the mayor” to carry 
“any pistol, dirk, bowie knife or weapon of the like kind,” as well as prohibiting certain 
concealed weapons); The Dog Was Mad, SUNDAY SENTINEL (Milwaukee, Wis.), Apr. 19, 
1885, at 3 (reporting that a number of Milwaukee citizens submitted applications to the chief 
of police for “permission” to carry a pistol in light of recent dog attacks). Initially, the 
Milwaukee licensing regime applied to the general carriage of dangerous weapons in public. 
See THE GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE TO JANUARY 1, 1896, at 692-93 
(Charles H. Hamilton ed., 1896). However, it seems the ordinance was subsequently amended 
to only prohibit the carriage of concealed weapons. See THE GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE 
CITY OF MILWAUKEE TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1905, at 181-82 (Carl Runge ed., 1906). Other cities 
adopted similar “good cause” or “may issue” regimes. See AN ORDINANCE IN THE REVISION OF 
THE ORDINANCES GOVERNING THE CITY OF KANSAS 264 (Gardiner Lathrop & James Gibson 
eds., 1880) (prohibiting concealed carriage unless the individual is a government official or 
obtained “special permission from the Mayor”); CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
STOCKTON 240 (1908) (1891 ordinance prohibiting concealed carriage unless the individual is 
a government official or obtained a “written permit to do so from the Mayor”); COMPILED 
ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF OMAHA 70 (Champion S. Chase ed., 1881) (ordinance prohibiting 
the carriage of concealed weapons, with exceptions to government officers and “well known 
and worthy citizens, or persons of good repute . . . going to or from their place or places of 
business, if such business be lawful”); GENERAL MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 218 (Fred L. Button ed., 1895) (1890 ordinance prohibiting concealed 
carriage unless the individual is a government official or obtained a “written permit . . . 
granted by the Mayor for a period of not to exceed one year to any peaceable person whose 
profession or occupation may require him to be out at late hours of the night to carry a 
concealed deadly weapon”); GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF BINGHAMTON, NEW YORK 
128 (John Marcy, Jr., & W. Earl Weller eds., 1919) (showing a permit issued by the chief of 
police was required to “carry pistols” in the city); GENERAL REVISED AND CONSOLIDATED 
ORDINANCE AND SPECIAL ORDINANCES OF LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68-69 (Thos. H. Pratt & D.J. 
Flaherty eds., 1908) (ordinance prohibiting concealed carriage except for “officers of the law 
discharging their duties” and “persons whose business or occupation may seem to require the 
carrying of weapons for their protection, and who shall have obtained from the Mayor a 
license to do so.”); MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF TROY 425 (1905) (1905 ordinance 
prohibiting concealed carriage except for “peace officers” and requiring “any person . . . who 
has occasion to carry a loaded revolver, pistol or firearm for [their] protection” to apply for 
permit from the “commissioner of public safety”); THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF ST. LOUIS 738 
(Eugene McQuillin ed., 1901) (1892 revised ordinance prohibiting concealed carriage unless 
the individual is a government official or obtained “written permission from the mayor”); THE 
MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 310 (Rose M. Denny ed., 1896) 
(1895 ordinance prohibiting concealed carriage of dangerous weapons or “any instrument by 
the use of which injury could be inflicted” unless the individual is a government official or 
obtained a “special written permit from the Superior Court”); REVISED CHARTER AND 
ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF TACOMA, WASHINGTON 81 (L.W. Roys ed., 1905) (ordinance 
prohibiting the concealed carriage of any “revolver, pistol or other firearms” unless the 
individual is a government official or had obtained a “written permit” from the chief of 
police); THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 283 (Joseph Lippman ed., 1893) 
(1888 ordinance prohibiting concealed carriage of deadly weapons unless the individual 
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obtained the “permission” of the mayor); City Ordinance, PADUCAH EVENING SUN, Sept. 8, 
1909, at 6 (ordinance prohibiting the carrying of firearms “within any park, boulevard, 
avenue, street, parkway, or driveway of this city under the control or supervision of the Board 
of Park Commissioners, except under a permit”); Democratic Platform, DEMOCRATIC NW. 
(Napoleon, Ohio), July 28, 1881, at 3 (calling for the amendment of the present law 
prohibiting concealed carriage by increasing the penalty and providing for a permit licensing 
scheme for “persons whose business keeps them out at night, and those in charge of money”); 
For Concealed Weapons: John Holt Had License to Tote Pistol, But Carried Same Concealed, 
GAINESVILLE DAILY SUN, Aug. 14, 1905, at 5 (discussing ordinance prohibiting concealed 
carriage, but permitting open carriage with a license so long as weapon is “carried in full 
view, and on the front of the body or person”); Kills Ten in a Second, COLUMBUS J. 
(Columbus, Neb.), Sept. 8, 1909, at 4 (“America is a civilized country whose cities and towns 
are—or—should be—sufficiently orderly and sufficiently policed to safeguard life and protect 
property, it must also be conceded that law-abiding citizens are not called upon to carry 
concealed weapons for their own protection. To carry weapons so concealed without a permit 
is itself unlawful.”); License to Carry Weapons, DENISON REV., June 11, 1913, at 3 (ordinance 
prohibiting the general carriage of “offensive and dangerous weapons” unless the individual is 
a government official or obtained a permit from the mayor, sheriff or chief of police); 
Ordinance No. 79, ADAMS COUNTY NEWS, June 14, 1899, at 2 (ordinance prohibiting 
concealed carriage unless the individual is a government official or obtained a “written permit 
from the Town Marshal”); P.F. Skinner, Suggests New Weapon Laws, WASH. HERALD, Mar. 
26, 1922, at 4 (calling for a revision of the District of Columbia’s armed carriage law that 
allows for a permit and stating “[n]o man with a permit to carry should object to a search 
when he knows such an action means his safety”); Reports on Weapons Carrying, EVENING 
TIMES-REPUBLICAN (Marshalltown, Iowa), Sep. 6, 1913, at 6 (grand jury calling on the mayor, 
chief of police, and sheriff to be more cautious when “granting permits to the present holders 
of such to carry guns and conclud[ing] that it can not overlook the want of care exhibited in 
the issuance of permits granting so dangerous a privilege to any person in the community”). 
For cities that adopted general prohibition on going armed in public, whether concealed, open 
or both, see CHARTER AND REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SAN JOSE 91 (1882) (1882 
ordinance prohibiting the general carriage of “slung shot, or knuckles, or instruments of the 
like,” and the concealed carriage of any “pistol, dirk, or other dangerous weapon” unless the 
individual is a government official); CHARTER AND GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
ALBANY 110 (1887) (ordinance prohibiting the carriage of “any deadly or dangerous weapons 
of any kind whatever in a concealed manner,” but excepting “peace officers”); CHARTER AND 
REVISED ORDINANCES OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS 196 (1900) (ordinance prohibiting the general 
carriage of “any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-shot, sword cane, spear or knuckle . . . bowie knife, 
or any other knife manufactured or sold for the purpose of offense or defense”); DIGEST OF 
THE CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, TOGETHER WITH THE ACTS OF THE 
LEGISLATURE RELATING TO THE CITY 190 (William H. Bridges ed., 1863) (ordinance 
prohibiting the concealed carriage of “any pistol, Bowie-knife, dirk or other deadly weapon,” 
including requiring policemen to obtain a permit from the mayor to do so); CHARTER AND 
ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN, TOGETHER WITH STATUTES RELATING TO THE CITY 
133 (1870) (ordinance prohibiting the general carriage of “brass knuckles, or any slung shot, 
or weapon of similar character,” as well as “any weapon concealed on his person”); CHARTER 
AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SYRACUSE 192 (1877) (ordinance prohibiting the carriage of 
“any dirk, bowie knife, sword or spear cane, pistol, revolver, slung-shot, jemme, brass 
knuckles, or other deadly and unlawful weapon”); CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
WATERBURY TOGETHER WITH STATUTES RELATING TO THE CITY 144 (1874) (ordinance 
prohibiting the carriage of “any steel, iron, or brass knuckles, or any slung shot or weapon of 
similar character, or . . . any weapon concealed on his person”); CODE OF THE CITY OF 
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA 187, at 296 (C.E. Dunbar ed., 1909) (prohibiting the carriage of concealed 
weapons); COMPILED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 78 (Hiram David 
Frankel ed., 1908) (1882 ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage of “dangerous or deadly 
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weapon[s]”); COMPILED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF OMAHA 70 (Champion S. Chase ed., 
1881) (ordinance prohibited the carriage of concealed weapons, with exceptions to 
government officers and “well known and worthy citizens, or persons of good repute . . . 
going to or from their place or places of business, if such business be lawful”); DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF LITTLE ROCK 168 (John H. Cherry ed., 1882) (1881 
ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage of “any pistol or colt . . . bowie-knife, dirk-knife, 
or dirk or dagger . . . or any other dangerous weapon”); DULUTH CITY CHARTER AND 
ORDINANCES 471 (J.B. Richards ed., 1905) (1904 ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage 
of any “slung-shot, sand-club, metal knuckles, dagger, dirk, pistol or other firearm, or any 
dangerous weapon within the city”); GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE AND 
THE RULES OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN AS REVISED IN THE YEAR 1899, at 219 (1900) 
(ordinance authorizing policemen to “arrest without warrant . . . any person . . . being unduly 
armed with a dangerous weapon”); ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF NASHVILLE 340 (William K. 
McAlister, Jr. ed., 1881) (1873 ordinance prohibiting the carriage of any “pistol, bowie-knife, 
dirk-knife…or other deadly weapon”); REVISION OF THE ORDINANCES AND MUNICIPAL LAWS 
OF THE CITY OF COVINGTON, KENTUCKY 254 (Walker C. Hall ed., 1900) (1900 ordinance 
prohibiting the concealed carriage of dangerous weapons “other than an ordinary pocket 
knife,” except for government officers, mail carriers, or express messengers); REVISED 
ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE 186 (1893) (ordinance prohibiting the concealed 
carriage of “any dangerous or deadly weapon”); REVISED GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY 
OF SIOUX CITY, IOWA 109 (M. Lloyd Kennedy ed., 1894) (1889 ordinance prohibiting the 
concealed carriage of dangerous weapons except for government officials in the “proper 
discharge of [their] official duties”); THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SEDALIA, 
MISSOURI 330 (John Cashman ed., 1894) (ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage of “any 
pistol or revolver, slung-shot, cross knuckles . . . or other dangerous or deadly weapon” unless 
the individual is a government official); THE CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE TOWN OF 
COVINGTON, VIRGINIA 33 (1896) (1896 ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage of “any 
pistol, dirk, bowie knife, razor, slung-shot, or any weapon of the like”); THE GENERAL 
ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SAINT JOSEPH 508 (Charles S. Shepherd ed., 1897) (ordinance 
prohibiting the carriage of concealed weapons); THE LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
PORTLAND, OREGON 22 (W.T. Hume ed., 1892) (ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage 
of “dangerous weapons”); THE MUNICIPAL CODE OF THE CITY OF TOLEDO 170, at 276 (Irvin 
Belford & Charles T. Lewis eds., 1885) (1868 ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage of 
“any pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or any dangerous weapon”); THE ORDINANCES OF A GENERAL 
NATURE OF THE CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO 52 (A.E. Knight ed., 1885) (ordinance 
prohibiting the concealed carriage of “any pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or any dangerous 
weapon”); THE REVISED CODE ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF HOUSTON OF 1914, at 267 (E.P. 
Phelps ed., 1914) (1913 ordinance prohibiting the general carriage of “any pistol, dirk, dagger, 
sword cane, spear, slung shot, [or] knife”); THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
JACKSONVILLE 92 (C. Harry Dummer ed., 1884) (1877 ordinance prohibiting the concealed 
carriage of any “pistol or revolver . . . dirk, knife, bowie knife, or any other dangerous deadly 
weapon,” except for government officials carrying out their duties); A War on Pistols, DAILY 
DISPATCH (Richmond, Va.), July 6, 1880, at 3 (reprinting four opinion editorials in other 
newspapers which detail the national increase of armed carriage laws, as well as call for more 
armed carriage laws); Deputy Sheriffs Must Obey the Law, ALBUQUERQUE MORNING J., Nov. 
12, 1905, at 1 (Albuquerque sheriff clarifying that not even “deputy sheriffs” were permitted 
to carry concealed weapons at all times unless in pursuit of criminal or was “necessary for the 
public safety”); Ordinance No. 88, WILLIAMS NEWS (Williams, Ariz.), Sept. 21, 1916, at 2 
(ordinance prohibiting the concealed carriage of any “revolver, pistol, bowie knife, dirk . . . or 
any other dangerous weapon”); The Carrying of Concealed Weapons, MEM. DAILY APPEAL, 
Dec. 1, 1872, at 2 (opinion editorial applauding the strict enforcement of Memphis’s armed 
carriage ordinance); Unloaded Weapons are Contrary to Law Also, L.A. HERALD, July 30, 
1907, at 7 (announcing that the Los Angeles city council amended its prohibition on carrying 
concealed weapons to be applicable to both unloaded and loaded firearms). In the case of 
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case of New York, New York the licensing regime required the applicant to prove 
his or her good character and the reason why the permit should be granted.246 Other 
cities followed suit at the urging of the press.247 In the case of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
the local newspaper advocated for an “ordinance forbidding the carrying of 
concealed weapons, except with special permits issue by the Mayor or City 
Marshall.”248 The newspaper was of the opinion that the city council retained “the 
right to frame and adopt such an ordinance,” and pointed to other cities that have 
adopted “ordinances similar . . . and they are believed to be useful laws, operating in 
the interest of peace and good order.”249 
                                                           
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the police retained discretion to arrest all that were “unduly armed.” 
See ORDINANCES OF THE TOWN OF PAWTUCKET, AS REVISED IN 1877, at 65 (1882); see also 1 
PROVIDENCE CITY DOCUMENTS FOR THE YEAR 1892, at 247 (1882). In the case of Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, its charter expressly recognized the power to “license, prohibit, regulate and 
control the carrying of concealed weapons and provide for confiscation of the same.” 
MINNEAPOLIS CITY CHARTER AND ORDINANCES 58 (Chas. F. Haney ed., 1892). The same was 
true of other cities. See, e.g., A DIGEST OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA IN FORCE AUGUST 
1, 1906, at 62 (1906); A DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND ORDINANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSPORT, PENNSYLVANIA IN FORCE AUGUST 1, 
1900, at 46 (1900); CHARTER OF THE CITY OF DALLAS 42 (1899) (“The city council shall have 
full power and authority by ordinance to regulate, control and prohibit the carrying of firearms 
and other weapons within the city limits”); THE ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK AND 
THE ACTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA 10 (1885). 
 246  Why People Carry Pistols, ST. LOUIS DAILY GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, Mar. 29, 1878, at 2. In 
New York City, only police officers were permitted to carry firearms in public without a 
license. The law may have been prompted at the suggestion of New York Supreme Court 
Justice John R. Brady. See Scraps and Facts, YORKVILLE ENQUIRER, Feb. 10, 1876, at 2. 
Justice Brady would continue to lobby for such a law at the State level. See A Life Sentence 
for Lovitz: Judge Brady Hopes it May be Made a Felony to Carry a Pistol Without a License, 
SUN (N.Y.C.), Feb. 26, 1891, at 9. 
 247  See, e.g., Accidents from Fire-Arms, TOWANDA DAILY REV. (University Park, Pa.), June 
2, 1881, at 2 (calling for the enforcement of the law against carrying concealed weapons and 
for Pennsylvania “to go a step farther in the matter, take charge of fire-arms, [and] give 
license to use them when a special case demands it”); Personal Liberty, LAKE CHARLES ECHO, 
July 29, 1882, 1 (calling for the amendment of the present armed carriage law by “granting a 
license to carry weapons upon the furnishing of a good peace bond” and a “rigorous 
enforcement” of the prohibition on all others); Scraps and Facts, supra note 246 (calling for a 
modification to the existing concealed carriage law by “providing that any citizen of character 
may get from the police a permit” and noting that “[n]o law abiding citizen would ever carry a 
concealed weapon from choice,” but there are times when a “citizen feels it necessary to have 
a weapon with which to protect himself against possible attack by thugs”); The Recent 
Homicides, ABBEVILLE PRESS & BANNER, Nov. 14, 1877, at 2 (calling for an amendment to the 
present armed carriage law by “requiring persons to pay a license for carrying deadly 
weapons” so that firearm casualties would be “of less frequent occurrence”); [Truncated 
Title], MEM. DAILY APPEAL, Feb. 17, 1882, at 2 (calling for a modification to the existing 
armed carriage law by “permitting those who desire to go armed to make application for that 
purpose to the chief of police”). 
 248  Concealed Weapons, SALT LAKE HERALD, June 4, 1887, at 4. 
 249  Id. 
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On the heels of southern courts upholding laws prohibiting armed carriage in the 
public concourse, and cities across the United States enacting their own armed 
carriage restrictions, northern courts began examining the constitutionality of laws 
that prohibited individuals from assembling and parading with militia type arms, 
even when such arms were disabled from firing.250 It was an issue that made it all the 
way to the Supreme Court in Presser v. Illinois, where it was unanimously held:  
It cannot be successfully questioned that the state governments, unless 
restrained by their own constitutions, have the power to regulate or 
prohibit associations and meetings of the people, except in the case of 
peaceable assemblies to perform the duties or exercise the privileges of 
citizens of the United States, and have also the power to control and 
regulate the organization, drilling, and parading of military bodies and 
associations, except when such bodies or associations, are authorized by 
the militia laws of the United States. The exercise of this power by the 
states is necessary to the public peace, safety, and good order.251 
Needless to say, by the close of the nineteenth century it became rather 
uncontroversial that state and local governments retained broad police power to 
restrict armed carriage in the public concourse. This is not to say such laws were 
never called into question as a violation of the right to arms.252 The nineteenth-
century legal challenges by themselves bring this point to light. But this was not the 
only medium through which challenges over the validity of armed carriage laws 
surfaced. The liberty of the press was another, which brings us to the second notable 
development to take shape on the law and armed carriage during the Reconstruction 
                                                           
 250  See, e.g., Dunne v. People, 94 Ill. 120 (1879); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138, 
138 (Mass. 1896); Carried a Gun: Murphy’s Conviction Sarsfield Guards Case Stands, BOS. 
DAILY ADVERTISER, May 23, 1896, at 10; To Bear Arms: The Murphy Case Before the Full 
Supreme Bench, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar. 31, 1896, at 10; see also City of Salina v. 
Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905) (stating as a militia right the right to bear arms does not 
permit individuals to carry arms “so that in case of an emergency they would be more or less 
prepared”). 
 251  Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886) (emphasis added); see also State 
Authority Over Assemblages—Various Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y. TRIB., Jan. 
5, 1886, at 2 (summarizing the holding in Presser as “the right of the State to prevent the 
armed assemblage of its citizens and their parading as military companies when not organized 
as such under the laws of the State or the United States”); The Right to Bear Arms, SALT LAKE 
EVENING DEMOCRAT, Jan. 9, 1886, at 2 (“not much attention is likely to be paid to [Presser v. 
Illinois] which, as soon as passion gave place to reason, all must have seen was inevitable. 
The police power of the States is absolute, and, in exercising it for the common safety, rights 
guaranteed by the constitution are not invaded, but preserved. It is not denying or abridging 
the right of the people to bear arms to insist that they shall satisfy the State authorities that 
their purposes are lawful, for otherwise they have no rights in the premises.”); NEW ULM 
WKLY. REV. (Minn.), Jan. 20, 1886, at 2 (summarizing the holding in Presser as “a state of the 
Union has the right to prevent the armed assemblage of its citizens and their parading as 
military companies when not organized as such under the laws of the state or the United 
States”). 
 252  See, e.g., David A. Curtis, The Right to Bear Arms: It Shall Not Be Infringed, Says the 
Constitution, L.A. HERALD, May 22, 1891, at 6 (calling into question whether armed carriage 
laws and permit licensing schemes violate the Second Amendment). 
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Era—the arrival of “pro-gun” newspaper opinion editorials debating the policy 
implications and effectiveness of armed carriage laws.253 
While these pro-gun opinion editorials seem to have done little, if anything, to 
prevent the passage of armed carriage laws or influence Reconstruction Era legal 
discourse on the subject,254 they historically serve as the first publications where 
individuals questioned the effectiveness of restricting armed carriage in the public 
concourse. One such editorial appeared in the October 26, 1866, edition of the Daily 
Evening Bulletin, and called into question San Francisco’s policy of prohibiting 
armed carriage “within the city limits.” What particularly troubled the author was the 
expansiveness of the city limits as defined by the legislature: 
The law ordains that no person shall carry deadly weapons within the 
city limits. Now, these limits are according to the law and city maps, all 
that tract of land between the Pacific ocean and the bay, and from North 
Beach to a point 12 miles south. This tract is laid out in our charts into 
beautiful streets, etc. This is the ideal San Francisco—such as it doubtless 
will be in 1966. The present San Francisco, however, is about one-sixth 
part of this great domain, whilst the remainder is nothing but a wilderness 
. . . . We do not meet with many inhabitants . . . over this waste . . . In the 
thickly settled part of the town, where the police are in sufficient number 
to protect the citizen against the evil-minded, I can understand the justice 
of the regulation. But to prohibit the carrying of weapons beyond our 
western hills and in the solitudes of Lone Mountain and the Mission, is 
something that must be pronounced unjust.255 
At no point did the author call into question the San Francisco council’s authority 
to regulate armed carriage. Instead, the author challenged the fairness of the law and 
whether it served its intended purpose. Other opinion editorials challenging the 
effectiveness of armed carriage laws took a similar tone.256 In the August 25, 1897, 
                                                           
 253  See Carrying Concealed Weapons: Another Disputant, EVENING STAR (D.C.), Aug. 8, 
1881, at 1; Concealed Weapons: Pretty Hard to Say When the Owners are Amenable to the 
Law, DENV. EVENING POST, Aug. 25, 1897, at 5; Concealed Weapons: Texas Siftings, 
GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 1886, at 8; Should We Carry Deadly Weapons? Should They 
be Licensed?, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 6, 1881, at 2; To the Waco Examiner, WACO 
EXAMINER, Feb. 10, 1888; When and Where May a Man Go Armed, DAILY EVENING BULL. 
(S.F.), Oct. 26, 1866, at 5. 
 254  Opinion editorials challenging the effectiveness and constitutionality of armed carriage 
laws continued well into the twentieth century. Hereto though, the editorials had little, if any, 
impact on the continued passage of armed carriage laws throughout the United States. It was 
not until the 1920s, when hunters and sportsman became organized, that any noticeable impact 
could be seen. See infra pp. 430-73. 
 255  When and Where May a Man Go Armed, supra note 253, at 5. 
 256  See, e.g., All Should Carry Arms, INDIANAPOLIS J., Dec. 7, 1895, at 4 (“[M]y judgement 
is that all laws against carrying weapons are wrong and should be repealed. They cannot be 
enforced, and for that reasons should not exist . . . . My view is that all should be free to carry 
arms as they please . . . . We would then hear less of violent assaults and burglaries, and such 
crimes as so often occur, and there would not be a crime more by reason of the unrestrained 
right to carry arms. It would prevent rather than promote crime.”); Concealed Weapons, NEW 
ORLEANS CRESCENT, Nov. 15, 1868, at 2 (“The law or ordinance forbidding the carrying of 
weapons is but the natural offshoot or inefficiency and negligence of those intrusted with the 
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edition of the Denver Evening Post, an anonymous author questioned the 
prosecutorial scope of the law: “It is . . . the circumstances not the man or weapon 
that makes a weapon dangerous.”257 The point the author was trying to make was 
many everyday tools, such as pitchforks, crowbars, and sledge hammers, can be used 
as dangerous weapons, yet their carriage was not prohibited by law.258 Meanwhile, in 
the February 6, 1881, edition of The Galveston Daily News, an author under the 
name Sinex asserted that Texas’s armed carriage law deprived “the law-abiding of 
the right to bear deadly weapons” against robbers and murderers.259 Sinex went on to 
argue that criminals would continue to carry dangerous weapons no matter the 
penalty, and called for an armed carriage licensing law rather than prohibiting the 
practice altogether.260 “Why not provide for licensing the carrying of concealed 
weapons, and make it a penitentiary offense for anyone to carry them without a 
license?,” Sinex queried.261 
In contrast to these pro-gun views were “pro-regulation” opinion editorials 
calling for the enforcement of existing armed carriage restrictions, the passage of 
new or additional restrictions or the end of armed carriage altogether. Such pro-
regulation editorials appeared with frequency in the press. Generally speaking, the 
authors viewed the practice of carrying dangerous weapons as needlessly inducing 
violence.262 It was only through strict enforcement of the law and education that the 
                                                           
execution of the law against the criminals who use weapons unlawfully. I say, let who will 
carry weapons if he chooses, but make him strictly responsible for their improper use. Let 
swift and adequate punishment follow the commission of crime and we will have less of it.”); 
Spectator, The Other Side, MEM. DAILY APPEAL, Dec. 12, 1880, at 2 (criticizing restrictive 
armed carriage laws on the grounds that weapons make “all equally strong,” criminals do not 
obey them, and allowing individuals to be armed would deter crime); The Practice of 
Carrying Concealed Weapons, PASCAGOULA DEMOCRAT-STAR, Oct. 13, 1882, at 6 (“unless 
the law against carrying concealed weapons can be enforced, it ought to be repealed; because 
if not enforced it places good citizens who will obey the laws at the mercy of those who break 
them.”). 
 257  Concealed Weapons: Pretty Hard to Say When the Owners are Amenable to the Law, 
DENV. EVENING POST, Aug. 25, 1897, at 5.  
 258  Id. 
 259  Should We Carry Deadly Weapons? Should They be Licensed?, GALVESTON DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 6, 1881, at 2; see also To the Waco Examiner, WACO EXAMINER, Feb. 10, 1888 
(“Are we protected by the pistol law? It arms the thief, robber and out-law against the honest 
and law abiding man. It leaves him a dependent upon the mercies of the out-law as the captive 
bird is upon that of its captors. Every violator of any law also violates the pistol law; at least 
carries a pistol; yet how many of them convicted of robbery, theft or other crime are made to 
suffer the penalty of a violated pistol law?”). 
 260  Should We Carry Deadly Weapons? Should They Be Licensed?, supra note 259, at 2; 
see also Concealed Weapons: Texas Sifting, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 1886, at 8 
(“The very people, the orderly and respectable, who would be deterred from carrying weapons 
out of respect for the civil law, are the very ones who would need them, and with whom they 
could be most safely trusted, while the criminal, bent on acts calculated to entail the most 
serious punishment, is not likely to try to escape the risk of a paltry $10 fine . . . .”). 
 261  Should We Carry Deadly Weapons? Should They be Licensed?, supra note 259, at 2. 
 262  See, e.g., Concealed Weapons, DALL. HERALD, Feb. 24, 1883, at 1; Concealed 
Weapons, NORTH AM. (Phila.), Oct. 8, 1881, at 2; Fighting Played Out, WKLY. DEMOCRATIC 
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authors believed the deadly practice could be abolished.263 From the pro-regulation 
perspective there was “no excuse for the carrying of weapons either openly or 
concealed,” except for in “half civilized or border communities, where law and order 
has not been established, and where each individual must look to himself for 
protection against all comers . . . .”264  
There were also opinion editorials that directly countered the pro-gun argument 
that armed carriage laws were pointless because only the law-abiding followed 
them.265 Take for instance the following anonymous editorial in the November 23, 
1867, edition of The Daily Evening Bulletin: 
We are told that the law is obeyed only by the well-disposed, that it 
deprives the good citizen of the means to protect himself, and that it 
causes more breaches of the peace than it prevents. These are astonishing 
propositions. There is certainly originality if not wisdom in opposing the 
law because it is obeyed only by the well-disposed. On this principle 
every law against crime should be repealed.266 
Much like the pro-gun side, it is unknown exactly what impact, if any, such pro-
regulation editorials had on the passage of armed carriage laws. What is known is 
that by the close of the nineteenth century almost every state in the Union 
maintained some type of armed carriage law,267 as did many cities and 
                                                           
STATESMAN (Tex.), Oct. 24, 1878, at 1; Going Armed, LA. DEMOCRAT, Dec. 2, 1868, at 1; One 
Way to Stop Murder, GA. WKLY. TELEGRAPH, Apr. 15, 1879, at 8; The Pistol and Concealed 
Weapons, LA. DEMOCRAT, Feb. 23, 1884, at 4; Shooting at Sight, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, 
Aug. 28, 1883, at 3; The Right to Bear Arms, and Murder, GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, May 15, 
1884, at 4; The Use of Pistols, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, June 16, 1881, at 4. 
 263  See, e.g., How to Put a Stop to Murder, WKLY. NEWS & COURIER (Charleston), Jan. 12, 
1898, at 5; Shooting at Sight, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 28, 1883, at 3; Wearing Arms 
Habitually, NEW ORLEANS REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1876, at 4 (stating that in order to end the 
practice of going habitually armed it “need not be by prosecution under the laws, but by 
remonstrance and persuasion with those who follow the practice.”). 
 264  Concealed Weapons, WKLY. GRAPHIC (Kirksville, Mo.), Jan. 28, 1881, at 1; see also 
Concealed Weapons, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, May 18, 1855, at 4 (“[T]he power should exist 
somewhere of prohibiting the carrying deadly weapons in the midst of a peaceful community, 
and we should imagine that it would be competent to enact prohibitory laws on this subject as 
a matter of police regulation and for the public security, without conflicting with the spirit of 
[State] Constitutional provisions which secure the right of carrying arms.”). 
 265  See, e.g., Disarming All But Assassins, DAILY PICAYUNE, Nov. 21, 1895, at 4 (stating 
the enforcement of the concealed carry law in Louisiana “disarms all law-abiding citizens; 
while the thugs, hoodlums, the bullies and other of that kidney pay no attention to the law and 
go constantly armed.”). 
 266  The Law Against Carrying Concealed Weapons, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F.), Nov. 23, 
1867, at 2. 
 267  See, e.g., 1 THE PENAL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 120-24 
(Sam Andrew Wilson ed., 1896) (prohibiting armed carriage at public places and gatherings, 
but not applying to frontier counties or “the carrying of arms on one’s own premises or place 
of business, nor to persons traveling, nor to one who has reasonable ground for fearing an 
unlawful attack upon his person, and the danger is so imminent and threatening . . .”); THE 
STATUTES OF OKLAHOMA 1893, at 503-4 (W.A. McCartney et al. eds., 1893) (prohibiting 
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municipalities.268 Additionally, some armed carriage laws were modified to 
eliminate discretion of enforcement. As a result, law enforcement officials could be 
fined or removed from office for failing to arrest individuals that violated the 
respective armed carriage law.269 Ultimately what the pro-regulation editorials 
inform us is that armed carriage laws were seen as a solution to quelling violence, 
crime, and murder. Thus much like the Statute of Northampton,270 the growth of 
nineteenth-century armed carriage laws reflected the government’s authority to 
ensure public safety, peace, and order. Indeed, in the Antebellum South the 
constitutionality of armed carriage laws were called into question as inviolate of the 
right to arms, whether that right was understood to be protected at the federal or state 
level.271 However, this view of the right to arms was not universally held across the 
United States by any means. More importantly, as the United States progressed into 
the twentieth century, it was a view that increasingly grew out of favor.272 
Needless to say, by the close of the nineteenth century, there was a general legal 
consensus that the Second Amendment did not encompass a right to preparatory 
armed self-defense in the public concourse. Here, it is worth noting that there are 
alternative historical assessments of the law and armed carriage in the nineteenth 
century. Standard Model scholar Michael P. O’Shea, who asserts that at the time of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification a right to armed self-defense outside the 
home was rather uncontroversial, postulates one such assessment.273 “It should be 
uncontroversial that when historical claims are made about the existence or 
nonexistence of a particular tradition in American legal history, the decisions and 
opinions of American Courts are important evidence of that tradition,” writes 
O’Shea.274 In other words, according to O’Shea, because some Antebellum Era 
courts in the South acknowledged a broad right to armed self-defense outside the 
home it is a right the courts must today recognize as being in line with traditional 
American values.  
However, for contemporary Second Amendment jurisprudence to only import the 
values and tradition of some southern Antebellum courts is doctrinally problematic. 
For one, it is a rather subjective take on the right to arms outside the home. Not only 
did contemporaneous northern courts view the public carriage of dangerous weapons 
differently, but later southern Reconstruction courts generally upheld laws 
                                                           
armed carriage at public places and gatherings, but permitting the carriage of shotguns or 
rifles for hunting, repair, and military muster). 
 268  See supra notes 149, 150 & 245. 
 269  See, e.g., DIGEST OF THE CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, supra 
note 245, at 190 (stipulating any police offer that fails to report every violation of the 
concealed carriage ordinance shall be “removed from office”); A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF 
ARKANSAS EMBRACING ALL LAWS OF A GENERAL NATURE 506 (L.P. Sandels & Joseph M. Hill 
eds., 1894). 
 270  For the purpose and intent behind the Statute of Northampton, see Charles, supra note 
38, at 7-30. 
 271  See generally infra pp. 401-29. 
 272  See generally infra pp. 401-29. 
 273  See generally O’Shea, supra note 3. 
 274  Id. at 671. 
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prohibiting the carriage of dangerous weapons in the public concourse.275 Therefore, 
the best historical rationale that O’Shea can put forward is although there was a 
variance of nineteenth-century opinions, it is better to acknowledge the southern 
Antebellum tradition over the others; that is the individual right to armed carriage in 
the public concourse over the police power to regulate it extensively.  
Additionally, O’Shea’s reliance on southern Antebellum case law is problematic 
in that it fails to come to terms with the violence and slavery tradition from which it 
is rooted. To borrow from Eric M. Ruben and Saul Cornell, it was “the distinctive 
nature of Southern society, including its culture of slavery and honor, [which] 
contributed to an aggressive gun culture and influenced Southern [armed carriage] 
jurisprudence.”276 This creates quite the morality dilemma in accepting the southern 
Antebellum Era as the jurisprudential baseline.  
Herein enters Standard Model scholar David B. Kopel, who views the 
Reconstruction South, not the Antebellum South, as presenting the morality 
dilemma. According to Kopel the Reconstruction South’s adoption of stricter firearm 
laws should be jurisprudentially stricken because such laws were an antecedent of 
Jim Crow.277 This history in law assessment is common in Standard Model circles.278 
However, it is an assessment that conflicts with most of the evidentiary record. 
While Kopel and other Standard Model scholars are correct to note that the 
Reconstruction Black Codes were racially motivated,279 this was not true of all late 
nineteenth-century firearm laws, particularly those pertaining to armed carriage.280 
                                                           
 275  See supra pp. 414-18. 
 276  Ruben & Cornell, supra note 172, at 128; see also Some Oil and Vinegar, ANDERSON 
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 13, 1881, at 1 (“Carrying concealed weapons is essentially a cowardly 
practice, and severe laws to punish it should not only be enacted, but relentlessly enforced. It 
is a very vicious part of a highly vicious American practice, which originating in the 
necessities of a rude border life, and strengthened in the South by the institution of negro 
slavery, and in the West by the preponderance of daring, swaggering or reckless men, has 
grown and spread, through all of this boasted nineteenth century, until it has become not only 
a national reproach, but an unbearable evil.”). 
 277  Kopel, supra note 38, at 32-43, 61-62; Kopel & Cramer, supra note 46, at 1137-38. 
 278  See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS (2010); DAVID P. KOPEL, THE 
TRUTH ABOUT GUN CONTROL 11-15 (2013); Robert J. Control & Raymond T. Diamond, 
“Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial 
Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1307 (1995); Robert J. Control & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: 
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 336 (1991); Clayton E. Cramer, 
The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1995). 
 279  Otherwise known as Black Codes, the regulations often prohibited free blacks and 
mulattoes from owning, using or carrying firearms. For more on the Black Codes, see Barry 
A. Crouch, “All the Vile Passions”: The Texas Black Code of 1866, 97 SW. HIST. Q. 12 
(1993); Joe M. Richardson, Florida Black Codes, 47 FLA. HIST. Q. 365 (1969); THEODORE 
BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); James B. Browning, The North 
Carolina Black Code, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 461 (1930). 
 280  See Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun 
Regulation in the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 621-22 (2006); 
Cornell, supra note 156, at 1724; see also supra pp. 401-06. 
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The fact of the matter is most late nineteenth-century firearm laws were adopted to 
quell violence, prevent crime, and mitigate public injury. 
But even assuming arguendo that Kopel and other Standard Model scholars are 
somehow correct, many late nineteenth-century firearm laws were adopted with 
racist forethought—their embrace of the Antebellum South is hypocritical. From a 
morality standpoint, it is difficult for Standard Model scholars to justify embracing 
an era and culture rooted in the institution of slavery, yet excluding another under the 
auspices that its legislators and judges were acting with implicit racism.281   
This raises an important doctrinal question. If the existence of implicit racism 
truly is a determining factor as to whether an era is appropriate for examining the 
scope and meaning of the Constitution, then what eras in American history should be 
excluded? Certainly the early republic must be considered given that the Founding 
generation owned slaves, acquiesced to slave codes, and maintained racial biases.282 
This included many Supreme Court Justices including Chief Justice John 
Marshall.283 In fact, if one pauses to consider, almost every era in American history 
has experienced some form of implicit racism, and this is not even considering other 
forms of prejudice such as sexism, xenophobia, homophobia, or bigotry. The English 
origins of American law present a similar dilemma. It is no secret that English law 
was rooted in social hierarchy and an intolerance of non-Protestants,284 yet the 
importation of English law is common in American jurisprudence.285   
                                                           
 281  When Moore v. Madigan was before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals the NRA 
submitted a legal brief asserting that the Second Amendment must extend beyond one’s 
doorstep because “colonial statutes required individual arms-bearing for public safety . . .” 
Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 34 n.14, Shepard v. Madigan, 
734 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2013) No. 12-1788 (citing An Act for the Better Security of the 
Inhabitants, By Obliging the Male White Persons to Carry Fire Arms To Places of Public 
Worship (Ga. 1770), reprinted in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 157–58 
(1800)). As historical support, the NRA relied on a Colonial Era Georgia statute that stipulated 
every able-bodied male shall carry arms to church and other public gathering. Id. But a close 
reading of the Georgia statute reveals its true purpose. The statute was not an endorsement of 
a right to armed carriage, but one of many means to suppress potential slave revolts. See 
PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE 
STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 18 (2009). Fortunately, when the Seventh Circuit handed 
down its opinion in Moore it did not rely on the Georgia statute, but it does highlight just how 
little consideration has been given to southern traditions of the law and armed carriage.  
 282  See, e.g., William Cohen, Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Slavery, 56 J. AM. 
HIST. 503 (1969); William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. 
REV. 81 (1972); William G. Merkel, Founding Father on Trial: Jefferson’s Rights Talk and 
the Problem of Slavery During the Revolutionary Period, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 595 (2012); 
Kenneth Morgan, George Washington and the Problem of Slavery, 34 J. AM. STUD. 279 
(2000); Gary Rosen, James Madison and the Problem of Founding, 58 REV. POL. 561 (1996). 
 283  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Custer, Bushrod Washington and John Marshall: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34 (1960); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Justices from 
Virginia, 84 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 131 (1976). 
 284  The history and background of Sir John Knight’s case is a fitting example. Knight went 
armed with the Mayor and Aldermen of Bristol to stop a Catholic meeting of worship. At the 
time, not only was Catholic worship often suppressed, but Catholics were also generally 
prohibited from holding political office or exercising many of the privileges and liberties of 
Protestants. Knight’s prosecution was highly political. James II, Catholic himself, wanted to 
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The point to be made is that if the judiciary faithfully applied the Standard 
Model’s implicit racism justification for excluding late nineteenth-century firearm 
laws, the same principle must apply to all eras and facets of the law. But to faithfully 
execute such a standard would mean that virtually every historical era could be 
negated on the grounds of implicit racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia, and 
bigotry.286 This is not, of course, an endorsement of importing any form of prejudice 
into American constitutional jurisprudence. It just means that the prejudice at issue 
needs to be unequivocally apparent and historically compartmentalized. The 
Antebellum Era Slave Codes and the Reconstruction Era Black Codes are examples 
that undoubtedly qualify, for both were instrumental in the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.287 Conversely, the overwhelming 
majority of late nineteenth-century armed carriage laws do not fall into this category. 
They were laws that applied to all individuals, regardless of race, sex, color, or 
creed.288 The same is true of most Antebellum Era armed carriage laws.  
The historical lesson to be learned is that the nineteenth century was largely a 
continuation of the legal precedents set by the previous five centuries with the 
survival and enforcement of the Statute of Northampton. Certainly, as the United 
States progressed through the nineteenth century, the law and armed carriage 
transformed gradually, but the legal tenets embodied in the Statute of Northampton 
were still prevalent. This can be seen in a language of the new statutory provisions, 
legal treatises addressing the subject of armed carriage, and a number of state court 
decisions. 
                                                           
make an example of Knight, but failed because Knight was assisting the Mayor and Aldermen 
in executing their duties. See supra pp. 393-99.   
 285  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 286  See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (2000); MARY 
FRANCES BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE-WHITE LAW: A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN 
AMERICA (1995); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Racism’s Past and Law’s Future, 28 VT. L. REV. 
683 (2004); Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context and Vision, 
52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (2003). 
 287  The point here is one should proceed cautiously when employing history in law. This 
not only ensures constitutional legitimacy, but also minimizes mythmaking. See generally 
Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional Legitimacy, 63 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 23 (2014). 
 288  Charges and convictions for carrying dangerous or concealed weapons in public 
appeared regularly in late nineteenth century newspapers. These convictions were not 
dependent upon race, color, or creed. See, e.g., Carrying Concealed Weapons, ROCK ISLAND 
ARGUS (Ill.), Feb. 21, 1883, at 1 (Judge Williamson calling for the strict enforcement of 
carrying concealed weapons and dangerous weapons); Circuit Court Docket, MARBLE HILL 
PRESS (Mo.), Mar. 10, 1892, at 4; Criminal Cases for June Court, JOHNSTOWN WKLY. 
DEMOCRAT (Pa.), June 6, 1890, at 8; Criminal Court at Alexandria, CIN. DAILY STAR, Dec. 3, 
1879, at 5; Criminal Court Notes, HARTFORD HERALD (Ky.), Oct. 8, 1879, at 3; District Court, 
ST. LANDRY DEMOCRAT (Opelousas, La.), Sept. 26, 1885, at 5; District Court, ST. TAMMANY 
FARMER (Opelousas, La.), Oct. 29, 1881, at 2; Mayor’s Court, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 8, 1890, 
at 8; The Court of General Sessions, PICKENS SENTINEL (S.C.), Mar. 17, 1892, at 3. 
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III. THE LAW AND ARMED CARRIAGE DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
As the United States entered the twentieth century, virtually every state in the 
Union retained some type of law regulating armed carriage. Additionally, a number 
of states permitted cities, towns, and localities to pass stringent restrictions on the 
use of firearms within their respective jurisdictions.289 In fact, by 1979 forty-three 
out of the fifty states allowed their cities, towns, and localities to enact more 
stringent firearm regulations.290 It was rather uncontroversial that state and local 
governments could prohibit the carrying of dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse.291 As one early twentieth-century commentator to explore the scope of 
the Second Amendment put it:  
                                                           
 289  State firearm localism to cities, towns, and localities has roots in the late nineteenth 
century. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 116-17 (2014). Take for 
instance, the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma, which prohibited the concealed carriage of “any pistol, 
revolver, or gun of any kind whatsoever,” and the general carriage of “any pistol, revolver, 
bowie knife, dirk knife . . . or any other offensive or defensive weapon[.]” CITY OF TULSA, 
OKLAHOMA: COMPILED ORDINANCES OF TULSA 462 (1917). The legal exceptions to the were 
“officers” executing their duties and “persons” carrying long guns “to and from repair 
shops[.]” Id. For some other early twentieth century and late nineteenth century city and 
municipal armed carriage laws, see supra notes 149, 150 & 245. 
 290  KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 
164 (2006). 
 291  See Albert Chandler, The Right to Bear Arms, 39 BRIEF 15, 20-23 (1940) (summarizing 
the cases supporting the constitutionality of armed carriage laws); John Brabner-Smith, 
Firearm Regulation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 413 (1933) (“in…the United States . . . it 
is recognized that, in the proper exercise of the police power, the carrying of weapons by the 
individual may be regulated, restricted, and even prohibited by statute.”); Lucilius A. Emery, 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 476 (1914) (“The 
single individual or the unorganized crowd, in carrying weapons, is not spoke of or thought of 
as ‘bearing arms.’”); George I. Haight, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 
31, 41 (1941) (“that the right to bear arms [as it pertains to “carrying certain weapons”], like 
other rights of person and property, is to be construed in connection with the general police 
power and is subject to legitimate regulation thereunder.”); Daniel J. McKenna, The Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. REV. 138, 143-44 (1928) (“There are certain forms of 
weapon regulation so proper and necessary that they are universally conceded . . . [such as] 
against wearing arms in church, court, polling-place, etc . . . .”); Advocates the Law for Sale of 
Arms: Proposed Enactment Not in Conflict With Constitution, Mr. Sinclair Says, EVENING 
STAR (D.C.), Nov. 30, 1914, at 3 (stating the Second Amendment, like other rights, “must be 
construed in connection with the police power—the power whereby the health, comfort, good 
order, peace, security, safety and general welfare of the community are promoted.”); Earl 
Godwin, Enforce the Gun Toting Law, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 1918, at 18 (“No court can 
afford to disregard a law so necessary as our own gun toting statute. This is NOT a border 
town nor a mountain fastness. It is the home of the President of the United States, his Cabinet, 
and the men who compose the brains of the nation in addition to several hundred thousand 
lesser fold who pray that they, too, may be looked upon as worthy of the protection of the 
law.”); Pistol Toting, ADAIR COUNTY NEWS (Columbia, Ky.), Feb. 8, 1905, at 9 (Missouri 
governor calling for the strict enforcement of current armed carriage laws); Pistol Toting Must 
Go, EVENING STAR (D.C.), Jan. 24, 1911, at 6 (discussing the growth of strict laws against 
pistol toting and that such habit  “has no proper place in a civilized community”); The Pistol 
Toting Evil, FORT MILL TIMES (Tex.), Sept. 15, 1910, at 8 (story of two judges calling for the 
strict enforcement of laws prohibiting armed carriage); The Governor on Whisky and Pistols, 
INDIANAPOLIS J., Jan. 14, 1903, at 7 (supporting Indiana Governor Winfield T. Durbin’s 
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Surely no one will contend that children have a constitutional right to go 
to school with revolvers strapped around them, or that men and women 
have a right to go to church or sit in the courtrooms, or crowd around 
election precincts armed like desperadoes, and that this is beyond the 
power of the legislature to prevent.292   
This understanding of the law and armed carriage gained strength following 
World War II.293 Jurisprudentially speaking, the status quo was that all laws 
regulating firearms were constitutionally scrutinized under a reasonableness or 
rationale basis standard of review.294 This included armed carriage laws.295 This is 
not to say that there was uniformity of regulation on the law and armed carriage. In 
1950 for example, out of the forty-eight states in the Union, seventeen required a 
license to carry a concealed firearm, but retained no restrictions as to carrying a 
firearm openly.296 Seven states and the District of Columbia required a license to 
carry a firearm concealed or openly.297 Twelve states prohibited the carrying of a 
concealed firearm, but did not require a license to carry a firearm openly.298 Georgia 
prohibited the carrying of a concealed firearm, but required a license to carry a 
                                                           
proposal to require a license to carry pistols, open or concealed); Y.B. LEGIS. 1903, at d14-d15 
(Robert H. Whitten ed., 1904). But see In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597 (1902); May Carry 
Weapons in Idaho, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1902, at 8 (reporting that the Idaho Supreme Court 
ruled the State Legislature cannot prohibit every manner of armed carriage in public).  
 292  Haight, supra note 291, at 42. 
 293  See Joe B. Brown, Firearms Legislation, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1362, 1371 (1966) (“[I]n 
the vast majority of states, firearms, or at least handguns, can be regulated by state authorities 
as long as the regulation bears a reasonable relation to the police power of the state and does 
not violate due process”); Carter B. Chase, Regulation of Carrying Pistols for Self-Defense, 14 
INTRAMURAL L. REV. N.Y.U. 20, 26 (1958) (“In general the trend has been to approve 
regulatory laws such as New York’s Sullivan Law.”); Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear 
Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 63 (1966) (“The 
right to bear arms . . . was established as a ‘fundamental principle’ by nations well aware of 
the parallel principle of police power—i.e., the protection of the public health, safety, and 
welfare.”); id. at 73 (“The test of the validity of gun-control legislation should then be its 
reasonableness as a police regulation considering any inhibiting effects on genuine self-
protection.”). But see Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, a Study in Judicial 
Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 405 (1960) (“It would seem that as long as 
there is danger to the life of man that the society has not eliminated the right of self-defense. 
As long as this right lives, then also should coexist the right to bear arms, this is exoteric.”). 
 294  See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 
(2007); Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597 
(2006). 
 295  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 146 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1962); Matthews v. State, 148 N.E.2d 
334 (Ind. 1958); People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927 (Mich. 1922); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 
(N.J. 1968); State v. Angelo, 130 A. 458 (N.J. 1925); State v. Storms, 308 A.2d 463 (R.I. 
1973); Hill v. State, 298 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1957). 
 296  F.J.K., Restrictions on the Right to Bear Arms: State and Federal Firearms Legislation, 
98 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 909 (1950). 
 297  Id. 
 298  Id. 
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firearm openly. Missouri only prohibited the carrying of firearms in specific 
places.299 Meanwhile, New Mexico prohibited the carrying of firearms in 
settlements.300   
Despite the lack of uniformity in state armed carriage laws one common feature 
developed—the adoption of “good cause” or “may issue” licensing regimes. The 
antecedents of these licensing regimes arguably date back to the Statute of 
Northampton, where constables, sheriffs, and justices of the peace retained broad 
discretion over whom may carry arms in the public concourse.301 Then in the late 
nineteenth century a number of cities, towns and localities adopted ordinances 
prohibiting armed carriage in public unless the individual had obtained a permit from 
either the mayor or police chief.302 This was followed by states adopting similar 
schemes,303 and by 1960 every state in the Union except Vermont and New 
Hampshire adopted some form of “good cause” or “may issue” licensing regimes.304   
But by the close of the twentieth century there was a noticeable shift away from 
“good cause” or “may issue” licensing regimes. This development in the law and 
armed carriage was largely due to pro-gun advocacy efforts. Part III explores this 
development in two parts. First, Part III.A. examines pro-gun attitudes to the law and 
armed carriage before the rise of the Standard Model Second Amendment—that is 
before the Second Amendment was interpreted broadly in pro-gun circles. Part III.B. 
then examines how the Standard Model ultimately facilitated the “right to carry” 
movement we know today. 
A. Pro-Gun Perspectives on Armed Carriage Before the Standard Model Second 
Amendment 
In order to fully contextualize how the majority of states went away from “good 
cause” or “may issue” licensing regimes it is important to understand what was 
taking place before the rise of the Standard Model Second Amendment from the 
mid- to late-1970s. As addressed earlier, as matter of legal understanding, at the turn 
of the twentieth century it was rather uncontroversial that state and local 
governments could prohibit or license the act of carrying dangerous weapons in the 
public concourse. This is not to say that armed carriage could be universally 
                                                           
 299  Id. at 909-10. 
 300  Id. at 910. For additional macro summaries of the law and armed carriage at the state 
level, see Transporting Your Firearms, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1970, at 41; Basic Facts of 
Firearms Control, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1964, at 14; Frank C. Daniel, The Gun Law Problem, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1953, 16 -18 . 
 301  See supra pp. 378-92. 
 302  See supra notes 149, 150 & 245. 
 303  See, e.g., SUPPLEMENT TO THE REVISED LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 1435 (1910) (“The justice of a court, or trial justices, the board of police or 
the mayor of a city, or the selectmen of a town, or persons authorized by them, respectively, 
may, upon the application of any persons, issue a license to such person to carry a loaded 
pistol or revolver in this commonwealth, if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear 
an injury to his person or property, and that he is a suitable person to be so licensed.”). 
 304  Richard S. Grossman & Stephen A. Lee, May Issue Versus Shall Issue: Explaining the 
Pattern of Concealed-Carry Handgun Laws, 1960-2001, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 198, 200 
(2008). 
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prohibited anywhere and everywhere. Based on nineteenth-century jurisprudence 
there developed an understanding that the law must be flexible enough for 
individuals to carry and transport arms for lawful purposes, whether that purpose be 
for recreational shooting, hunting, and even self-defense in extreme cases.305   
Despite this legal consensus, at the turn of the twentieth century, there arose a 
growing number of pro-gun opinion editorials that were highly critical of armed 
carriage laws. The criticism came in a variety of forms.306 Some claimed that armed 
carriage laws misplaced the criminal blame with the instrument itself rather than the 
actions of the individual carrying it. Meanwhile, others thought armed carriage laws 
were pointless because criminals and murderers would never obey them.307 These 
individuals rationalized that the better alternative was armed citizens, which in turn 
would cause criminals to reconsider their actions: 
The gangster is born a coward or he wouldn’t be a gangster, and he 
will take all the mean advantage he can get. A defenseless citizen is 
“meat” to him. But let an apparently defenseless citizen “flash a gun” on 
him and the chances are he and his gang will “beat it” precipitately.308 
But as the United States proceeded further into the twentieth century, the 
lethality, quantity, and accessibility of firearms were noticeably on the rise. So, too, 
was the practice of carrying pistols, revolvers, and other dangerous weapons in 
public. To presidential advisor and civil rights leader Booker T. Washington, the 
solution was educating the public against the “barbarous, coarse and vulgar habit” of 
carrying dangerous weapons in public.309 “There is no reason why a person in a 
civilized country like the United States should get into the habit of going around in 
the community loaded and burdened with a piece of iron in the form of a pistol or 
                                                           
 305  See infra pp. 433-64. 
 306  See, e.g., Carrying Concealed Weapons, UNION TIMES (S.C.), Jan. 25, 1901, at 4 (“To 
our mind, it has always been plain that all [armed carriage] laws are in contravention to the 
plain wording of the second amendment”); The Citizen’s Right to Carry Arms, OCALA 
EVENING STAR (Fla.), Feb. 29, 1912, at 2 (“The law against carrying concealed weapons 
should be repealed. It is a sneaking, hypocritical attempt to deprive the people of their 
constitutional rights. The constitution of the United States explicitly guarantees the right to 
carry arms. As neither state nor federal statutes can take away this right, legislatures pass laws 
against carrying concealed weapons, knowing that self respect and the opinions of his 
neighbors will prevent a man from carrying them openly.”); The “Right to Bear Arms,” N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1903, at 8 (stating a proposed armed carriage law for Chicago is “in apparent 
contravention of the Federal Constitution”). But see The Right to Bear Arms, N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 
13, 1906, at 6 (stating unless the respective state’s constitution guarantees a right to armed 
carriage the government, “in the exercise of the police power,” may “regulate and restrict the 
carrying of deadly forces for private purposes, just as it does for the carrying of explosives”). 
 307  See, e.g., A. Weinhagen, Concealed Weapons, OUTDOOR LIFE, June 1909, at 607 (“It is 
quite unnecessary to point out that a man who is willing to dynamite, rob, burglarize, shoot 
and murder, is extremely unlikely to have his conscience keep him from carrying a weapon, 
even though it be unlawful.”). 
 308  J.W.E., The Right to Bear Arms, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1910, at 6. 
 309  Booker T. Washington Asks Negroes to Suppress the Gun-Toter, IOWA ST. BYSTANDER, 
Feb. 2, 1912, at 2. 
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gun,” wrote Washington in a nationally reprinted opinion editorial.310 Others thought 
the solution was to ban the sale of pistols and revolvers to the general public. As one 
early twentieth-century judge rationalized, if the sale of pistols were prohibited to 
“any persons other than policemen and persons employed as guardians of great 
interests,” the practice of carrying dangerous weapons in the public concourse would 
overall cease.311 
New York City Police Commissioner William G. McAdoo also gave 
considerable thought to the increase of firearms violence and the social costs 
associated.312 In an opinion editorial, McAdoo pleaded that a “crusade should be 
instituted immediately in all cities of the country against the illegal carriers of deadly 
weapons.”313 According to McAdoo, from 1881 to 1902 the national murder ratio 
increased fourfold.314 As a solution McAdoo proposed that local governments 
“intelligently and severely” enforce existing armed carriage laws, adopt armed 
carriage permit schemes, and increase the penalties associated with unlawful 
carriage.315 Additionally, McAdoo proposed some of the first modern controls on the 
supply and sale of dangerous weapons. Indeed, in the late nineteenth century it 
became common for cities, towns, and localities to control the sale of firearms and 
other dangerous weapons to minors.316 However, there were no comparable 
restrictions for adults. Therefore, McAdoo proposed that states, cities, and 
municipalities adopt licensing regimes to purchase firearms on par with the District 
of Columbia.317 McAdoo also proposed that every dealer in “deadly weapons . . . 
                                                           
 310  Id. 
 311  Against All Weapons: Justice Foster Says Laws are Too Lax—Cause of Crime, N.Y. 
TRIB., Jan. 31, 1906, at 14. 
 312  William G. McAdoo, The Concealed Weapon: How to Prevent Fifty Thousand Crimes 
a Year, EVENING STAR (D.C.), July 2, 1905, at 11 (“I have talked with many foreign officials 
upon the subject, and they all regard us as the one and only civilized country in which 
violence exists unchecked. That this is true from their standpoint is clearly evident from the 
perusal of our own daily papers as compared with theirs. That it is not checked as it might be 
is true, and it is a mystery to them how a nation so civilized in other respects can permit it.”). 
 313  Id. at 15. 
 314  Id. at 11 (“The ratio of murders to our national population has increased from 24.7 per 
million in 1881 to 112 per million in 1903. It rose irregularly in 1894, 1895, and 1895 to 144, 
152, and 151 respectively; but the ratio is steadily increasing. In this respect we are becoming 
steadily more lawless, steadily more inclined to take the law into our own hands.”). 
 315  Id. 
 316  See, e.g., A DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 726 
(Frank F. Brightly ed., 1887); SUPPLEMENT TO THE PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF MASSACHUSETTS 156 (C.A. Merrill ed., 1890); THE CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE 
CITY OF SALEM  168 (1896); THE CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF 
MONTGOMERY, WITH THE CHARTER 240 (William S. Thorington ed., 1888); THE CODE OF THE 
STATE OF GEORGIA 1186 (R.H. Clark et al eds., 1882); 3 REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF 
GALESBURG, ILLINOIS 71 (W. Selden Gale et al eds., 1896); THE REVISED STATUTES, CODES 
AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3330 (Clarence F. Birdseye ed., 1890). 
 317  McAdoo, supra note 312, at 11 
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keep a register of the name and residence of every purchaser, with a full description 
of the weapon.”318  
In light of the increase of firearms violence and crime, legislators began 
exploring new regulatory regimes, which were very similar to McAdoo’s proposed 
reforms.319 Arguably the most notable was New York’s Sullivan Law, which 
required individuals to obtain a license to either purchase or carry a handgun.320 
From the Sullivan Law’s enactment it was heavily criticized in pro-gun literature. 
What bothered pro-gun supporters in particular was the licensing requirement to 
purchase and own a pistol.321 The Sullivan Law’s severe limitations on armed 
carriage were also criticized,322 but not every sportsman and gun owner was opposed 
                                                           
 318  Id.; see also WILLIAM G. MCADOO, GUARDING A GREAT CITY 150 (1906). 
 319  See J.W.G., Homicide and the Carrying of Concealed Weapons, J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 92 (1911); A Pistol Regulation, EVENING STAR (D.C.), Oct. 14, 1911, at 6 
(calling for new firearms legislation under District of Columbia’s power to enact “police 
regulations”); Gang Prisoners Fined: Magistrate Breen Says Concealed Weapons Cause 
Feuds, N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 21, 1903, at 4; The Pistol Habit: Stop It, 69 INDEPENDENT 371 (Aug. 
18, 1910); Magistrates Say Limit the Sale of Deadly Weapons, EVENING WORLD (N.Y.C.), 
Apr. 16, 1901, at 1 (front page feature outlining the need for stricter firearm regulations and 
controls to prevent homicide, murder and crime); Paul Theiman, Tag the Revolvers, 
SAVANNAH TRIB., Aug. 7, 1909, at 1; The Gun Habit, HOLT COUNTY SENTINEL (Oregon, Mo.), 
July 3, 1908, at 2 (discussing growing public sentiment for firearm regulations and controls); 
Topics of the Times: Big Pistols or None Commanded, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1907, at 6. 
 320  The Sullivan Law is reprinted in the HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL 
MEETING 895 (1925). According to newspaper accounts, the Sullivan Law was enacted to 
lower the “numbers of murders and suicides and sacrifice of human life by irresponsible 
persons . . . .” Gun-Toting Bill Urged at Albany: Suicide and Murder Lessened, Plea of Its 
Supporters, WASH. HERALD, Feb. 17, 1911, at 3. In 1916, The New York Times reported 8,000 
citizens obtained licenses to carry weapons in New York City. See 8,000 New Yorkers May 
“Tote” Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1916, at 9. By 1929, the number of carry licenses 
increased to 26,627. See 32,400 Get Permits for Pistols in Year, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1929, at 
N2. New York was not alone in requiring individuals to obtain a license to purchase a 
handgun. See, e.g., THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF AKRON, OHIO 37 (Henry M. 
Hagelbarger ed., 1921) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to buy, purchase, or obtain in 
exchange, any revolver, pistol or other small firearm without first having obtained a permit 
from the Chief of Police to make such purchase.”); THE CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE OF 1922, at 
366 (Samuel A. Ettelson ed., 1922) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase any 
pistol, revolver, derringer, bowie knife, dirk or other weapons of like character, which can be 
concealed on the person, without first securing from the superintendent of the police a permit 
to do so.”); New Law Governing Sale of Weapons, CRESCO PLAIN DEALER (Cresco, Iowa), 
June 27, 1913, at 1 (announcing a new law prohibiting the sale of certain concealable 
weapons, requiring a “permit from the chief of police, mayor or sheriff” for arms dealers to 
sell “any revolver, pistol or pocket bill or other weapons of a like character which can be 
concealed on the person,” and requiring a license to carry concealed weapons). 
 321  See The Sullivan Law, FIELD & STREAM, Jan. 1912, at 886; see also The Sullivan Pistol 
Act, FIELD & STREAM, Feb. 1912, at 991-92 (asking the law be amended to allow for licensing 
at the “city, town, and village” level). 
 322  See F.J.B., The Sullivan Anti-Weapon Law, OUTDOOR LIFE, June 1914, at 563-65 (“I fail 
to see where there is any authority permitting any Legislature to restrict the carrying of arms 
by any citizen of the United States.”). 
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to them.323 To many, the ownership and use of firearms was an important 
responsibility that required the balancing of American values with the public 
safety.324 These individuals perceived firearms as part of their heritage, yet 
understood that society was changing rapidly and required new legislative 
approaches.325   
However, for pro-gun supporters the Sullivan Law was the wrong course of 
action. It heightened their fears that the United States was moving away from a 
“nation of riflemen” to the more civilized European model.326 What also heightened 
pro-gun fears was that other state and local jurisdictions were adopting similar 
legislation.327 This prompted pro-gun supporters to assail the Sullivan Law in every 
way possible. They asserted that the Sullivan Law negatively impacted the national 
                                                           
 323  See Ernest Coler, About Gun Cranks, OUTDOOR LIFE, Aug. 1911, at 182 (opposing 
restrictive firearm laws, but not supporting “the average gun toter who lugs a loaded weapons 
around for sheer foolishness, without need, or with illegal intent”); The Sullivan Law, supra 
note 321, at 886 (satisfied the Sullivan Law was construed to allow for the transportation of 
arms for hunting and recreation); The Sullivan Pistol Act, supra note 321, at 991-92 
(requesting the Sullivan Law be amended to at least allow for the transport of firearms in 
luggage when traveling). At the time the Sullivan Law was enacted, New York City already 
maintained a “good cause” or “may issue” licensing regime. See supra pp. 418-21. 
 324  Harry V. Radford, The Position of the American Sportsman, FIELD & STREAM & AM. 
ANGLER, June 1901, at 233-35. 
 325  See Another Shooter, More Concerning Anti-Pistol Laws, ARMS & MAN, Mar. 22, 
1917, at 515 (admitting that in “many instances pistol bills are not all ‘bad’ and it has been 
found wise not to stir sleeping dogs”); Coler, supra note 323, at 183 (“There was a time when 
folks across the water called us a nation of riflemen,” but now “it has become an unctuous 
boast to say: ‘I’ve never owned a gun in my life and never will own one.’”); F.J.B., supra note 
322, at 563-65 (seeing the Sullivan Law as part of the problem with American values towards 
firearms changing); Merry Christmas—And Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1929, at 6 (listing 
firearms legislation the NRA supported and opposed). 
 326  See Firearms and Crime Prevention, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 8, 1919, at 388; Alfred B. 
Geikie, The Passing of the American, OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1915, at 573 (“There was a time 
when the American-born citizen was virtually personified. He was a rifleman of the type 
which is the nation’s greatest protection against foreign invasion . . . . The times have 
changed. The ‘spirit of 76’ is but a memory and the type of American contemporaneous with 
those stirring days has been obliterated in the on-rush of so-called ‘civilization’ . . . .”); Henry 
Morris, Will Anti-Pistol Laws Decrease Crime?, OUTDOOR LIFE, July 1924, at 71-73; Lionel F. 
Phillips, The Citizen and the Revolver, OUTDOOR LIFE, May 1922, at 299 (“Disarming the 
citizen simply doubles the resources of the criminal, and does not lessen crime. On the 
contrary, it increases it, for the simple reason that the criminal has nothing to fear except the 
police and other public officials in that case.”); Posted Land, FIELD & STREAM, Dec. 1913, at 
805 (“In our country, this assurance that we are a nation of riflemen is rapidly passing away . . 
. . To-day more and more the percentage of men who go afield with firearms is decreasing, 
and the cities are filling with human herds absolutely valueless as soldiers or fighting men.”). 
 327  See C. C. Finn, Firearms Legislation, ARMS & MAN Feb. 1, 1921, at 13; Fool Pistol 
Legislation in Massachusetts, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1912, at 471-72; Massachusetts Would 
Legislate Against Revolver, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 18, 1915, at 407; Nathaniel C. Nash, Jr., Anti-
Revolver Legislation: Part I, ARMS & MAN, Nov. 16, 1916, at 145-46; On the Question of 
Concealed Weapons, ARMS & MAN, May 6, 1915, at 106; see also supra note 320 and 
accompanying text. 
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defense,328 did nothing to decrease crime and murder rates,329 left law-abiding 
citizens defenseless,330 and that the government should enforce existing firearm laws 
before creating new ones.331 The Sullivan Law was even assailed as being “un-
American” and some pro-gun supporters went so far to speculate it was part of a 
sinister insurance scheme or a foreign attempt to disarm the United States.332 
                                                           
 328  See, e.g., Firearms and Crime Prevention, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 8, 1919, at 388; 
Nathaniel C. Nash, Jr., Anti-Revolver Legislation: Part II, ARMS & MAN, Nov. 23, 1916, at 
165-66. 
 329  See The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, NEGRO STAR (Wichita), Dec. 2, 1927, at 1 
(“Legislation to prohibit [pistols] on the theory that it would reduce crime, is a mistake, for the 
criminal would still get his guns from sources outside the United States.”); see also F.M. 
Barker, The Home Gun Man, OUTDOOR LIFE, Jan. 1925, at 42 (“The non-availableness of 
pistols will no more stop crime than does the difficulty of obtaining dynamite or 
nitroglycerine prevent the blowing of safes in banks and offices today.”). 
 330  See Captain E.C. Crossman, Anti-Firearms Legislation, FIELD & STREAM, Dec. 1923, at 
925 (“I fail to see why a few million law-abiding citizens, ill-protected and often entirely 
unprotected by the police, should be disarmed in the vain hope that the same laws would also 
disarm some small proportion of the crooks, and so reduce the risks attendant to the profession 
of policemen.”); Charles P. Fagnani, Assails Sullivan Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1923, at 16 
(“If it has been conceived in the manifest interest of the criminally disposed to deliver up 
decent members of the population, helpless and undefended, into the power of gunmen, 
burglars, &c., it could not be more adequate.”); Robert P. Green, The Sullivan Law’s 
Workings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1914, at 10 (questioning the prosecutorial scope of the 
Sullivan Law to a citizen that defended himself in the home against an assailant); Allyn H. 
Tedmon, A Law for the Outlaw, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1, 1923, at 4; The Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1923, at 18 (“As to the comparative safety of the armed and 
unarmed citizen, a man who knows how to use his gun is not likely to be ruined by the 
opportunity of resistance.”); Stephen Trask, Fighting the Devil With Fire, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 
1, 1924, at 9 (stating “laws of the Sullivan type have miserably and pathetically failed of their 
purposes”). 
 331  See, e.g., Eltinge F. Warner, The Anti Anti-Pistol Fight, FIELD & STREAM, Oct. 1922, at 
640 (“Every State in the Union already has a law, every city and town and hamlet an 
ordinance, which, if enforced, would solve the problem. There is no need whatsoever for 
additional laws of any kind.”). 
 332  See G.C. Brown, Get Together and Fight, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 23, 1918, at 430 
(“Recently I saw a statement that German gold has undoubtedly been the cause of some of the 
attempted legislation against arms . . . it would most certainly be to Germany’s advantage to 
make us more defenseless than we were.”); Disarmament and Economy, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 
1931, at 41 (asserting a link between the Sullivan Law and higher insurance premiums); 
Donald E. Martin, Anti-Gun Laws and Their Originators, OUTDOOR LIFE, Nov. 1924, at 354 
(“The anti-gun fanatic . . . may be agents of some foreign power which wants American 
disarmed for obvious reasons. They may be agents of predatory wealth contemplating 
something too raw to be safe while the people have the power to resist effectually, or of a 
Bolshevik clique with ambitions to deliver the blessings of Leninism to the United States.”); 
Joe Taylor, The Anti-Pistol Laws, FIELD & STREAM, July 1923, at 34 (asserting restrictive gun 
laws lead to increased crime rates and insurance premiums); The Anti Anti-Pistol Situation, 
FIELD & STREAM, Dec. 1922, at 887 (“Who is contributing the money to put out this anti-pistol 
propaganda—they are most carefully keeping cover.”); Eltinge F. Warner, It’s Up to YOU!, 
FIELD & STREAM, Jan. 1926, at 34-35 (asserting anti-pistol laws will lead to the confiscation of 
all firearms); Eltinge F. Warner, Who is to Blame?, FIELD & STREAM, June 1921, at 827 
[hereinafter Warner, Who is to Blame] (“All kinds of anti-firearm laws . . . all of them 
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To counter the Sullivan Law and what pro-gun supporters perceived to be a 
growing anti-firearms movement, the United States Revolver Association (USRA) 
took the lead in advancing the interests of sportsmen and gun owners.333 The USRA 
was the first organization to advocate for Second Amendment rights, and took the 
position it would never stand in the way of firearm laws that restricted the criminal 
element from possessing or using firearms.334 This included laws requiring a “license 
to carry a firearm provided” the applicant could “show cause why [they] should go 
armed.”335 The USRA ultimately lived up to its promise by drafting and promoting 
“sane” model legislation for states to adopt in 1923.336 Known as the Revolver Act, 
the model legislation sought to balance the “incontrovertible right of the people to 
protect themselves” and “the police to deny the right to carry pistols . . . to those 
whose character or history would indicate that they might make unlawful use of the 
same.”337 Under the Revolver Act, individuals were required to obtain a license to 
carry a concealed weapon; all handgun purchases were subjected to a brief waiting 
period, and the gun dealers had to turn over all records of handgun sales.338 The 
                                                           
decidedly anti-American, have been brought before these legislatures and there seems to be a 
wave of crazy legislation going over the country for some unknown reason.”); Watch the Anti-
Firearm Laws, ARMS & MAN, Dec. 15, 1919, at 8 (stating “anti-firearm laws” are “un-
American” and are “repulsive to the average thinking citizen”); F.J.B., supra note 322, at 564 
(“The New York state law . . . will lead to a reign of terror similar to the conditions in Rome 
at the time of Rienzi.”). 
 333  Pistol Association Asks for Laws, VINITA DAILY CHIEFTAIN (Okla.), May 11, 1912, at 1. 
The USRA was incorporated in 1904 “to foster the art of revolver and small-arm shooting.” 
Revolver Association Incorporated, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1904, at 11. The USRA worked 
closely with the NRA. See Would Join with N.R.A.: Revolver Association Seeks Amalgation of 
Two Bodies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1917, at 11. 
 334  See Fight the Anti-Firearm Law, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 2, 1918, at 368-69; see also 
Kendrick Scofield, U.S.R.A. Names New Officers, ARMS & MAN, Jan. 26, 1918, at 346-54. 
 335  Pistol Association Asks for Laws, supra note 333, at 1. Considering that “good cause” 
or “may issue” licensing laws had been in effect for over thirty years, it is not surprising that 
the USRA supported them. See generally supra note 245.  
 336  See The Rising Curve of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1922, at 14; U.S. Revolver 
Ass’n, Sane Regulation of Pistol Sales, OCALA EVENING STAR (Fla.), Sept. 30, 1922, at 1 
(opinion editorial published by Revolver Association promoting the Revolver Act as “sane” 
legislation); Uniform Weapon Laws, EVENING WORLD (N.Y.C.), Nov. 16, 1922, at 30 
(showing the Revolver Association touted the Revolver Act as “sane regulation”). 
 337  Shall We Abolish the Hammer?, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1922, at 557. 
 338  ADAM WINKLER, GUN FIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 
207 (2011); see also Wants Pistols Sold Here Under License: Head of Revolver Association 
Advocates Measure Like the Capper Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1923, at 5. Even before the 
Revolver Act there were some cities that required gun dealers to maintain records of all sales. 
See, e.g., REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF PEORIA, ILLINOIS 783 (1910) (“Every person 
dealing in deadly weapons . . . shall keep a register of all such weapons sold, loaned, rented, 
or given away . . . . Such register shall contain the date of sale, loaning, renting or gift, the 
name and age of the person . . . and the purpose for which it was purchased or obtained.”); 
New Law Governing Sale of Weapons, supra note 320, at 1 (announcing a new law requiring 
licensed dealers to report all sales within twenty-four hours to the county recording, including 
“age and occupation of the purchaser, and description, number and identification of the 
weapon sold.”); THE CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE, supra note 320, at 366 (“Every person, firm 
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Revolver Act was enthusiastically endorsed in pro-gun circles339 and subsequently 
enacted by a number of states, to include California, Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and West Virginia.340   
In addition to the formation of the USRA, the Sullivan Law brought about 
increased efforts by hunters and sportsmen, as well as local hunting, fishing, and 
other organizations of “he-men,”341 to regularly inform gun owners of pending state 
and local legislation.342 Here, it is important to note that prior to the Sullivan Law’s 
enactment there was no unified gun advocacy movement.343 Resistance to firearm 
legislation was limited to opinion editorials, which primarily appeared in hunting 
and sporting magazines such as Outdoor Life, Field and Stream, and the NRA’s 
publication Arms and the Man, which was later renamed American Rifleman in 
1923. Although these opinion editorials appeared with some regularity, they 
generally took up no more than a page or two of any hunting and sporting magazine.  
The historical point to be made about the Sullivan Law is it, along with other 
contemporaneous firearm restrictions, essentially changed the gun advocacy 
landscape. From the perspective of pro-gun supporters, the growth of restrictive 
                                                           
or corporation that is licensed to deal . . . shall make out and deliver to the superintendent of 
police every day before twelve o’clock noon, a legible and correct report of every sale or gift 
made under authority of said license of the preceding twenty-four hours”). 
 339  See, e.g., Peter P. Carney, Regarding Uniform Revolver Law, OUTDOOR LIFE, Mar. 
1925, at 175 (calling for more states to adopt the uniform revolver legislation); Morris, supra 
note 326, at 72 (claiming that unlike other anti-firearm laws, the model legislation has not led 
to an increase in crime in California); Elemore E. Peake, In Defence of the Pistol, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 7, 1923, at xx6 (stating the Act “will accomplish all that any pistol legislation can 
accomplish . . . without denying . . . law-abiding citizens . . . the protection of life and 
property as well as recreation.”); Joe Taylor, The Price of Murder, FIELD & STREAM, May 
1924, at 29 (“The recently enacted California law referred to is a model one and every State of 
the Union should follow California’s lead toward protecting law abiding citizens and 
disarming crooks.”); The Anti Anti-Pistol Situation, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1923, at 29 (“We 
believe that this is the best law of its kind that we have yet come across and one that ought to 
be on the statute books of every state in the Union that does not already possess one equally as 
good. By ‘equally as good’ we mean a law that amply protects the right of the honest citizen 
to possess and carry pistols and revolvers for the protection of his person, his loved one and 
his property while at the same time providing the police departments with ample authority and 
leeway to prevent these weapons from coming into, or remaining in, the hands of lawless or 
irresponsible persons.”). 
 340  WINKLER, supra note 338, at 208. For public support of the Revolver Act, see 
Regulating Revolver Sales, GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Oct. 2, 1922, at 4 (“That some 
legislation on this subject is necessary scarcely admits of argument.”); Way Must Be Found to 
Stop Pistol “Toting,” EVENING STAR (D.C.), Oct. 18, 1922, at 6 (showing nationwide support 
for the Revolver Association’s push for model legislation and the end of “pistol toting”). 
 341  Joe Taylor, For Instance—The Anti Anti-Pistol Law, FIELD & STREAM, May 1923, at 
127. 
 342  See Report on Field and Stream’s Campaign to Prevent Anti-Pistol Legislation, FIELD 
& STREAM, May 1923, at 127. 
 343  See, e.g., G.C. Brown, Get Together and Fight, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 23, 1918, at 429-30; 
Kenneth F. Lockwood, Lawmakers and Sport, FIELD & STREAM, Dec. 1921, at 76; Shooter, 
Urges Union Against Anti-Pistol Laws, ARMS & MAN, Feb. 15, 1917, at 415; Warner, supra 
note 331, at 640. 
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firearm legislation was due to undesirable changes in American society and culture. 
Individuals that supported firearms restrictions were often cast as being “gun cranks” 
or “anti-pistol.” Women and “feminine” men were blamed for America’s changing 
attitudes on guns.344 “Nearly every day we read of some crank, faddist or reformer, 
usually a woman or a near-woman, trying to curtail the limited liberties of the 
already burdened American citizen,” wrote one commentator in an opinion 
editorial.345 The run-of-the-mill pro-gun supporter wanted reformers to focus less on 
restrictive firearm legislation and more on solving other problems.346 This would 
guarantee that the United States was “run by real men, and not by old women and 
petticoated men.”347 
Casting those that supported firearm restrictions as weak, unpatriotic, and 
ignorant was quite common in early twentieth-century pro-gun literature.348 In 
contrast to these deprecating characterizations, pro-gun supporters interestingly cast 
themselves as being patriotic defenders against all enemies, foreign and domestic.349 
Essentially, sportsmen and gun owners were socializing each other to believe that 
they are the true Americans and flag bearers of the country’s heritage and future.350 
                                                           
 344  See, e.g., Coler, supra note 325, at 182; Harry McGuire, Behold, the Popgun 
Crusaders!, OUTDOOR LIFE, Sept. 1932, at 16 [hereinafter McGuire, Popgun Crusaders!] 
(claiming most “reformers” are “women, most of them are unoccupied women; and most of 
them are unoccupied women who have dignified their status by organizing into some king of 
Friday Morning Club, Snoop Society or Social Service Sorority.”); Harry McGuire, Farewell, 
Farewell to the Popgun Crusaders, OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1931, at 20-21 [hereinafter McGuire, 
Farewell]; Harry McGuire, The Good Women of the Friday Morning Club, OUTDOOR LIFE, 
Apr. 1929, at 1 [hereinafter McGuire, Friday Morning Club]. 
 345  W.T. Burress, Pocket Disarmament and Reformers, OUTDOOR LIFE, Sept. 1921, at 208. 
 346  Id. 
 347  Id. (emphasis added). 
 348  See, e.g., Carney, supra note 339 (describing those that support firearm restrictions as 
“poor misguided souls” and the “real enemies of our nation”); Alfred B. Geikie, The Passing 
of the American, OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1915, at 573; Ray P. Holland, Pass a Law, FIELD & 
STREAM, Dec. 1925, at 17; Donald E. Martin, Anti-Gun Laws and Their Originators, 
OUTDOOR LIFE, Nov. 1924, at 354; Nash, supra note 327, at 145-46; Eltinge F. Warner, Idiocy 
Running Amuck, FIELD & STREAM, Nov. 1931, at 17; Warner, Who is to Blame, supra note 
332. 
 349  See, e.g., Hysteria in High Places, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1932, at 4; Joe Taylor, The 
Anti-Anti Pistol Situation: An Answer to the Foregoing, FIELD & STREAM, June 1923, at 186 
(“[Citizens that sign petitions for firearm restrictions] don’t realize they are playing into the 
hands of the bandits. They don’t realize they are also striking a mistaken blow at the 
thousands of true blue American sportsmen and sportswomen who follow clean, health-giving 
sport by field and stream.”); The Plot to Take Your Guns Away, OUTDOOR LIFE, Apr. 1941, at 
20; John P. Wright, Proposed Legislation Against Firearms, OUTDOOR LIFE, Jan. 1925, at 40 
(stating restrictive firearm laws will always be rejected by those who are “faithful to their 
ancestry of patriotic fighting men who won our national independence and not with empty 
words, but by thoro[ugh] knowledge and use of firearms.”). 
 350  See, e.g., A Memorial—An Heritage, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1932, at 4 (“The sallow, the 
anemic, the narrow, may try to reform you; may, because you love a gun, call you potential 
murderers or wanton destroyers; but when the Nation needs a Man it will turn to a sportsman, 
to an out-of-doors man, as it turned in the day of George Washington, and as it has turned in 
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According to the pro-gun line of thinking, riflemen do not follow “weaklings” or 
“reformers.”351 Riflemen point “the way for cowards and for weaklings . . . .”352 The 
USRA’s former Vice President and then NRA President Karl T. Frederick echoed 
these sentiments in a Field and Stream opinion editorial.353 Those that did not own 
or use firearms were labeled as “sheep.”354 Meanwhile, those that did own and use 
firearms were labeled as “shepherds”:  
The object of [restrictive firearms laws] is obvious. It is to disarm 
everybody except the police and a few favored persons. The result is 
equally obvious. Everyone is disarmed except for the crooks, the 
racketeers, the gangsters, the police and those few favored persons . . . . 
The theory, which underlies this doctrine of disarming the populace is 
steadily becoming clearer. Graphically stated it is this: The people of the 
state are divided into three classes. First come the sheep—a great flock of 
several million, the honest law-abiding men and women of the state. Then 
come the shepherds. The police are the shepherds of this enormous flock 
of sheep. And third come the wolves—the gangsters, racketeers and 
crooks, who prey upon the sheep. 
The theory as well as the practice of the Sullivan Law and all other 
anti-pistol laws of the several states is that this great flock of sheep must 
behave like sheep. They must support the shepherds and endure the 
wolves. They cannot and they must not defend themselves. They must 
only bleat. They must run for cover; they must huddle together; they must 
obey the shepherds and depend upon them for safety . . . . 
The shepherds, however, are warriors. They alone can fight the 
wolves; they alone are brave; they alone can be trusted with weapons; 
they alone know how to use them . . . . 
And the wolves—how they flourish! Their existence and numbers are 
proof complete that the shepherds cannot protect the sheep. The shepherds 
do what they can, and they catch or kill some of the wolves . . . . For the 
shepherds to exterminate the wolves becomes more and more impossible. 
Every year they increase in numbers and boldness . . . . 
This pictures the situation which exists under the Sullivan Law in New 
York and in those states where the “pistol abolitionists” have had their 
way. 
How long are you sheep going to consent to be mutton for the wolves? 
How long are you going to let the shepherds deny you the right to be 
anything but helpless sheep? Are you satisfied to bleat, or are you going 
to do something more effective?355 
                                                           
every crisis since.”); Make “The Spirit of ‘76” the Spirit of ‘32, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1932, at 
6. 
 351  Fight!, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1932, at 4. 
 352  Id. 
 353  For more on Frederick’s background, see WINKLER, supra note 338, at 210. 
 354  Karl T. Frederick, Are You Men or Mutton?, FIELD & STREAM, Feb. 1932, at 13. 
 355  Id. 
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The argument that the unarmed are easy prey for criminals was employed 
whenever pro-gun supporters wanted to denounce and criticize armed carriage 
laws.356 They viewed instances where an armed “courageous citizen” thwarted 
criminal activity as impressing upon criminals “the lesson of the Vigilante days of 
the old West—namely, that the criminal element can be cleaned up even in the worst 
of times if a sufficient number of citizens will arm themselves and use those arms 
when they are needed.”357 Some pro-gun supporters went a step further by claiming 
a fully armed society would not only deter crime, but bring forth civility.358 From 
their perspective, the government should encourage armed carriage. “The law-
abiding citizen should feel that by carrying a revolver for defense he is performing a 
public service, and I certainly believe that if the criminal element once thought that 
the chances were that their intended victims were armed they would think twice,” 
wrote one pro-gun supporter in an opinion editorial.359 This is not to say that pro-gun 
supporters endorsed individuals going armed in public without proper training.360 It 
was quite the opposite.361 As H.R. Ridgely, a retired Navy officer, wrote in an 
opinion editorial advocating for the repeal of armed carriage laws altogether: “The 
untrained are never safe when handling firearms, but are dangerous to themselves 
and to others.”362 
                                                           
 356  See, e.g., Crossman, supra note 330, at 925; Arthur Grahame, The Plan to Disarm 
Sportsmen, OUTDOOR LIFE, July 1938, at 17, 19; Guns and Crime, OUTDOOR LIFE, Aug. 1925, 
at 157; John Walker Harrington, Too Many Loopholes for Criminals are Seen in Sullivan Law, 
N.Y. HERALD, Sept. 20, 1925, at A3; George L. Morrow, The Anti-Pistol Law, OUTDOOR LIFE, 
Apr. 1925, at 300; The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1923, at 18. 
 357  McGuire, Farewell, supra note 344, at 20; see also Ray P. Holland, Pistols, FIELD & 
STREAM, Sept. 1936, at 17 (stating that where “fool pistol laws don’t exist” citizens are 
“granted the privileges of their fathers” which allows “real justice to strike quickly when 
crime is committed”). 
 358  See, e.g., William W. Ems, The Obnoxious Anti-Weapon Law, OUTDOOR LIFE, Feb. 
1915, at 190 (stating that in Guatemala everyone carries arms, which “makes every man a 
great deal more polite to his neighbor than he otherwise might be, and he does not take 
offense at trivial matters so quickly and hurling insulting epithets at another. Also, it places 
the respectable citizen on an equal footing in the matter of arms with the footpad and gunman 
. . . .”); Lionel F. Phillips, The Citizen and the Revolver, OUTDOOR LIFE, May 1922, at 299 
(“The logical method of combatting the activities of the criminal class is not to disarm the 
law-abiding citizen . . . but to remove the present restrictions as to the carrying of weapons, 
and then train the citizen to their use.”). 
 359  G.P. Gleason, To Combat the Non-Gun Toting Law, OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1922, at 442. 
 360  See, e.g., A Congressional Firearms Inquiry, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1924, at 11 (arguing 
that Congress should require “every law officer, federal and municipal, to prove proficiency in 
the practical use of firearms before a weapon is issued to him as a prerequisite to his privilege 
of going legally armed”) (emphasis added); C.A. Richmond, The Revolver’s Alibi, OUTDOOR 
LIFE, Jan. 1923, at 34 (“If there must be pistol legislation, the safety of the public would be 
better conserved by a law which would compel every citizen to carry a revolver and be 
capable of scoring at least 50 out of a possible 100 at 50 yards.”). 
 361  See, e.g., Morris, supra note 326, at 72 (advocating for “armed reputable citizens” to 
“subjugate gun-toting reprobates”). 
 362  H.C. Ridgely, Why Not Carry Firearms?, OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1926, at 465. William 
P. Eno, the father of traffic safety regulations, advanced a similar line of thinking. See William 
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What ultimately came out of the pro-gun literature against restrictive firearm 
legislation was what would later be dubbed the “more guns equals less crime” 
theory. Pro-gun supporters rationalized if an unarmed citizenry was easy prey to 
criminals and armed carriage laws were ineffective in deterring criminal behavior, 
then it was common sense that the more responsibly armed citizens society placed in 
the public concourse the less crime there would be.363 One pro-gun supporter went 
so far to state it was “the duty of all good citizens . . . to aid in the suppression of 
crime by discouraging the criminal, by convicting him that his victims will not 
tamely submit to his depredations but will meet him with his own weapons and skill 
a shade better than that possessed by the thug.”364   
Today, the “more guns equals less crime” theory is often associated with the 
statistical work of John Lott, Jr. In 1998, Lott asserted that gun control and safety 
laws were ineffective at reducing crime, and that those state and local jurisdictions 
that enacted pro-gun legislation experienced a noticeable reduction in criminal 
activity.365 Although Lott’s findings have turned out to be highly questionable,366 the 
“more guns equals less crime” theory has remained influential in modern 
discourse.367 In the first half of the twentieth century, however, the theory did not 
gain traction outside of pro-gun circles. The one exception was forensic scientist and 
Army officer Calvin Goddard.368 In 1930, he published an article in the American 
                                                           
P. Eno, Arms for the Public: Permits Should Be Issued to Keep and Carry Weapons, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1931, at 23 (criticizing the Sullivan Law’s workings, but supporting a permit 
scheme to “carry arms” in public so long as the applicant is of good character and can 
demonstrate to the police that they are “familiar with arms and know[] how to handle them 
safely”). 
 363  See, e.g., The Best Defense, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1932, at 6 (discussing how the Iowa 
Bankers Association learned that “an armed offensive was the best defensive” which 
eliminated bank robberies in Iowa); Morris, supra note 326, at 72; Ridgely, supra note 362, at 
464-65 (asserting that armed citizens in public would deter crime and current firearm 
legislation only increases crime rates); Tyros on the Hill, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1932, at 6 (“the 
type of anti-firearms legislation which attempts to disarm . . . has never resulted in anything 
except an increase of armed felonies. On the other hand, where the honest citizen has been 
permitted to own a gun and has been encouraged to know how to use it safely, some splendid 
records for the suppression of armed felonies have been established. In no case has crime 
increased because the sportsmen of the State have been permitted to possess guns without 
having to bootleg them.”). 
 364  Making Crime Unattractive, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1924, at 13. 
 365  See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND 
GUN CONTROL LAWS (3d ed., 2010). See generally Don B. Kates & Alice Marie Beard, 
Murder, Self-Defense, and the Right to Arms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1685 (2013); Don B. Kates & 
Carlisle Moody, Heller, McDonald, and Murder: Testing the More Guns, More Murder 
Thesis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1421 (2012).  
 366  See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 25-27 (2014); Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More 
Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003). 
 367  Charles, supra note 2, at 1173-75. 
 368  However, it was likely that Goddard was a member of the NRA or, at a minimum, a 
supporter. See Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Goddard, How Illinois Organized to Fight Anti-
Firearms Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1934, at 9. 
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Journal of Police Science claiming that firearm restrictions, particularly the Sullivan 
Law, doubled violent crime rates.369 According to Goddard, in the early twentiety 
century there was virtually no crime.370 There were also no legal restrictions as to the 
production, sale, ownership, or use of lethal weapons.371 Allegedly, the passage of 
anti-firearms legislation changed the status quo. The net effect was a decrease in 
ownership of firearms and a substantial increase in crime.372  
As a solution Goddard proposed the repeal of most restrictive firearms 
legislation.373 Moreover, Goddard proposed that miltary reserve officers in civilian 
attire carry concealed weapons to deter criminals.374 Alongside them would be NRA 
and USRA members. “Let [these] members too, be invited, urged, indeed besought, 
in the interests of public welfare, to accept permits to carry arms concealed and 
transport them upon their persons at all times,” wrote Goddard.375 These measures in 
turn would “increase the percentage of armed, ununiformed, persons present in any 
gathering, and decrease immeasurably the changes of the crook ‘getting away with 
it.’”376 However, Goddard cautioned against armed citizens enforcing the law or 
untrained citizens carrying arms in the public concourse. “I do not advocate . . . 
presenting them with pistol permits and saying, ‘Go ye forth, and bear arms in 
defense of the peace of the land.’ An armed man who knows not how to use his arms 
safely and accurately, is a liability and not an asset,” wrote Goddard.377  
Historically speaking, Goddard’s analysis on armed carriage laws and 
criminology is significant because it was first time anyone thoughtfully considered 
how “more guns” could in fact equal “less crime.” But it is worth noting that 
Goddard’s analysis was based solely on his perception of the past, not verifiable 
historical facts. For one, Goddard’s assertion that there were virtually no laws 
regulating firearms at the turn of the twentieth century is patently false.378 
Additionally, at no point did Goddard provide any statistical evidence or analysis to 
support his claim that early twentieth-century restrictive firearms legislation led to an 
increase in crime rates. Essentially, Goddard’s analysis was based on his personal 
observations and convictions, not reliable scientific research.379   
                                                           
 369  Calvin Goddard, The Pistol Bogey, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 178, 183 (1930). 
 370  Id. at 178. But see McAdoo, supra note 312. 
 371  Goddard, supra note 369, at 178. 
 372  Id. at 179-83. 
 373  Id. at 184-85. 
 374  Id. at 186. 
 375  Id. at 187. 
 376  Id.  
 377  Id. 
 378  See supra pp. 401-31. 
 379  It is possible that Goddard was relying on the first Uniform Crime Reports, which were 
published monthly from 1930 to 1931, and quarterly from 1932 to 1940. See Marvin V. 
Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PENN. L. REV. 708 (1963). At 
no point, however, did Goddard mention or refer to these reports. More importantly, the 
content of the reports would have made it impossible to scientifically conclude that more guns 
equals less crime. The reports themselves are available online at the National Archive of 
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As far as Goddard’s “more guns equals less crime” analysis influencing the the 
field of criminology, it did not gain traction like his writings on forensic ballistics.380 
But Goddard did catch the attention of NRA President Karl T. Frederick, for the 
following year Frederick published an article that echoed many of Goddard’s 
sentiments.381 In the article, Frederick claimed that despite the growth in “restrictive 
laws relating to pistols” there was a “startiling increase in violent crime.”382 
Additionally, Frederick asserted there was more than a casual connection between 
states that adopted strict firearm regulations and increased violent crime rates. 
“Some of the States which have the most drastic laws suffer, nevertheless, from the 
greatest proportion of violent crime; others whose laws are extremely mild and 
reasonable stand high in respect to the absence of crime,” wrote Frederick.383 But 
like Goddard, Frederick provided no subsantial evidence to support it. Still, noting 
the arrival of the “more guns equals less crime” theory in pro-gun circles is of 
historical significance because it coincided with the next push to provide uniformity 
to state firearm laws.  
At the same time the USRA was promoting the Revolver Act, the National 
Conference of Commissioners (NCC) began exploring its own model legislation—
the Uniform Firearms Act.384 Much like the Revolver Act, the Uniform Firearms Act 
required a license for individuals to carry concealed weapons in the public 
concourse, all handgun purchases to be subjected to a brief waiting period, and gun 
dealers turn over all records of handgun sales.385 Initially, the NCC’s desire to adopt 
uniform firearms legislation was endorsed by virtually everyone, to include the 
National Crime Commission, attorney generals, firearm manufacturers, and even the 
USRA and NRA.386 But following the publication of the Uniform Firearms Act’s 
                                                           
Criminal Justice Data. Uniform Crime Reports, 1920-1959, NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. 
DATA, 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3666?keyword=Uniform+Crime+Repor
ts&permit%5B0%5D=AVAILABLE) (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).  
 380  NRA President Karl T. Frederick seems to be the only author to have incorporated 
Goddard’s analysis as to how trained armed citizens may thwart criminal activity. Compare 
Goddard, supra note 369, at 180 (“Here is a dead man. Here is the gun that killed him. Had 
this gun not existed, he would be alive today. Abolish guns and we abolish their effects.”), 
with Karl T. Frederick, Pistol Regulation: Its Principles and History, Part 1, 2 AM. J. POLICE 
SCI. 440, 450 (1931) (same). 
 381  See supra note 369 and accompanying text. 
 382  Frederick, supra note 380, at 450–51. 
 383  Id. at 451. For the remainder of Frederick’s article, see Karl T. Frederick, Pistol 
Regulation: Its Principles and History, Part II, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 72 (1932); Karl 
T. Frederick, Pistol Regulation: Its Principles and History, Part III, 3 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 531 (1932). 
 384  See Charles V. Imlay, The Uniform Firearms Act, 12 A.B.A J. 767, 767–69 (1926); To 
Ask All States for Ban on Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1927, at 2. 
 385  See W.H., The Uniform Firearms Act, 18 VA. L. REV. 904, 904–08 (1932). 
 386  See Mills Suggests Pistol Laws, BOS. DAILY GLOBE, July 25, 1926, at B4; Eltinge F. 
Warner, The Pistol Situation, FIELD & STREAM, Nov. 1926, at 15; Will Asks States for Pistol 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1926, at. 4. 
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first draft, pro-gun supporters rejected it on the grounds it was poorly drafted and 
required a license to purchase a pistol.387 As NRA Executive Vice-President Milton 
A. Reckord wrote in an opinion editorial:  
We are of the opinion that pistol and revolver traffic should be controlled, 
but we believe this can be done without disarming the honest citizen. We 
think it can be done by controlling the dealer and placing certain 
restrictions upon the sale of revolvers and pistols and by licensing those 
who carry a pistol.388  
What ultimately came out of the pro-gun objections was a number of legislative 
compromises.389 In terms of the law and armed carriage, pro-gun supporters were 
successful in steering the NCC away from a complete prohibition in the public 
concourse.390 In its place individuals would obtain a concealed carry license if they 
could show a proper reason for carrying and the approval process was a matter left 
up to the respective states.391 The compromise was largely a reflection of the NRA’s 
stance on armed carriage laws.392 At the time, the NRA was willing to concede the 
necessity of some restrictive firearm legislation.393 The organization even supported 
                                                           
 387  See, e.g., Disarming the Gunman, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1927, at. 4; M.A. Reckord, The 
Truth About the Firearms Situation and a Suggestion for Its Practical Solution, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1, 1927, at 4; Wants Sound Laws Regulating Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
1926, at 21. For the other problems and concerns relating to the provisions within the Uniform 
Firearms Act, see Imlay, Uniform Firearms Act Reaffirmed, 16 A.B.A J. 799, 799–801 
(1930); Henry Morris, The National Crime Commission Anti-Gun Bill, OUTDOOR LIFE, June 
1927, at 28-29, 80. 
 388  M.A. Reckord, Control of Pistol Traffic, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 10, 1927, at 18. 
 389  W.H., supra note 385, at 908 (“In view of the fact that the Uniform Firearms act was 
designed with a view to affecting a practical compromise between two extreme views and at 
the same time to remain in line with existing state legislation, it is submitted that this result 
has been admirably achieved.”). 
 390  See M.A. McCullough, Conference’s Antifirearm Law Derided, OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 
1930, at 71 (dissenting to a draft of the Uniform Firearms Act that prohibited the carrying of 
concealed weapons except at “one’s place of abode or fixed place of business”); see also 
Morris, supra note 387, at 29 (arguing that the NCC was wrong to prohibit armed carriage 
because if “citizens were encouraged to meet criminals on equal terms . . . the chances are that 
they would win all prizes for bravery and for real results.”). 
 391  See Urges Pistol Law With License Clause, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1930, at 2; W.H., 
supra note 385, at 907. 
 392  See Merry Christmas—And Gun Laws, supra note 325, at 6 (“We have no objection to 
obtain a permit to carry a gun concealed, as long as a proper provision is made in the law to 
enable any honest citizen who is a member of a properly organized target-shooting club to 
carry his gun to and from the target range. We do not believe that the necessity of a permit to 
carry concealed weapons with have any appreciable effect on the use of guns by criminals; but 
if the police believe that such a law will help them, we have no objection to its passage.”). 
 393  See, e.g., Charles Askins, Game Laws for the Other Fellow, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1924, 
at 129 (“Without some restriction of what the individual would consider his human rights, our 
sole job in the world would be killing each other off. Such restrictive laws meet general 
approval for every one of us knows that whether we like them or not they are an unavoidable 
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the strict regulation of “powerful weapons in crowded communities,”394 to include 
requiring the registration the Magnum revolver in the same vein as machine guns 
and sawed-off shotguns.395 
In the end, the Uniform Firearms Act was heralded by pro-gun supporters and the 
NRA as the “most effective and proper measure to control possession and sale of 
guns.”396 And because of its popularity among federal and state government 
officials, law enforcement, and pro-gun supporters alike, the Uniform Firearms Act 
was adopted by Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.397 The NRA and pro-gun 
supporters were even optimistic that the Uniform Firearms Act’s popularity would 
result in New York adopting it, and therefore repeal the Sullivan Law.398 However, 
such optimism was short-lived when New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt 
vetoed the bill and issued the following statement: 
[Although] this legislation retains [the] prerequisite for a pistol permit 
in the city of New York . . . it would permit a person to obtain a permit in 
any county outside of the city without the necessity of fingerprinting and 
photographing, and bring the revolver into the city of New York . . . . 
A great many sportsmen have urged me to approve this legislation. It 
is hard to understand the interest of sportsmen and pistols. I have myself 
fished and hunted a great deal. I have a deep interest in outdoor sports and 
in the various sportsmen’s associations which foster them. But, it is 
common knowledge, of course, that fishermen never use a pistol, and that 
hunters practically never use a pistol. Practically all hunting is done with 
shotgun or rifle and this legislation does not concern itself with shotguns 
or rifles.  
There are a few people—relatively few—who desire to have revolvers 
in their homes for theoretical self-protection. Of course, the value of a 
revolver for this purpose is very problematical . . . . 
                                                           
necessity. All law and every law is restrictive; there is no human progress without law of some 
kind”). 
 394  You Can’t Fool the Editors All the Time, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1925, at 14. 
 395  Powder Smoke: Legislation in 1937, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1937, at 4. The NRA’s 
rationale was the Magnum “performs no practical function for the sportsman which cannot be 
as well or better performed by arms of standard type,” and therefore “it is impossible to 
defend the Magnum against legislation which would have the practical effect of limiting its 
sale to agents of the Federal, States, and local police.” Id. 
 396  Donald Stillman, Rod and Gun, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Feb. 19, 1932, at 2. 
 397  WINKLER, supra note 338, at 209. In the case of Indiana, the Uniform Firearms Act 
rescinded all of the state’s previous concealed carriage licenses. License holders were required 
to reapply for new licenses through the circuit court. See License of Pistol Toters Expires 
Midnight June 30, DAILY BANNER, June 15, 1935, at 4. 
 398  See, e.g., George P. Le Brun, Uniform Pistol Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1930, at 24; 
Karl T. Frederick, Too Many Teeth in Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1932, at 20; F.G. Morris, 
The Uniform Firearms Act, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 11, 1932, at 12; Mulrooney Fights 
Easing Pistol Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1932, at 4; Sportsmen Plan “Sane” Substitute for 
Sullivan Act, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Jan. 19, 1932, at 6; Stillman, supra note 396, at 26; Uniform 
Pistol Bill Passes, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 9, 1932, at 32. 
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The grave increase in the use of revolvers by criminals, individually or 
in organized gangs, makes essential the rigid control of the manufacture 
and sale of these weapons. To obtain full protection, there ought to be a 
Federal statute on the subject so as to prevent the present continuous and 
ready flow of pistols from one state to another. 
The methods provided by law for such identification at the present 
time may cause inconvenience to a few—but this is inconvenience only—
for there is nothing, and should be nothing, derogatory or degrading to 
one’s character or standing as a citizen in being photographed or 
fingerprinted for this purpose. No person, on mature reflection should 
object to this inconvenience if he but realize that the state and its 
communities are trying to stamp out gangsters and unlawful pistol toters . 
. . .399 
Roosevelt’s rejection of the Uniform Firearms Act drew the ire of pro-gun 
supporters for two reasons. First, although pro-gun supporters maintained few 
qualms with the licensing of armed carriage, they thought it was “un-American” to 
license firearm purchases. As Ray P. Holland, the editor-in-chief of Field and 
Stream put it: “A permit should be required to carry concealed weapons. That’s all. 
It is un-American to forbid a man to have a pistol in his home.”400 The second reason 
Roosevelt’s veto message irked pro-gun supporters was it encouraged federal 
action.401 Ever since the passage of the Sullivan Law, pro-gun supporters backed 
legislative proposals that incorporated aspects of firearm localism and limited 
aspects of firearm nationalism.402 Thus far, pro-gun supporters adverted federal 
intervention into the matter. However, upon Roosevelt being elected President of the 
United States, a federal solution to the nation’s crime and violence epidemic was 
certainly forthcoming, and the task fell to Attorney General Homer S. Cummings.403   
Throughout Cummings’s tenure as Attorney General (1933–1939), pro-gun 
forces worked diligently to defeat any federal attempt to regulate firearms. It began 
                                                           
 399  Governor Vetoes Gun Law Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1932, at 4. 
 400  Holland, supra note 357, at 17. 
 401  Id. 
 402  See, e.g., A National Sullivan Law, ARMS & MAN, Mar. 1921, at 8; McCullough, supra 
note 390, at 71 (“A law which might be suitable within the well-policed and closely built-up 
areas of metropolitan districts is wholly out of place in other sections . . . . Local option should 
be decisive. No law which runs counter to the prevailing sentiment is ever enforced generally . 
. . .”); The Sullivan Law, supra note 321, at 886; The Sullivan Pistol Act, supra note 321, at 
992 (stating the Sullivan Law “should be amended to permit . . . . Local license option in 
every city, town, and village in the state”). 
 403  See Adam Winkler, Franklin Roosevelt: The Father of Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/111266/franklin-roosevelt-father-gun-
control. For Cummings’s twelve point plan to suppress crime, see Homer S. Cummings, U.S. 
Attorney Gen., Address Delivered Before the Continental Congress of the Daughters of the 
American Revolution: A Twelve Point Program (Apr. 19, 1934), 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches-5. For Cummings’s take on firearms and crime 
suppression, see Homer S. Cummings, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address Delivered Before the 
Annual Convention of International Association of Chiefs of Police: Firearms and the Crime 
Problem (Oct. 5, 1937), http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches-5. 
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in September 1933 when the NRA called upon its members to get involved. From 
the NRA’s perspective, the national crime problem was not due to the availability of 
firearms, but with a criminal justice system that placed “police chiefs, 
commissioners, sheriffs, judges, prosecutors, and justices of the peace under the 
domination of politicians.”404 Moreover, the NRA was of the opinion that if the 
federal government regulated firearms it would ultimately lead to an increase in 
crime. The NRA felt that if history taught the world anything it was that criminals 
could be “stamped out by an aroused armed citizenry, either called to the aid of the 
police as possemen, or, as in the days of the Old West, disgusted with corrupt police 
officials and organized into their own law-enforcement groups—the Vigilantes.”405 
In other words, the NRA believed that history showed that the armed citizen was the 
“weapon of democracy.”406 
Within sportsmen and gun-owner publications, this type of rhetoric appeared 
regularly in response to proposed federal firearm regulations.407 The NRA, in 
particular, exerted its leverage and employed numerous tactics to urge membership 
against firearm nationalism.408 In one publication the organization blamed sportsmen 
and gun owners for not getting involved.409 In another it postulated that federal 
firearm regulations were part of a conspiracy towards arms confiscation.410 This line 
of rhetoric was employed frequently to argue against registration.411 At one point the 
NRA even asserted it did not oppose registration because “the theory was bad,” but 
because there was no assurance whatsoever it would not be used for “political 
persecution purposes.”412  
In the end, the tactics employed by the NRA and pro-gun supporters were quite 
effective.413 Although both the 1934 National Firearms Act and the 1938 Federal 
                                                           
 404  Powder Smoke: Federal Firearms Law, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1933, at 4. 
 405  Powder Smoke: The Attorney General is Inconsistent, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1934, at 4 
(emphasis added). 
 406  Id. 
 407  See, e.g., Ray P. Holland, Anti-Gun Mania, FIELD & STREAM, May 1936, at 15 
[hereinafter Holland, Anti-Gun]; Ray P. Holland, Guns, FIELD & STREAM, May 1934, at 15 
[hereinafter Holland, Guns]; Sylvester Rabadan, A Letter, FIELD & STREAM, May 1938, at 23.  
 408  See, e.g., Powder Smoke: Random Shots, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1934, at 4; Powder 
Smoke: Keep Those Letters and Telegrams Coming, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1934, at 4; Powder 
Smoke: Firearms in the Senate, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1934, at 4. 
 409  See Powder Smoke: Why Gun Laws?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1933, at 4. 
 410  See Disarmament by Subterfuge, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1934, at 4; Powder Smoke: The 
Clearing Picture, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1933, at 4. 
 411  See, e.g., Powder Smoke: Gun Registration, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1934, at 4; Milton E. 
Reckord, Mr. Cummings Proposes, FIELD & STREAM, Apr. 1938, at 21; Random Shots, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1934, at 4. 
 412  Powder Smoke: Why Honest Citizens Object, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1936, at 4. 
 413  See, e.g., Ray P. Holland, Before Election, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1934, at 15 (stating 
National Firearms Act does not burden sportsmen); Powder Smoke: Sportsmen’s Victory, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1938, at 4 (celebrating the passage of Federal Firearms Act as a NRA 
victory). 
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Firearms Act were enacted into law, the enforcement provisions did not impose 
serious burdens on an individual’s ability to purchase, own, and use firearms.414 
Additionally, the NRA gained invaluable experience in combatting restrictive 
firearms legislation, as well as grass roots organizing. The NRA developed an 
efficient process to track and grade federal, state, and local anti-firearms 
legislation.415 The process included the use of telegrams and telephones to set “in 
motion a large train of events” to defeat restrictive firearms bills.416 The NRA even 
touted itself as providing a form of “guardianship” over firearm freedom through 
“conscientious cooperation, wide-flung organization, and a frequently-exhibited 
willingness and ability to bring down upon the head of the short-sighted anti-gun 
legislator the concentrated wrath” of the sportsman and gun owner.417 
What made the NRA’s legislative and grass roots efforts so effective were its 
cunningly tailored talking points. Each served to rouse its membership against 
restrictive firearms legislation. The NRA’s talking points included things like 
“punish the criminal not the law-abiding firearm owner,”418 “enforce the laws on the 
books,”419 “firearm restrictions lead to increased crime rates,”420 and “one new 
firearm law leads to more and ultimately confiscation.”421 Until 1950 arguably the 
                                                           
 414  For more on scope of the National Firearms Act and the Federal Firearms Act, see 
Alfred M. Ascione, The Federal Firearms Act, 13 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 438 (1939); James N. 
Brown III, Note, Firearms Regulations, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 569, 571–73 (1965); Brabner-
Smith, supra note 291, at 405–09. 
 415  See Firearms Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1941, at 22 (first instance where NRA 
begins grading legislation); C.B. Lister, The Record for 1933, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1933, at 8; 
Our Business is Everybody’s Business, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1933, at 6; The Roll Call of 1933 
Firearms Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1933, at 20 (first instance where NRA publishes 
legislation roll call); Cover Page, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1932, at 1 (outlining the NRA’s 
objectives, to include “assistance to legislators in drafting laws discouraging the use of 
firearms for criminal purposes” and “prevention of the passage of legislation unnecessarily 
restricting the use of firearms”). 
 416  Quiet Efficiency, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1933, at 6. 
 417  Id.; see also Congress Convenes This Month—, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1938 (encouraging 
current NRA members to sign up friends to combat anti-firearm legislation); Powder Smoke: 
More on Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1937, at 6 (stating the NRA has been quite 
successful in its lobbying efforts). 
 418  See, e.g., Another Vicious and Unnecessary Firearm Bill, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1936, at 
2; Harold F. Dawes, Logic on Pistol Laws, OUTDOOR LIFE, July 1932, at 72-73; Powder 
Smoke: Gun Registration, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1934, at 4; Cover Page, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 
1932, at 1 (outlining that one of the NRA’s objectives was to provide “assistance to legislators 
in drafting laws discouraging the use of firearms for criminal purposes”). 
 419  See, e.g., Powder Smoke: Random Shots, supra note 408, at 4. 
 420  See infra pp. 458-66; see also Edward Huntington Williams, Criminal Gun, OUTDOOR 
LIFE, Oct. 1930, at 30 (stating firearms laws do not work).  
 421  See, e.g., C.B. Lister, Pattern in Red, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1948, at 10 [hereinafter 
Lister, Pattern in Red]; C.B. Lister, The History of Liberty—, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1946, at 9 
[hereinafter Lister, The History of Liberty]; C.B. Lister, A Foot in the Door, 94 AM. 
RIFLEMAN, 13 Apr. 1946, at 13 [hereinafter Lister, A Foot in the Door]; see also Raymond R. 
Camp, Wood, Field and Stream, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1941, at 31; Ben Franklin Hardaway, 
Ban on Ammunition Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1948, at 26; Eltinge F. Warner, 
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NRA’s greatest talking point was its legislative arch nemesis—the Sullivan Law. It 
was used as a constant reminder as to what could happen nationally if sportsmen and 
gun owners did not fight against each and every piece of restrictive firearms 
legislation.422   
In 1940, the NRA combined all of its talking points and lessons learned into a 
pamphlet titled The Pro and Con of Firearms Legislation. Its purpose was to “assist 
legislators who are interested in making a thorough study of the problems involved 
in regulating the use, ownership and possession of firearms.”423 The pamphlet 
outlined everything from the NRA’s organizational history, to legislation that the 
organization would both work in support and opposition to,424 to the NRA’s views 
on “anti-gun” laws, criminology, and crime statistics,425 to a summary of federal and 
state regulations on firearms.426 What is of particular interest, at least as a matter of 
historiography, was the pamphlet’s analysis of the Second Amendment because it 
aptly summarized the NRA’s position on the law and armed carriage from the 1920s 
until the late twentieth century. In contrast to what some academics have historically 
claimed,427 the NRA and its members had given some thought to the Second 
Amendment’s meaning and protective scope.428 Certainly a detailed analysis was 
                                                           
Disarmament for Defense?, FIELD & STREAM, Oct. 1940, at 15; No Gun Registration Law 
Needed, OUTDOOR LIFE, June 1934, at 73; Eltinge F. Warner, Idiocy Running Amuck, FIELD & 
STREAM, Nov. 1931, at 17. 
 422  See, e.g., Frederick, supra note 354, at 13; see also The Plot to Take Your Guns Away, 
supra note 349, at 21; Grahame, supra note 356, at 17, 19; Holland, supra note 407, at 15; 
C.B. Lister, Invasion, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1943, at 11; Powder Smoke: The Sinister Influence, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1935, at 6; Powder Smoke: Stick to the Issue, Mr. Alco!, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
Nov. 1934, at 6; Powder Smoke, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1934, at 4; Powder Smoke: Shades of 
the Pioneers!, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1934, at 4; Powder Smoke: Gun Registration, supra note 
411, at 4. 
 423  NAT’L RIFFLE ASS’N., THE PRO AND CON OF FIREARMS LEGISLATION 1 (1940) (on file 
with author). 
 424  The NRA supported legislation that (1) prohibited the possession of firearms or 
dangerous weapons by convicted criminals, fugitives, mental incompetents, drug addicts, 
vagrants, and undesirable aliens; (2) provided additional penalties for armed felons; (3) 
background checks; and (4) making the theft of a firearm a major criminal offense. Id. at 2. 
The NRA did not oppose legislation that (1) required gun dealers to register for a nominal fee; 
(2) prohibited the handling of arms by pawnbrokers; (3) required a “reasonable delay” 
between application and purchase of firearms; and (4) limited the sale and use of firearms by 
minors. Id. The NRA opposed legislation that (1) imposed punitive taxes on firearm 
purchases; (2) permitted government officials the authority to decide whether individuals 
could own and use firearms; and (3) required the registration of firearms. Id. 
 425  Id. at 3, 12. 
 426  Id. at 7, 10–11. 
 427  See, e.g., JOAN BURBICK, GUN SHOW NATION: GUN CULTURE AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 73–74 (2006); WINKLER, supra note 338, at 64–65. 
 428  See Small Arms and the Explosives Bill, ARMS & MAN, Sept. 1917, at 509 (stating that 
state firearm regulations seem to violate the “spirit” of the Second Amendment); Congress 
Convenes This Month, supra note 417 (asking every NRA member to stand up for the “right 
of the American Citizen to bear Arms”); Powder Smoke: Keep Those Letters and Telegrams 
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lacking, but the NRA and its membership firmly believed that the Second 
Amendment and similar state constitution analogues provided sportsmen and gun 
owners with some constitutional protection.429 In terms of the pamphlet itself, the 
NRA’s analysis in many ways reflected the constitutional status quo, with a hint of 
idealism:  
The most generally accepted concept of [the right to bear arms] is that 
it delegates the task of controlling firearms to the individual state 
governments. The original states thought themselves as separate and 
individual sovereignties who voluntarily joined in a Federal union to 
which they surrendered certain rights and powers for the common good. 
Any power not specifically delegated to the Federal government was 
reserved as a proper function of the state governments. To further clarify 
the matter of states’ rights and to relive the minds of those citizens who 
feared that the new Federal government would disregard certain principles 
of liberty which had been adopted after long and bitter struggles, the first 
ten amendments were prepared as a “Bill of Rights” to specifically 
designate some powers as functions of governments. 
                                                           
Coming, supra note 408, at 4; A National Sullivan Law, ARMS & MAN, Mar. 1, 1921, at 8 
(stating legislators never properly consider the Second Amendment when enacting anti-
firearm legislation); Brown, supra note 332, at 429 (stating the Second Amendment 
historically came from the 1689 English Declaration of Rights and protected arms ownership 
“for defense only”). For some early twentieth-century pro-gun advocate opinion editorials 
discussing the scope and meaning of the Second Amendment, see Another View of 
Preparedness, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1923, at 10 (stating one of the “fundamental” rights of 
American citizenship is “the right to keep and bear arms”); Barker, supra note 329, at 42; 
Constitutional Provision on Arms, OUTDOOR LIFE, Aug. 1921, at 148; Geikie, supra note 326, 
at 573-74; McGuire, Friday Morning Club, supra note 344; McGuire, Popgun Crusaders!, 
supra note 344, at 16; Morrow, supra note 356, at 300; The Foreign Gunman in American 
Crime, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1925, at 22 (“The American Rifleman bears to brief for any 
political party or religious creed . . . it stands for the right of all reputable citizens to own and 
bear arms, as guaranteed to them by the Constitution.”); Rabadan, supra note 407, at 23; The 
Sullivan Law, supra note 321, at 886; The Sullivan Pistol Act, supra note 321, at 991-92; 
Chauncey Thomas, Our Own Fault, OUTDOOR LIFE, Aug. 1914, at 187-88; Eltinge F. Warner, 
An Important Letter, FIELD & STREAM, Sept. 1925, at 16; Eltinge F. Warner, You Have No 
Constitutional Rights!, FIELD & STREAM, Mar. 1932, at 15; Captain Charles S. Wheatley, The 
People, the Constitution, and Firearms, OUTDOOR LIFE, June 1930, at 104. 
 429  See supra note 428; see also Camp, supra note 421, at 31 (echoing the sentiments of 
the NRA that the Second Amendment guarantees a “hands-off policy” to federal firearm 
regulation); Raymond R. Camp, Wood, Field and Stream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1949, at 31 
(asserting that many state firearm regulation proposals violate the Second Amendment); 
Raymond R. Camp, Wood, Field and Stream, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1947, at S3 (asserting that 
the registration of firearms is a violation of the Second Amendment); Charles W. Carson, 
Firearms Restrictions Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1941, at 20 (asserting that the regulation 
of private possession of firearms, to include the Sullivan Law, violate the Second 
Amendment); Eltinge F. Warner, Firearm Laws and the Constitution, FIELD & STREAM, Oct. 
1946, at 41 (asserting that there was a time where “courts in several decisions held state anti-
gun laws to be a violation of the Second Amendment,” but that is was “no longer considered 
open to argument, and it is extremely improbable that any Federal Court would today listen to 
such an argument”). 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the second amendment 
is a limitation on the power of the Federal government. Under this 
interpretation a state legislature is free to regulate the manner of bearing 
arms within the limits of its own constitution but in any case it probably 
lacks the authority to completely destroy the right to bear arms. By a 
judicious use of its police power it may properly regulate the use of 
firearms as a means of preventing crime but legislatures cannot exercise 
this power in an arbitrary manner but must make a reasonable use of the 
police powers granted to them by the state constitutions under which they 
operate.430 
Of historical note was the NRA’s admission that state and local governments 
retained broad police powers—that is so long as such legislation did not contradict 
the respective state’s constitutional provision.431 Here again, it is worth noting that 
the NRA did not have any problem with the licensing of armed carriage per se.432 As 
NRA President Karl T. Frederick stated before Congress in 1934, “I have never 
believed in the general practice of carrying weapons . . . I do not believe in the 
general promiscuous toting of guns. I think it should be sharply restricted and only 
under licenses.”433 However, the NRA did not support licensing laws where state or 
local government exercised police power in an “arbitrary manner.”434 By “arbitrary 
manner” the NRA meant licenses that were without sufficient due process.435 This is 
not to say that some pro-gun supporters did not take more extreme positions on the 
law and armed carriage, but these positions were largely based on romantic notions 
of the past.436 One open letter stated that it was a “disgrace” that so many Americans 
                                                           
 430  NAT’L RIFFLE ASS’N., supra note 423, at 4. 
 431  Id.  
 432  See, e.g., Shall We Abolish the Hammer?, supra note 337, at 557 (“In order that the 
police may function properly in this respect, it is essential to require every person to obtain a 
police permit to carry a pistol. And that the police be empowered to require whatever proof 
they shall deem sufficient of the integrity of the applicant.”). 
 433  National Firearms Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means H.R., 73rd 
Cong. 59 (1934). 
 434  NAT’L RIFFLE ASS’N., supra note 423, at 4. 
 435  See Eltinge F. Warner, Gun Prohibition, FIELD & STREAM, Aug. 1940, at 13 (objecting 
to armed carriage laws that do not presume an individual applying for a license to carry is 
“responsible” and “honest”); Holland, supra note 357, at 17 (stating any armed carriage 
permit scheme should be “compulsory on the authorities to grant”); Shall We Abolish the 
Hammer?, supra note 337, at 557 (dissenting to licensing laws that “permit the police to 
exercise arbitrary judgment and reject any application they care to whether they have just 
cause or not”); Eltinge F. Warner, Hand Over Your Gun!, FIELD & STREAM, May 1930, at 19 
(objecting to a proposed armed carriage law on the grounds it would only license a “small 
minority”). 
 436  See, e.g., Grahame, supra note 356, at 18 (“Our forefathers took the possession of 
firearms as a matter of course. Every farmer and ranchman had his shotgun or rifle or handgun 
and state lawmakers were quite content to go along with them. Citizen gun owners were a 
great aid in law enforcement, and when dangerous criminals had to be hunted down, the 
sheriff often did the job with a hastily sworn-in posse of volunteers, who brought along their 
own guns and didn’t need anyone to show them how to use them.”). 
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had become “unfamiliar with the use of firearms.”437 The author was of the opinion 
that if the people would only return to “some of the ideals of ‘76” that society would 
deter criminal activity.438 As a solution, the author recommended an “efficient, well-
paid police department,” judges “appointed for life,” and permitting, “all good 
citizens to own and carry arms and train them in their proper safe use.”439 
Although the NRA did not officially condone universal armed carriage to deter 
criminal activity, the organization certainly fostered the viewpoint in its magazine 
American Rifleman.440 This is because the NRA championed the view that all 
restrictive firearms legislation led to an increase in crime.441 Moreover, the NRA 
often portrayed the armed citizen as carrying out an important American historical 
tradition.442 In contrast, those that supported restrictive firearms legislation were 
characterized as too civilized, weak, unpatriotic or ignorant of firearms.443 Once 
World War II broke out it became common for the NRA to associate supporters of 
restrictive firearms legislation with Nazis, communists, and fascists.444 The practice 
                                                           
 437  Stephen D. Butts, A Letter, FIELD & STREAM, Dec. 1933, at 15. 
 438  Id. 
 439  Id. 
 440  See, e.g., Powder Smoke: The Attorney General is Inconsistent, supra note 405, at 4 
(stating history proves that criminals could be “stamped out by an aroused armed citizenry, 
either called to the aid of the police as possemen, or, as in the days of the Old West, disgusted 
with corrupt police officials and organized into their own law-enforcement groups—the 
Vigilantes.”) (emphasis added). 
 441  See, e.g., Lister, A Foot in the Door, supra note 421, at 13; Tyros on the Hill, supra 
note 363, at 6. 
 442  See, e.g., A Memorial—An Heritage, supra note 350, at 4; Fight!, supra note 351, at 4; 
C.B. Lister, History vs. Histrionics, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1943, at 13; ISM, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
Feb. 1939, at 2; “Make ‘The Spirt of ‘76” the Spirit of ‘32, supra note 350, at 6. 
 443  See Powder Smoke: Politics and Propaganda, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1940, at 4; Powder 
Smoke: Adequate Defense for Uncle Sam—And His Nephews, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1936, at 4; 
Holland, Anti-Gun Mania, supra note 407, at 15 (“It seems utterly absurd that anyone with 
even fourth-grade intelligence could think that anti-firearm laws will prevent crime.”); Lister, 
supra note 442, at 13. 
 444  See Frank A. Contey III, Possessing Firearms Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1952, at 
14 (opinion editorial asserting Nazi registration and disarmament); C.B. Lister, A Soldier 
Speaks, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1949, at 8; C.B. Lister, For Disarming the Bourgeoisie, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1947, at 7; C.B. Lister, Matter of Proportion, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1948, at 10; 
C.B. Lister, Optimist—Or Sucker?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1948, at 12; C.B. Lister, Passion for 
Crisis, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1948, at 10; C.B. Lister, Pious Subterfuge, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 
1946, at 9; C.B. Lister, Simple Arithmetic, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1949, at 10; C.B. Lister, State 
of Mind, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1948, at 8; C.B. Lister, Straightening the Record, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1947, at 6; Lister, supra note 422, at 11; Lister, Pattern in Red, supra note 
421, at 10; Lister, The History of Liberty, supra note 421, at 9. But see Logic and Reason, AM. 
RIFLEMAN Feb. 1962, at 14 (showing the NRA taking offense for its members and their beliefs 
being referred to as “communists, radicals, or fanatics”); John M. Snyder, The Other Side of 
Gun Control, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1973, at 14 (dissenting to media coverage that associated 
the NRA’s membership with Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan, and Minutemen). 
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continued throughout the twentieth century and is still prevalent today.445 Writing in 
1968, Yale Law School professor George D. Braden aptly criticized the NRA’s 
comparison as “hysterical,” “demagogic,” and missing the point altogether: 
There never have been any really good arguments against legislation 
designed to protect civilized society against trigger happy fools. But up to 
now the murder-weapon lovers have used rational arguments. When they 
are reduced to comparing civilized Americans who believe in controlling 
firearms to the German people of Hitler’s day, irrational arguments have 
taken over . . . . We civilized people do not wish to deny arms to the 
people. We wish only to know precisely who keep and bear arms and to 
assure ourselves that they are competent keepers and bearers.446 
From the close of World War II until the end of the 1960s, the NRA maintained 
its formula for defeating restrictive firearms legislation by informing its members of 
pending legislation,447 encouraging them to be politically active,448 warning them of 
supposed schemes to confiscate firearms and potential threats to America’s ideals,449 
and fostering a positive and patriotic image of sportsmen and gun owners,450 to 
                                                           
 445  See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi 
Gun Laws: Exploding Gun Culture Wars (A Call to Historians), 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 653 
(2004); see also Again, Gun Registration Aids Confiscation, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1967, at 16; 
Communism as a Bitter Lesson, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1973, at 8; Communism, Assassinations 
and Anti-Gun Attitudes, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1974, at 22; Communism Versus Gun 
Ownership, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1973, at 14; Communism Versus Gun Ownership, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1970, at 16; Will Revolutionaries With Guns Heed the 1968 Gun Control 
Act?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1973, at 14. 
 446  George D. Braden, Rifle Group Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1968, at 46-47. 
 447  See, e.g., A Busy Year With Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1956; Federal Gun 
Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1966, at 15; Legislative Activity in 1961, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
Aug. 1961, at 22; Legislative Box-Score, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1949; NRA Position on Gun 
Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1967, at 17. 
 448  See, e.g., Merritt A. Edson, The Greatest Dangers, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1955, at 16; 
Inform Your Legislator, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1961, at 8; Let’s Take the Offensive, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1958, at 16; C.B. Lister, The Greater Danger, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1949; 
Louis F. Lucas, The Price of Individual Rights, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1960, at 16; John 
Scofield, The Voice, the Pen, the Vote…, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1951; The Big Half-Truth and 
Smear By Association, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1966, at 16; The Power to Make Law, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1957, at 16.  
 449  See, e.g., C.B. Lister, Truth—Self Evident, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1949, at 10 (asking 
members to ever be mindful of communist and fascist threats to “American ideal”); C.B. 
Lister, Hysteria Abroad, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1949, at 12 (warning that game laws are the 
new threat to “the arsenal of democracy”); The Faces of the Opposition, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 
1967, at 16 (alleging a concentrated media campaign to support anti-gun agenda); The Right to 
Arms for Self-Defense, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1967, at 16 (warning of attempts of “homefront 
disarmament”); Jac Weller, Britain Disarms Herself, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1954, at 15-18 
(using Britain as an example as to how “rigid firearms control” could lead to “the disarming of 
the private citizen and plac[e] him at the mercy of the criminal”). 
 450  See A Man and His Gun, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1959, at 14; A Paul Revere 
Organization, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1958, at 14; Karl Hess, Don’t Let the Feds Take Your 
Guns, AM. MERCURY, Feb. 1958, at 35; Donald L. Jackson, The Man With a Rifle, AM. 
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include the notion that an armed citizenry is a strong deterrent to Cold War 
aggression.451 One noticeable addition was the NRA’s emphasis on education over 
new firearms legislation.452 From the NRA’s perspective, restrictive firearms 
legislation was usually the result of an unfortunate accident, which in turn led some 
“anti-gun” reformers to advocate, “there ought to be a law.”453 The NRA’s solution 
was to provide its members with the educational tools to prevent the passage of such 
laws and in the process promote good firearms legislation.454 This included 
                                                           
RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1951, at 13; James E. Serven, Why Americans Own, Shoot, and Collect Guns, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1963, at 12; The Armed Citizen, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1965, at 14. 
 451  See e.g., Merritt A. Edson, . . . Keep Your Powder Dry!, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1954, at 
14 (stressing the importance of riflemen to defeat communism); Merritt A. Edson, Is the 
Rifleman Outmoded?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1954, at 16 (stating that riflemen will be needed in 
future warfare and “the continued existence of our country, may, some day in the future, 
depend again upon stout-hearted men armed with rifles and with the ability to use them”); 
C.B. Lister, Plan for Defense, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1949, at 10 (encouraging “universal 
military service” and a defense budget that supports rifle clubs); see also Ralph L. Smilde, 
Right to Bear Arms: Ownership of Rifle Declared Part of Our National Heritage, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 1964, at 22 (stating that individual proficiency and ownership of small arms would 
“certainly be a deterrent to any attack of invader”); James I. Wendell, Right to Bear Arms 
Upheld: Limitation on Weapons Considered Poor Means to Prevent Murder, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 1963, at 21 (stating the familiarity and ownership of weapons is an important skill 
seeing that “practically every young male American will be called up for military service”).  
 452  See Let’s Take the Offensive, supra note 448, at 16 (“The real answer to gun accidents, 
just as has been found in traffic accidents, is education.”); see also Merritt A. Edson, 
Education Versus Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1955, at 16 [hereinafter Edson, Education 
Versus Legislation 2] (“A gun, just like an automobile, can be dangerous unless the operator 
has been taught how to handle it safely. A gun, just like an automobile, can be used for 
unlawful purposes unless the operator has been convinced that crime does not pay. These are 
the essential truths on which gun legislation should be based.”); Merritt A. Edson, Education 
Versus Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1953, at 12 [hereinafter Edson, Education Versus 
Legislation 1] (“Just as crime cannot be eradicated by passing laws aimed at the gun rather 
than at the criminal, neither can shooting accidents be wiped out by a similar approach . . . . 
The real answer to gun accidents, just as has been found in traffic accidents, is education.”); 
Merritt A. Edson, A Sense of Responsibility, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1952, at 16 (admitting that 
“guns are dangerous and have always [been] so,” but emphasizing the importance of 
responsibility through education); Merritt A. Edson, A Realistic Approach, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
Oct. 1951, at 16 (stating the answer to hunting accidents is not to “pass a law,” but “gun-
safety education, just as driver education and training has been found to be the proper 
approach to the automobile accident problem.”). 
 453  See, e.g., A Knowledge of Existing Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1963, at 12; 
Legislation by Regulation?, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1957, at 16; There Ought to be a Law!, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1956, at 16; The Quick-Draw Craze, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1959, at 14 
(encouraging gun safety before people will react with “there ought to be a law”); see also Karl 
Hess, Should You Own a Gun?, AM. MERCURY, Apr. 1957, at 59. 
 454  See J.J. Basil, Jr., & Daniel L. Mountain, Firearms Legislation and the Gun Owner: A 
Guide to Sound Action by the Individual for Preventing Restrictive Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
July 1964, at 30-32; Elizabeth T. Cornish, Your Gun and the Non-Shooter, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
Mar. 1955, at 4; Frank C. Daniel, The Gun Law Problem, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1953, at 16-18, 
46; Let’s Sound Off!, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1956, at 16 (admitting that firearms result in 
accidents and deaths, but encouraging proper education and training in firearms); Michael 
Nadel, What Can We Do?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1954, at 19; John F. Soubier, Before It’s Too 
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establishing a test for sportsmen and gun owners to determine whether the respective 
firearms legislation was “good” or “bad.”455 The test comprised of five questions: 
1. Is it an enforceable law? 
2. For what purpose is the law intended, and will it actually achieve that 
purpose? 
3. Could the law be used by an unscrupulous person or party to extend or 
perpetuate its own power? 
4. Is the law really necessary or does it merely contribute to a network of 
technical restrictions which can trip you or some other conscientious 
sportsman into being an unintentional violator? 
5. Is the law an attempt to accomplish by prohibition what can be 
accomplished only by education and training?456 
If one applied the NRA’s test to virtually any restrictive firearms law the result 
was always a failed grade. Given that the NRA was of the opinion that virtually 
every restrictive firearms law led to increased crime rates or was ineffective at 
deterring crime altogether, the result should not at all be surprising.457 Yet somehow 
the NRA continued to tout itself as a supporter of reasonable firearm legislation.458 
At one point the NRA claimed it “always has . . . and always will be ready to do 
what is best for America,” to include never placing its organizational goals or 
firearm heritage “ahead of the national welfare.”459 The NRA supported the 
                                                           
Late: Learn What is Required to Fight Local Antigun Legislation, and Be Ready, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1958, at 17-19, 32; The Positive Approach, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1961, at 16; 
Edson, supra note 448, at 16 (“We must prepare ourselves to counter bad ideas with good 
ideas. We must meet good intentions with proven results, incomplete knowledge with 
education.”). 
 455  See Daniel, supra note 455, at 16-18; Inform Your Legislator, supra note 448, at 8; 
Louis F. Lucas, Good-by Guns?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1960, at 14; Franklin L. Orth, Where 
the NRA Stands…, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1966, at 22; There Ought to be a Law!, supra note 
253, at 16; Well-Meaning, But Without Understanding, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1957, at 14. 
 456  Lucas, supra note 455, at 14. 
 457  See, e.g., The Positive Approach, supra note 454, at 16 (“It is true that a small 
percentage of our population uses firearms for illegal purposes. We abhor this situation but 
believe that firearms legislation is of insufficient value in the prevention of crime to justify the 
inevitable restrictions which such legislation places on law-abiding citizens.”).  
 458  See The Illegal Use of Guns, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1964, at 16; This is Our Stand, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, May 1965, at 16 (“Contrary to the claims by the anti-gun forces, members of the 
[NRA] and millions of other law-abiding citizens do not oppose all proposed firearms 
legislation.”); Edson, Education Versus Legislation 1, supra note 452, at 12 (“Consistently, 
the NRA has favored and supported those laws that are good.”); Edson, Education Versus 
Legislation 2, supra note 452, at 16 (“Consistently, the NRA has favored and supported those 
laws that are good.”); There Ought to be a Law!, supra note 253, at 16 (“The Federal 
government controls the transfer between individuals of machine guns and requires dealers in 
firearms to maintain certain records. Although these laws technically may be imperfect 
instruments, few would claim that, in theory, their object was improper. If we could say ‘All 
gun laws are bad gun laws’, our course of action would be clear and well defined. Since we 
must concede that some controls are good, then we assume the burden of defining what is 
good, and what is bad.”). 
 459  Word of Wisdom on Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1967, at 14. 
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disarmament of anyone who “committed a felony or a crime of violence or has a 
notoriously bad character . . . .”460 Additionally, the NRA supported legislation that 
required firearm purchasers to identify themselves, firearm dealers maintain records 
of sales, parental consent before selling a firearm to a minor, taking a safety course 
before a minor could obtain a hunting license, and punishing theft of a firearm as a 
“major offense.”461 At one point, the NRA even supported a seven-day waiting 
period before purchasing a handgun.462 In the 1980s, however, the NRA retracted its 
support for waiting periods on the grounds they were nothing more than “permit-to-
purchase” statutes that burden “law-abiding citizens,” and threaten public safety.463 
Essentially, the NRA’s post-World War II stance as to whether firearms 
legislation was “good” or “bad” was a direct reflection of the organization’s 
interpretation of the Second Amendment. To the NRA, the Second Amendment 
embodied both individual responsibilities and constitutional guarantees.464 As it 
                                                           
 460  Merritt A. Edson, On Our Honor, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1954, at 16. 
 461  Frank C. Daniel, The Gun Law Problem, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1953, at 18. 
 462  See Peter Grose, Rifle Group Head Disputes Need of Gun Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 1968, at 16; Bill Riviere, The Great 40 Million Firearms Owners Insist the Right to Bear 
Them is Sacred, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1968, at F8. 
 463  See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer, California’s Waiting Period Law; Just How Well Has It 
Worked?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1993, at 20-21; Waiting Periods Threaten Public Safety, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, July 1991, at 59; Waiting Periods: No Modest Proposal, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 
1981, at 56-57. 
 464  See Citizens of Good Repute, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1964, at 20 (stating the NRA has 
always supported “the right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms for recreation, for 
self-protection, and for national defense . . . this right has been forfeited by individuals who 
commit a crime of violence or have a notoriously bad character.”); Merritt A. Edson, The 
Right to Bear Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1955, at 14 [hereinafter Edson, The Right to Bear 
Arms] (“Any right carries with it certain responsibilities and, in discharging those 
responsibilities, we surrender none of the basic right. In case of the basic right, as we see it, is 
the right of the lawful citizen to own personal weapons and to use those weapons lawfully for 
recreation and for personal and national defense.”); Merritt A. Edson, Independent, and 
Prepared for Peace or War, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1955, at 16 (stating the NRA stands for “the 
right of loyal, law-abiding citizens to purchase, to own, and to use firearms for lawful 
purposes”); Merritt A. Edson, Our Common Interests, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1954, at 16 
(stating the NRA serves to protect the “right of law-abiding citizens to own and use firearms 
in recreation, self-defense, and national security.”); Merritt A. Edson, To Keep and Bear 
Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1952, at 16 [hereinafter Edson, To Keep and Bear Arms] 
(discussing the Second Amendment as a responsibility and a right to own and use firearms for 
lawful purposes, as well as national defense); Edson, supra note 460, at 16 (“The National 
Rifle Association has steadfastly maintained that the right of citizens of good repute to keep 
and bear arms for recreation, for self-protection, and for national defense should not be 
abridged. We believe just as stoutly that the individual who has committed a felony or a crime 
of violence or has a notoriously bad character should be denied that right.”); Louis F. Lucas, 
The National Rifle Association of America, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1959, at 16 (stating the NRA 
“believes in the fundamental right of an individual to keep and bear arms and stands squarely 
behind the premise that the lawful ownership of firearms must not be denied [to] American 
citizens of good repute, so long as they continue to use such weapons for lawful purposes.”); 
Our Priceless Heritage, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1958, at 16 (stating the Second Amendment 
imposes the obligation to “use our firearms, when necessary, in defense of our nation; to exert 
our best efforts to see that every citizen, military and civilian alike, is taught basic 
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pertained to the right as an individual responsibility, NRA Executive Director 
Merritt A. Edson wrote it was “to see that we use our weapons safely, lawfully, and 
in observance of those controls imposed by proper authority for the welfare of 
all.”465 It was even conceded that it was “generally accepted that some degree of 
control over firearms is both proper and necessary”: 
Because of the constitutional right of individual Americans to keep 
and bear arms, responsible citizens have the right to own firearms and to 
use them for self-protection, for the security of our nation, and for 
recreational activities such as hunting and target shooting. In return, they 
have certain obligations which must be fulfilled. Firearms must be 
handled with safety and skill. They must be kept in good condition and 
stored in an appropriate place. They must be used with common sense and 
consideration for others . . . . 
Intelligent Americans will agree that under today’s conditions, 
guidelines must be established for the control of firearms in some areas. 
Nevertheless, this control must be based on reason and understanding, not 
on emotional reaction or misinformation.466 
As it pertained to the Second Amendment’s constitutional guarantee, the NRA 
consistently advanced that the right protected individual firearm ownership for 
national defense, self-protection, and “lawful purposes” such as shooting for 
recreation and hunting.467 At no point did the NRA claim the Second Amendment 
guaranteed a right to preparatory armed carriage in public.468 However, the NRA 
                                                           
marksmanship; to train our youth to enjoy shooting . . . to insure proper punishment of those 
who use firearms for unlawful purposes; and to be forever alert to prevent wearing away of 
our right.”). 
 465  See Edson, The Right to Bear Arms, supra note 464, at 14; see also Words of Wisdom 
on Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1967, at 14 (“Neither citizens [that have fought in past or 
current wars] nor the NRA, their organization, would put personal pastime with firearms 
ahead of the national welfare. The record in that respect is crystal clear. Many of the truly 
effective firearms regulations in this country . . . were passed with NRA support and counsel. 
The NRA always has been and always will be ready to do what is best for America. It is the 
first of all patriotic organizations of good conscience.”). 
 466  The Misuse of Firearms, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1964, at 16; see also Mail-Order Gun 
Control, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1965, at 16; This is Our Stand, supra note 458, at 16.  
 467  The Misuse of Firearms, supra note 466, at 16. 
 468  See Basic Facts of Firearms Controls, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1964, at 14 (“The courts 
have held that the states under there general and broad police powers may regulate, within the 
limits of their constitutions, the possession and use of firearms in furtherance of the health, 
safety, and general welfare of their citizens. In the exercise of this power and in the due 
administration of criminal justice, the states have adopted various controls over the . . . 
carrying . . . of firearms.”); CBS Reports: Murder and the Right to Bear Arms, (CBS 
Television Network June 10, 1964) (statement of NRA President Bartlett Rummel) (“we 
believe that a respectable citizen should have the right to have and keep his weapons to use 
them in hunting or in sports, or defending his home or his place of business.”) (on file with 
author); Edson, The Right to Bear Arms, supra note 464, at 14 (“Going armed with a 
concealed weapons is a privilege which the community properly reserves for those possessed 
of good reason. The fact that we are required to show reason for being granted the privilege of 
going armed with a concealed weapons should not be interpreted as an infringement upon the 
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asserted that the Second Amendment must at least guarantee an ancillary right to 
transport weapons from home to business or from home to shooting recreation. “The 
right to own a personal weapon amounts to little without the corresponding right to 
carry it from place to place—from home to range, from tournament to tournament, in 
the upland country in search for birds, or in the deepest wilds in the hunt for carrying 
game,” wrote Edson.469 
While the NRA did not perceive the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right 
to preparatory armed carriage up through the late 1960s, as a matter of public policy, 
the organization began openly advocating against “shall issue” licensing regimes.470 
The NRA truly believed that “fewer crimes of violence would take place” if there 
were a number of properly trained armed citizens on the streets.471 From the NRA’s 
perspective, imposing restrictions on the ownership and use of firearms did little, if 
anything, to reduce crime.472 Crime was a larger societal problem that involved 
                                                           
right to keep and bear arms.”); Oscar Godbout, Wood, Field and Stream: Sportsmen Are Not 
Expected to Complain About Proposed Curbs on Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1964, at 24 
(stating that no sportsmen would object to a city prohibition on carrying unloaded rifles or 
shotguns unless in a case); Mail-Order Gun Control, supra note 466, at 16 (“In some parts of 
America, crime has become a real problem. In some cases, concealable firearms are a vital 
part of that problem.”); Realistic Firearms Controls, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1964, at 14 (“The 
NRA does not oppose reasonable legislation regulating the carrying of a concealed handgun, 
but it does oppose the theory that a target shooter, a hunter, or a collector should be required 
to meet the same conditions.”); The Illegal Use of Guns, supra note 458, at 16 (“Reputable 
gun owners . . . do not oppose reasonable legislation regulating the carrying of a concealed 
handgun, but they do oppose the theory that a target shooter, a hunter, or a collector should be 
required to meet the same conditions.”); There Ought to be a Law!, supra note 253, at 16 
(stating some firearm restrictions are “proper and necessary” such as the 48 state regulations 
on concealed carry). But see Bartlett Rummel, Pistol Licensing Laws: Do They Deny Your 
Right of Self-Defense?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1961, at 23 (concluding that many NRA 
members have a difficult time reconciling judicial opinions upholding a license to carry arms).  
 469  See Edson, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 464, at 16; see also NRA Basic Policy, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1964, at 31 (“The NRA is opposed to the theory that a target shooter, 
hunter, or collector, in order to transport a handgun for lawful purposes, should be required to 
meet the conditions for a permit to carry a concealed weapon.”). 
 470  See, e.g., Daniel, supra note 461, at 18 (pledging the NRA’s continued support for the 
Uniform Firearms Act); NRA Basic Policy, supra note 469, at 31 (supporting legislation that 
“clearly” sets forth in the law the “conditions” for a license to carry, and its “issuance . . . 
should be mandatory”). 
 471  See Norman D. Arbaiza, Opinion, For Repeal of Sullivan Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
1955, at 32 (opinion editorial hypothesizing the “crime rate” would be “substantially reduced” 
in New York if criminals “were aware that a majority of law-abiding citizens carried arms”); 
John E. Osborn, Guns, Crime, and Self-Defense, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1967, at 31 (advocating 
for less restrictive armed carriage licensing so long as the applicant “know[s] how to use guns 
and [is] familiar with all the rules of safety as well as the penalties for misuse.”); John M. 
Snyder, Crime Rises Under Rigid Gun Control, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1969, at 54; Let’s Sound 
Off!, supra note 454, at 16. 
 472  See, e.g., Crime Control for Non-Criminals?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1967, at 16; Words 
of Wisdom on Gun Laws, supra note 465, at 14. 
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many variables.473 At the time, however, the American public overwhelmingly 
disagreed with the NRA’s position and stricter firearm regulations became the 
norm.474 The NRA responded by blaming the large disparity of public opinion in 
favor of increased firearm restrictions on everything from the biased media, to 
distorted television depictions of firearms violence, to cultural changes in American 
society.475   
                                                           
 473  See Edson, Education Versus Legislation 2, supra note 452, at 16; Edson, Education 
Versus Legislation 1, supra note 452, at 12; Let’s Take the Offensive, supra note 448, at 16 
(“Just as crime cannot be eradicated by passing laws aimed at the gun rather than at the 
criminal, neither can shooting accidents be wiped out by a similar approach”); Wendell, supra 
note 451, at 21 (“This writer does not believe that safety, or protection from the emotionally 
maladjusted, can ever be absolute.”). 
 474  See Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Gun Control, 3 PUB. OPINION Q. 455 (1972); George 
Gallup, Gallup Poll: A Permit to Be Armed?, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 15, 1965, at 11; Gallup Poll 
Hits Gun Owners, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1959, at 12 (showing seventy-five percent of adults 
favoring a law requiring a police permit before buying a firearm). For the NRA’s view and 
response to these public opinion polls, see Robert L.F. Sikes, Should Congress Enact 
Administration Proposals for Increased Federal Controls Over Firearms? CON, 46 CONG. 
DIG. 221, 223 (1967) (statement of NRA President Franklin L. Orth, July 19, 1967) (“A 
segment of the publicity media has been wont to cast the aims and purposes of the National 
Rifle Association in a highly unfavorable and negative light. This has been particularly true in 
the field of firearms legislation. Our critics and adversaries often proclaim by word of mouth 
and on the printed page that the NRA is for minimum firearms control or no gun regulation at 
all. Nothing could be further from the truth.”); Do Americans Really Want New Gun Laws?, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1968, at 16 (showing a recent survey does not support claims that the 
public supports more firearm restrictions); Louis F. Lucas, Firearms and Public Opinion, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1960, at 14 (encouraging NRA members to “make known the true facts and 
create public opinion which is favorable to firearms and shooting”); John M. Snyder, Why 
Anti-Gun Polls Are Open to Doubt, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1968, at 20 (questioning the 
methodology of public opinion polls that show a desire for increased firearms restrictions); 
Realistic Firearms Controls, supra note 468, at 14 (stating the Kennedy assassination caused 
an “eruption in the press, radio, and television” for increased firearm restrictions); see also 
Mark J. Green Lynn Hinerman, Letter to the Editor, For Gun Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 
1968, at 18 (responding to the NRA’s claim of “hysteria” against firearms and stating public 
opinion polls have shown “long standing and overwhelming” support for firearm restrictions). 
 475  See Robert A. Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 A.B.A. J. 665, 668 (1965) 
(postulating that the either deputizing “armed citizens” along President Kennedy’s route in 
Dallas or an “armed witness” may “have been alert enough after the first shot to have 
prevented the fatal shot”); Can Three Assassins Kill a Civil Right?, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1968, 
at 16 (stating the underlying causes of crime are complicated and the problem is not firearms); 
Harlon B. Carter, The NRA . . . What It Is and Does, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1965, 19 (stating 
the positive effects of gun control are “exaggerated,” and many of the problems with society 
revolve around “permissive education, permissive parents, and . . . a permissive society”); 
Consent of the Governed, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1961, at 16 (“We Americans slowly but 
steadily are being molded to conform to the Big Government pattern. It is a trend, and if we 
succumb to it, we shall lose everything that made this nation and brought it to greatness . . . 
.”); Creating ‘Vigilantism’ Where None Exists, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1967, at 16 (assailing the 
media for mispresenting the NRA’s position in an opinion editorial published in American 
Rifleman); Harold W. Glassen, Opinion, Another Opinion: The Right to Bear Arms, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 1968, at E17 (opinion editorial by NRA president expressing his frustration at 
Americans pushing for increased firearm restrictions); In the Interest of Accuracy, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1967, at 106 (responding to Reader’s Digest article We Need a Firearms 
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As a counterpoint to sway public opinion away from firearm restrictions, the 
NRA continued to contend that restrictive firearms legislation was ineffective at 
reducing crime.476 But the NRA’s criminological claim was always more nominal 
than real. Herein entered Alan S. Krug—an economist and assistant to the director of 
the National Shooting Sports Foundation—who published a number of studies that 
coincided with the NRA’s position on firearm restrictions.477 According to Krug, 
“[f]ewer people with guns [did] not mean less crime” and there was “no positive 
correlation between the extent of firearm ownership and crime rates.”478 Krug even 
thought it was theoretically plausible that more “firearms ownership by the law-
abiding public could be a factor in restricting the number of . . . criminal acts,” but 
                                                           
Control Law—Now!); Non-Violence Begins at Home—on the TV, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1968, 
at 18 (blaming TV programming and the media for glorifying and sensationalizing violence); 
Self-Defense—1966, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1966, at 22 (reprinted opinion editorial asserting 
“one gun could have made the difference between life and death for the eight student nurses 
who were brutally slaughtered” by Richard Speck); The Answer is Simply Law Enforcement, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1968, at 16 (stating there is much misinformation and propaganda 
against firearms and that it may be a government ploy to distract people away from the 
Vietnam War); The Latest Twist in Anti-Gun Propaganda, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1968, at 16; 
The Mentally Ill, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1966, at 20; The U.S. Justice Department, Izvestia and 
the New Yorker, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1968, at 16 (dissenting to media portrayals of the NRA 
and Carl Bakal’s book); Whose Right to Be Biased?: Gun Owners Ask TV Network, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, May 1967, at 38 (assailing NBC’s portrayal of NRA in a one-hour program Whose 
Right to Bear Arms?); Paul Wilkes, The NRA—A Study in Power, BALT. SUN, June 23, 1968, 
at FD1 (detailing the NRA’s efforts to defeat restrictive firearms legislation); Let’s Sound 
Off!, supra note 454, at 16 (asserting the media and television is wrongfully placing the blame 
on guns for accidents in the home); The Big Half-Truth and Smear by Association, supra note 
448, at 16 (stating a number of “firearms critics” are misrepresenting crime statistics and 
smearing the NRA). For more on Carl Bakal’s views on the NRA and gun control, see CARL 
BAKAL, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1966); Carl Bakal, The Right to Bear Arms VI: What Can 
Be Done?, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 5, 1966, at 10; Carl Bakal, The Right to Bear Arms V: Dodd Bill 
Smothered, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1966, at 18; Carl Bakal, The Right to Bear Arms IV: Kinfolk 
Use the Guns, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1966, at 12; Carl Bakal, The Right to Bear Arms III: 
Arsenal: U.S. Home, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1966, at 14; Carl Bakal, The Right to Bear Arms II: 
The Rifle That Killed Him, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1966, at 8; Carl Bakal, The Right to Bear 
Arms . . . It’s Killing Us, BOS. GLOBE, July 31, 1966, at A3. 
 476  See, e.g., The Silent Protectors, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1971, at 28; Grose, supra note 
462, at 16; Lucas, supra note 455, at 14 (“A realistic evaluation will show that most firearms 
legislation is of insufficient value in the prevention of crimes or accidents . . . .”); Realistic 
Firearm Controls, supra note 468, at 14 (“The NRA believes that firearms legislation is of 
insufficient value in the prevention of crime to justify the inevitable restrictions which such 
legislation places upon law-abiding citizens.”); see also William C. Snead, Do Laws 
Requiring Registration of Privately Owned Firearms Lower Murder Rate?, 3 S. TEX. L.J. 317 
(1958) (using basic statistics of murder and homicide to conclude the registration of weapons 
will not lower the rate at which murders and homicides are committed). 
 477  See ALAN S. KRUG, DOES FIREARMS REGISTRATION WORK (1968); ALAN S. KRUG, THE 
TRUE FACTS ON FIREARMS LEGISLATION (1968) [hereinafter KRUG, THE TRUE FACTS]. The 
NRA subsequently employed Krug. See NRA Closes Pennsylvania Lobbying Office, OUTDOOR 
NEWS, Jan.1996, at 1. 
 478  KRUG, THE TRUE FACTS, supra note 477, at 17. 
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admitted his conclusion in this respect was “not proven by . . . the results of this 
study.”479 
The NRA embraced Krug’s findings and presented them at congressional 
hearings.480 However, Krug’s findings were misleading. The only variable Krug 
considered was whether the states required a license to purchase a firearm.481 At no 
point did Krug consider how overall firearm availability and use impacted total 
deaths by homicide, suicide, and accident by firearms.482 Indeed, Krug and the NRA 
were correct in asserting that an individual intent on committing a criminal act would 
hardly be deterred by legislative restrictions,483 but they seemingly ignored that 
controlling the availability and use of firearms could lower the overall rate of firearm 
deaths and curtail tragic shootings,484 and needless to say, the assertion that “more 
guns equals less crime” remained in dispute. 
As the NRA entered the 1970s, the organization stepped up its efforts to defeat 
restrictive firearms legislation.485 In order to counter growing public sentiment in 
favor of more restrictive firearms legislation, the NRA went on the offensive. The 
NRA openly accused the media as having an anti-gun agenda,486 blamed the criminal 
                                                           
 479  Id. 
 480  Id. at 7-13. 
 481  See generally Martin S. Geisel et al., The Effectiveness of State and Local Regulation of 
Handguns: A Statistical Analysis, 1969 DUKE L.J. 647. 
 482  Id. 
 483  See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 82-83 (1958) (“[F]ew 
homicides due to shootings could be avoided merely if a firearm were not immediately 
present, and that the offender would select some other weapon to achieve the same destructive 
goal.”). 
 484  See also Elmer A. Bessick, Gun Control Statutes and Domestic Violence, 19 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 556 (1970); Steven Thomas Seitz, Firearms, Homicide, and Gun Control 
Effectiveness, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 595 (1972); The Philadelphia Firearms Ordinance—A 
Case of Comprehensive Oversight, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 554 (1966). But see Douglas R. 
Murray, Handguns, Gun Control Laws and Firearm Violence, 23 SOC. PROBS. 81 (1968) 
(concluding that every study using statistics to determine the effects of firearm legislation on 
crime is unsupported). See generally Frank Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent 
Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721 (1968). 
 485  See Anti-Gun Issue Reaches Showdown, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1976, at 16; Anti ’68 Gun 
Law Bills Flood House Committee, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1971, at 44;  . . . And No Apologies, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1970, at 14; Biggest Nonsense in Gun Control, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 
1971, at 16; Ashley Halsey, Jr., Sentiment Grows for Gun Law Repeal, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 
1970, at 47; Ashley Halsey, Jr., Where We Stand on U.S. Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 
1970, at 26; How the 1968 Gun Act ‘Creates Criminals’, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1971, at 20; 
Woodson D. Scott, A Statement: By the President of the National Rifle Association, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1970, at 16; Woodson D. Scott, On Repeal of the Gun Control Act, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, July 1970, at 17; The Gun Control Act: How Much Longer?, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 
1970, at 16; This Is the Year, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1972, at 14; We Must Continue Our Fight, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1975, at 16; Where the Biggest Blame Lies, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1971, at 
22. 
 486  See Anti-Gun Article Backfires, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1972, at 19; Answering the Latest 
Humbug About Handguns, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1971, at 18; CBS Hoodwinks the U.S. on 
Guns, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1974, at 22; Ashley Halsey, Jr., Handgun Ownership ‘Whipped’ on 
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justice system for being too soft,487 and questioned the validity of opinion polls that 
showed support for more restrictive firearms legislation.488 Still, despite the NRA 
becoming increasingly frustrated with additional firearms restrictions, the 
organization maintained its position on armed carriage laws. While the NRA 
continued to emphasize that trained armed citizens were effective in deterring and 
stopping criminal activity,489 armed carriage had to be within the confines of the 
law.490   
In fact, following the attempted assassination of Governor George C. Wallace in 
1972, the NRA put forth the argument that the assassination might not have taken 
place had Maryland enforced its “shall issue” licensing provision accordingly.491 
This was followed by former NRA President Harold W. Glassen conceding to the 
constitutionality of most firearm restrictions under the “police power,” to include 
armed carriage laws: 
It is necessary . . . for you and me and the millions who think as we do 
to recognize at once that all the State courts of last resort, insofar as I 
know without exception, have recognized that the constitutional right of 
the people, of the individual, to keep and bear arms is subject to the police 
power of the States. “Police power” simply means that the State has the 
right of reasonable regulation for the general health, welfare and safety of 
its citizens. The key word here is “reasonable” and this has been quite 
universally interpreted to include within such police power tight 
                                                           
TV, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1970, at 16; How Anti-Gun Propaganda is Twisted Into ‘News’, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1971, at 47; Of Time (TV) and Money, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1974, at 14; 
Irvine Reynolds, Gun Controls and the News Media, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1974, at 42; Some 
Advice for Ann Landers, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1974, at 16; Snyder, supra note 444, at 19; TV 
Anti-Gun Bias: The FCC Position, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1975, at 53; What You Can Do About 
Anti-Gun TV, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1975, at 18; What They Preach, But Don’t Practice, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1974, at 18; Why the Anti-Gun Press is Mistaken, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1974, 
at 14; Who Can Relax and Enjoy the Wall Street Journal?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1972, at 20. 
 487  See, e.g., Facts Prove Crime, Not Guns, Is Problem—Kukla, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1974, 
at 54; Let’s Legislate Against Crime for a Change, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1971, at 16. 
 488  See, e.g., Clare E. Aukofer, Gun Opposition Tied to Ignorance: Best Educated Often 
Know Least About Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1976, at 44; Gallup vs. Harris, And What 
You Can Believe, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1975, at 14; Gun Control Facts to Remember and to 
Tell to Others, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1972, at 15; Don B. Kates, Jr., Why So Many Anti-
Handgun Polls?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1979, at 38. The NRA even contracted its own 
“independent” study on the matter. See Neal Knox, Crime, Not Guns, Real Issue, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, May 1979, at 49 (article appeared in the NRA Official Journal placed within the 
magazine); Pro-Gun Poll Comes as Revelation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1976, at 16; White House 
Hears Pro-Gun Side, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1976, at 16. 
 489  See, e.g., The Silent Protectors, supra note 476, at 28 (celebrating the 112th publication 
of the “Armed Citizen” column). 
 490  See, e.g., Police and the NRA, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1971, at 14; Transporting Your 
Firearms, supra note 300, at 41. 
 491  See Ashley Halsey, Jr., One With a Gun, One With a Hammer, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 
1972, at 18-19. 
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regulations on the carrying of concealed firearms, the carrying thereof in 
public places and the carrying of firearms in automobiles . . . .492 
It was not until the mid-1970s that a series of events changed the NRA’s stance 
on armed carriage laws. It began when the NRA registered as a political lobby and 
stood up its Legislative Action Unit.493 A year later the NRA stated it would no 
longer compromise on gun control.494 The NRA’s position was only hardened 
following the 1977 Cincinnati Revolt,495 when the organization’s membership 
rededicated and reformed the organization to combat gun control.496 But arguably the 
most important event to change the NRA’s position on armed carriage laws was the 
rise of the Standard Model Second Amendment, and it is a subject Part III.B. 
discusses in detail. 
B. After the Standard Model Second Amendment 
In the mid to late 1970s, at the same time the NRA changed its position on gun 
control, the Standard Model Second Amendment was coming into the academic 
fold.497 Under the Standard Model, the Second Amendment was placed into the Bill 
of Rights to provide every individual the right to possess and use arms, divorced 
from government sanctioned militias, as a means to check government tyranny 
through an armed citizenry, provide the means to repel force with force should one 
be assailed in private or public, and provide for the common defense.498   
This is not to say that the Standard Model Second Amendment appeared out of 
nowhere. The historical justifications, theoretical premises, and legal arguments that 
ultimately became the Model’s foundation appeared periodically within pro-gun 
                                                           
 492  Harold W. Glassen, Right to Bear Arms is Older than the Second Amendment, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1973, at 22. 
 493  See NRA Forms Legislative Action Unit to Check Anti-Gun Moves, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
June 1975, at 16; John M. Snyder, NRA Registers As Lobby to Uphold Gun Ownership, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1974, at 16. 
 494  NRA Stand: No Compromise on Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1975, at 44. In taking 
this stand, the NRA abandoned its previous position that “some degree of control over 
firearms is both proper and necessary . . . .” The Misuse of Firearms, supra note 466, at 16. 
 495  See, e.g., Harlon Carter, This is Your NRA, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1978, at 60. 
 496  See Concerned NRA Members Redirect Their Association, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1977, at 
16; Jim Carmichael, The NRA Revolution, OUTDOOR LIFE, Sept. 1977, at 102; see also Joel 
Achenbach et al., How NRA’s True Believers Converted a Marksmanship Group Into a 
Mighty Gun Lobby, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-nras-true-believers-converted-a-
marksmanship-group-into-a-mighty-gun-lobby/2013/01/12/51c62288-59b9-11e2-88d0-
c4cf65c3ad15_story.html. 
 497  See Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second Amendment, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1211 (2009). The first commentator to coin the term “Standard Model” was Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 
TENN. L. REV. 461, 463 (1995). 
 498  See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS 
OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (2008). 
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literature throughout much of twentieth century.499 But it was not until 1976 that the 
first law review article appeared.500 Written by David I. Caplan, the article concluded 
that history shows the right to arms permits the people “to retain the ability to obtain, 
keep, and practice with arms, in order that they may always be in a position to 
exercise their right of self-preservation and defense, as well as join and serve 
effectively in the appropriate militia to restore the Constitution, should the need ever 
arise.”501 Additionally, as it pertained to the law and armed carriage, Caplan asserted 
that the Second Amendment guaranteed the right to “carry arms in a quiet and 
peaceful manner.”502 
As historical support for this “right to carry” conclusion, Caplan relied solely on 
the 1686 English case Rex v. Knight.503 According to Caplan, at the time the case 
was decided the courts had adopted a “narrow reading” of the Statute of 
Northampton, which “required proof that the carrying of arms had been for the 
purpose of ‘terrify[ing] the King’s subjects.’”504 Caplan then proceeded to 
selectively quote prominent English legal commentators, such as Edward Coke, 
William Blackstone, and William Hawkins, to conclude that by the time of the 
American Revolution there had developed a “clear individual right to carry arms in a 
non-threatening manner . . . .”505 
Caplan’s resort to English history was crucial to his overarching interpretation of 
the Second Amendment. As Caplan wrote in an article appearing in the NRA’s 
publication American Rifleman, “[t]he common law sets the minimal standard to this 
day for the various provisions of the Bill of Rights interpreted by our Supreme 
Court.”506 Considering this constitutional premise, Caplan ultimately concluded 
that—through the common law—the Second Amendment “protected the absolute 
right of individuals to arms for self-defense—so long as not in such manner or of 
such unusual type as to terrorize the ‘good people of the land’ . . . .”507 
In terms of historical accuracy, Caplan’s conclusion is an affront to the 
evidentiary record. Caplan never explored the background history surrounding Rex v. 
Knight, to include the indictment against Sir John Knight, the Attorney General’s 
                                                           
 499  See, e.g., Constitutional Provision on Arms, supra note 430, at 148; Glassen, supra 
note 492, at 22; Edson, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 464, at 16; Wheatley, supra note 
428, at 104; see also Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, supra note 293, at 381-406; Hess, supra 
note 253, at 54; Bartlett Rummel, To Have and Bear Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1964, at 38; 
The Right to Arms for Self-Defense, supra note 449, at 16. 
 500  Caplan, Restoring the Balance, supra note 104, at 31-53. 
 501  Id. at 52. 
 502  Id. at 34. 
 503  Caplan’s analysis was solely based on the incomplete English Reports. See CAPLAN, 
supra note 101, at 2-3; Caplan, supra note 104, at 32. For the historical problems associated 
with relying on the English Reports, see supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 504  Caplan, supra note 104, at 32. 
 505  Id. at 34-35. 
 506  Caplan, supra note 105, at 81. 
 507  Id. 
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prosecution, or Knight’s legal defense.508 But more importantly, at no point did 
Caplan research or address the historical evidence contemporaneous with Statute of 
Northampton’s enactment, the record of its subsequent enforcement for centuries, as 
well as all the legal commentary confirming its broad prosecutorial scope.509 The 
fact of the matter is for five centuries the Statute of Northampton was enforced and 
generally restated as restricting armed carriage with dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse.510   
From a historiographical perspective, Caplan’s conclusion is significant in two 
respects. For one, Caplan was the first legal commentator to give the Statute of 
Northampton a narrow construction. Up to that point, virtually every twentieth-
century legal commentator to have quoted or cited the Statute of Northampton 
understood it as prohibiting armed carriage in the public concourse.511 The other 
reason Caplan’s conclusion is significant was its mass proliferation in pro-gun 
literature.512 Relying on the same incomplete English Reports, virtually every 
follow-on Standard Model convert came to the same conclusion.513 The conclusion 
                                                           
 508  See supra pp. 393-99. 
 509  See supra pp. 378-92. 
 510  See supra pp. 465-68. 
 511  See Emery, supra note 291, at 473 (reading the Statute of Northampton as a broad 
prohibition on armed carriage); Haight, supra note 291, at 32 (reading the Statute of 
Northampton and other public carry restrictions broadly); F.J.K., supra note 296, at 905 
(reading the Statute of Northampton as “prohibit[ing] the carrying of weapons in public 
places, to encourage peaceful behavior”); Stanley Mosk, Gun Control Legislation: Valid and 
Necessary, 14 N.Y. L. F. 694, 707 (1968) (reading the Statute of Northampton as establishing 
“the statutory misdemeanor of ‘going about armed’”); Rohner, supra note 293, at 61-62 
(reading the Statute of Northampton as a “statutory misdemeanor of ‘going about armed’”); 
Brabner-Smith, supra note 291, at 400 (reading the Statute of Northampton as a “crime 
against the public peace to ride or go about with dangerous or unusual weapons”). 
 512  See, e.g., NRA INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 106; Caplan, supra note 
105, at 30; The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 105, at 16. 
 513  See David I. Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial 
Trend, 4 DET. C. L. REV. 789, 794-95 (1982) (relying primarily on the English Reports 
incomplete account of Sir John Knight’s case for interpreting the Statute of Northampton); 
Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty—A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. 
KY. L. REV. 63, 71-72 (1982); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State 
Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 VT. L. REV. 
255, 311 (1985); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7 (1981); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen 
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 
565 (1986); see also Robert Dowlut & Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 177, 202 (1982) (citing Sir John Knight’s case 
for the proposition that the “open peaceful carrying [of dangerous weapons] in one’s business 
place, vehicle, or on a public street in the ordinary course of one’s travels . . . cannot be 
prohibited”). 
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gained even more prominence once historian Joyce Lee Malcolm began publishing 
her findings on the English history of the right to arms.514   
Some members of the United States Senate subsequently embraced the 
conclusion. In 1982, the Republican-controlled Senate Subcommittee on the 
Constitution of the Committee of the Judiciary published a report accepting the 
Standard Model’s limited construction of the Statute of Northampton carte blanche, 
and thus concluded that the Second Amendment guaranteed “a right of the individual 
citizen to privately possess and carry in a peaceful manner firearms and similar 
arms.”515 The Senate Subcommittee’s report was swiftly applauded in pro-gun 
circles. Standard Model scholar David T. Hardy wrote the report was a “conclusive 
reply to those who assert, without historical research . . . that the Amendment relates 
only to state-organized bodies of troops.”516 The NRA also praised the report as “the 
most extensive legal research made public on the Second Amendment . . . .”517 
The only Standard Model scholar to deviate from Caplan’s right to carry 
conclusion518 was Don B. Kates, who in 1983 wrote that the Second Amendment’s 
core did not protect a right to armed carriage unless “in the course of militia 
service.”519 Still, Kates was the opinion that the Second Amendment’s “right to 
possess” arms must come with some ancillary right to transport “between the 
purchaser or owner’s premises and a shooting range, or a gun store or gunsmith and 
so on.”520 Kates’s interpretation was essentially a mirror image of the NRA’s before 
the 1977 Cincinnati Revolt. Up to that point, the NRA never professed that the 
Second Amendment guaranteed a right to preparatory armed carriage in the public 
concourse, but did feel the Second Amendment must implicitly protect some 
ancillary right to transport. As NRA Executive Director Merritt A. Edson wrote in 
1952: “The right to own a personal weapon amounts to little without the 
corresponding right to carry it from place to place—from home to range, from 
tournament to tournament, in the upland country in search for birds, or in the deepest 
wilds in the hunt for carrying game.”521 
                                                           
 514  MALCOLM, DISARMED, supra note 106, at 7; MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, 
supra note 106, at 104; Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 106, at 293; Malcolm, 
The Creation, supra note 106, at 242; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 515  THE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., 
THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 11 (Comm. Print 1982). The subcommittee was 
comprised of Republican Senators Orrin G. Hatch (Utah), Strom Thurmond (South Carolina), 
Charles E. Grassley (Iowa), and Democratic Senators Dennis DeConcini (Arizona) and 
Patrick J. Leahy (Vermont). Id. 
 516  David T. Hardy, To Keep and Bear Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1982, at 36-37. 
 517  Special Senate Judiciary Report: Second Amendment Protects Individual Rights, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1982, at 54. 
 518  Caplan, supra note 104, at 40. 
 519  Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 267 (1983).  
 520  Id. 
 521  Edson, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 464, at 16.  
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Kates’s rejection of Caplan’s right to carry for “peaceful purposes”522 drew the 
ire of other pro-gun scholars, and was even categorized by fellow Standard Model 
scholar Stephen P. Halbrook as “Orwellian Newspeak.”523 In fact, before Kates 
submitted a petition of certiorari to the Supreme Court to determine the scope of the 
Second Amendment, Halbrook and others “advised” Kates that the right to “bear 
arms” included a right to armed carriage for self-defense.524 Kates ultimately rejected 
the advice and instead petitioned the Supreme Court that any right to carry was 
limited to militia service and transport for lawful purposes.525 
It was not until two years later that Kates retracted his stance, albeit on his own 
terms. Following a debate with Halbrook,526 Kates conceded that the historical 
evidence invalidated his previous position, but cautioned that any right to armed 
carriage was qualified.527 From this point onward Standard Model scholars have 
been in full agreement on the Statute of Northampton’s limited construction, and 
thus have presented the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right to preparatory 
armed carriage in the public concourse.528 
With history now seemingly in the NRA’s favor, it was only a matter of time 
before the organization changed its position on the law and armed carriage. From an 
ideological standpoint the change made sense. Beginning in the 1970s, the NRA no 
longer supported even modest firearms restrictions.529 The organization firmly 
                                                           
 522  Caplan, supra note 104, at 40. 
 523  Stephen P. Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: Our Second Amendment 
Heritage, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1984, at 28. 
 524  Id. 
 525  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th 
Cir. 1982) No. 82-1934 (“[B]ased on 18th Century usage . . . the Amendment’s guarantee is 
plainly individual in nature, and . . . it extends to the keeping of small arms for any legitimate 
purpose—but that individuals may carry them outside the home only in the course of militia 
service.”); id. at 22 (“Coke emphasized that the Statute of Northampton, which prohibited the 
carrying of arms, did not apply to their possession in the home . . . .”). 
 526  In the debate, Halbrook asserted it was “inconceivable” that the Founding generation 
“would have tolerated the suggestion” that the people needed the “permission of a state 
authority” to carry arms in the public concourse. Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers 
Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 
162 (1986). 
 527  Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 
149 (1986); see also Kates, supra note 497, at 1222. 
 528  See supra notes 46, 106 & 107, and accompanying text; see also Amicus Curiae Brief 
of Historians, supra note 47. 
 529  See NRA Stand: No Compromise on Gun Laws, supra note 494, at 44. 
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believed that the only way to deter crime was to punish the criminal severely530 and 
armed citizens were seen as an important variable in the equation.531     
It was in 1985 that the NRA officially changed its position following a “straw 
poll to determine member attitudes . . . regarding harsh laws designed to prohibit 
citizens from lawfully carrying concealed firearms for personal protection.”532 The 
NRA ended up agreeing with its membership that society benefited from 
“responsible gun ownership and carrying by law-abiding individuals.”533 The NRA 
stated in addition to “member attitudes,” both criminology and history was in their 
favor.534   
What ultimately came out of the NRA’s change in position was the right to carry 
initiative. It consisted of the NRA promoting model “shall issue” licensing 
legislation, which recognized “the choice of carrying a firearm for self-defense is a 
highly personal one, that it may literally be a matter of life and death, and that the 
means to self-defense must not be denied to any citizen except under the most 
extraordinary circumstances.”535 The NRA’s right to carry initiative was one of four 
intended to reverse the trend of restrictive firearm legislation and promote the 
Standard Model Second Amendment.536 The second was firearms preemption 
legislation, which prevented cities, towns, and municipalities from adopting any 
localized firearm law.537 The third was modifying state Second Amendment 
analogues to be more reflective of the Standard Model Second Amendment.538   
Lastly, there was the education initiative, which was the NRA’s public relations 
campaign intended to sway the American people against firearm restrictions.539 Here, 
the NRA took quite an aggressive approach. In 1981 for instance, the NRA put 
                                                           
 530  See, e.g., Causes of N.Y.C. Crime Revealed, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1980, at 64; Neal 
Knox, Open Letter To All NRA Members and Gun Owners, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1981, at 54; 
Facts Prove Crime, Not Guns, Is Problem—, supra note 487, at 55 (“This nation does not 
need any more gun control. What it desperately needs is a system to provide fast, just, and 
certain punishment for crime.”). 
 531  See, e.g., As Crime Escalates: More Gun Laws Not the Solution, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 
1981, at 54; FBI Crime Report Dispels Gun Myths, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1980, at 48; Howard 
W. Pollock, The President’s Column, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1983, at 54 (writing anti-gun 
forces are “unable to acknowledge the deterrent effect of an armed citizenry to criminal 
attacks from any quarter, whether from individual felons, tyrants, or world aggressors”); see 
also The Silent Protectors, supra note 476, at 28. 
 532  Conover, supra note 10, at 40. 
 533  Id. 
 534  Id. at 41. 
 535  Id. at 74. 
 536  For the NRA’s larger strategy to expand Second Amendment rights, see J. Warren 
Cassidy, Here We Stand, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1989, at 7. 
 537  See Arnett, supra note 11, at 7; Garcelon, supra note 11, at 46; Gun Owners Win 
Significant Legislative Fights in 1987, supra note 11, at 66. 
 538  See supra note 537; see also Right to Bear Arms Affirmed By Voters in State Referenda, 
AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1982, at 49. 
 539  See Warren, supra note 536, at 7. 
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together a documentary titled It Can’t Happen Here, which portrayed the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) as a “jack-booted group of fascists.”540 Then 
in 1989 the NRA published full-page advertisements depicting acts of criminal 
violence with headline questions such as “do robbers, rapists and murders wait in 
lines,” “why can’t a police man be there when you need him”, and “how much red 
tape is too much red tape when he threatens to kill you.”541 It is difficult to gauge the 
effectiveness of the NRA’s education initiative during these early years. While the 
Standard Model certainly gained new supporters in legal circles,542 the NRA’s 
aggressive tactics did not stop the passage of the 1993 Brady Handgun Prevention 
Act or the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB).543 The NRA in turn 
expressed its disgust by printing on the cover of the American Rifleman a depiction 
of the Statute of Liberty being raped by a politician.544   
Placing the education initiative aside, what is certain is the NRA’s other 
initiatives proved quite successful. As it pertained to the preemption initiative, in 
1979 forty-three states allowed their respective cities, towns, and localities to enact 
more stringent firearm regulations, yet by 2005 the NRA was successful in shifting 
that number to just five.545 The state constitution initiative was equally successful. 
                                                           
 540  Peter Earley, NRA Aims at U.S. Agency, WASH. POST (July 23, 1981), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/07/23/nra-aims-at-us-
agency/d6b42283-ce0b-4744-bf93-8dd80f4a3d91; Howard Kohn, Inside the Gun Lobby, 
ROLLING STONE (May 14, 1981), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-the-gun-
lobby-19810514.  
 541  NRA’s Violent Crime Ads Hit Home, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1988, at 50. 
 542  See, e.g., Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 384-401 (2000) (outlining the growth of Standard Model literature in 
the late twentieth century); see also Robert J. Cottrol, Enforce the Second Amendment, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1990, at 21 (asserting the Standard Model interpretation needs to “become 
part of the public debate on the Constitution and gun control”); Clayton E. Cramer, State 
Constitutions and the Second Amendment, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1992, at 22-23, 73 (asserting 
all late eighteenth century state constitution Second Amendment analogues support the 
Standard Model interpretation); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Arms Of All the People Should Be 
Taken Away, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1989, at 26-28, 76-77 (asserting the framers adopted the 
Second Amendment in response to British attempts to disarm the colonists); Michael K. 
McCabe, Madison and the Bill of Rights, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1991, at 20-21 (asserting the 
Second Amendment’s drafting history supports the Standard Model interpretation); Mark H. 
Overstreet, Warren Burger vs. the Founding Fathers, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1992, at 53-54, 74 
(pushing back against Chief Justice Warren Burger’s interpretation of the Second 
Amendment). 
 543  For some of the NRA’s literature opposing the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act and the AWB, see Assault in Congress Puts Your Rights at Risk, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 
1991, at 20; James Jay Baker, Gun Control is Bad Medicine, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1994, at 32; 
James Jay Baker, War For Your Guns, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1991, at 36; James Jay Baker, 
First Step Brady Bill Leads to Semi-Auto Ban and More, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1991, at 54; 
Christopher C. Little, Communitarianism, Clinton & Congress: A New Threat Emerges for 
Gun Owners, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1993, at 30; The Last Chapter in Second Amendment 
History, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1993, at 34. 
 544  Inside was an article depicting the same image. See Tanya Metaksa, Help Me Stop the 
Rape of Liberty, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1994, at 40.  
 545  GOSS, supra note 290, at 164. 
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By the close of the twentieth century the NRA obtained gun-friendly Second 
Amendment analogues in twelve states.546 In the case of West Virginia, the new 
constitutional provision proved instrumental in striking down the state’s “may issue” 
licensing regime as unconstitutional.547 
These successes complimented the right to carry initiative. The NRA no longer 
needed to concern itself with combatting local firearms legislation. The organization 
could now focus its efforts on transforming the right to arms at the state level. The 
first success was achieved in 1987, when Florida adopted the NRA’s model armed 
carriage legislation.548 From there the NRA was successful in pushing the model 
legislation to other states. Within a span of just three years the NRA successfully 
lobbied ten states to adopt “shall issue” licensing regimes.549 In the first half of 1995 
alone the NRA lobbied another ten states.550 And by the close of the twentieth 
century a total of twenty-nine states adopted “shall issue” licensing regimes, thus 
making “shall issue” the jurisdictional majority in the United States.551     
To be clear, as the United States entered the twenty-first century, the law and 
armed carriage shifted drastically. For some gun rights’ supporters the shift was 
perceived as a return to a period in American history where firearms regulations 
were non-existent. For others the change made criminological sense. However, 
historically speaking, both of these justifications have proven to be more nominal 
than real. For one, as this Article has highlighted, the history of the law and armed 
carriage spans over seven hundred years. The criminological justification is equally 
suspect. When one considers all the variables associated with crime it is curious how 
some social scientists have concluded less firearm restrictions are directly 
responsible for lowering crime rates.552  
                                                           
 546  For a compilation of changes in State constitution “bear arms” provisions from 1982 to 
2000, see Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 192, 215–17 (2006). 
 547  See State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 180 W. Va. 457 (1988); West Virginia 
High Court Overturns Licensing Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1988, at 67. 
 548  Lattanzio, supra note 11, at 135. 
 549  Grossman & Lee, supra note 304, at 200. 
 550  Randy Kozuch, Victory Report From the States, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1995, at 44; Sam 
Walker, More States Allow People to Pack Guns So Mr. Noble Is Doing It, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Mar. 9, 1995), http://m.csmonitor.com/1995/0309/09011.html.  
 551  Grossman & Lee, supra note 304, at 201. 
 552   See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON LAW AND JUSTICE, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL 
REVIEW 150 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2004) (“The literature on right-to-carry laws . . . 
has obtained conflicting estimates of their effects on crime. Estimation results have proven to 
be very sensitive to the precise specification used and time period examined. The initial model 
specification, when extended to new data, does not show evidence that passage of right-to-
carry laws reduces crime. The estimated effects are highly sensitive to seemingly minor 
changes in the model specification and control variables. No link between right-to-carry laws 
and changes in crime is apparent in the raw data, even in the initial sample; it is only once 
numerous covariates are included that the negative results in the early data emerge. While the 
trend models show a reduction in the crime growth rate following the adoption of right-to-
carry laws, these trend reductions occur long after law adoption, casting serious doubt on the 
proposition that the trend models estimated in the literature reflect effects of the law change. 
Finally, some of the point estimates are imprecise. Thus, the committee concludes that with 
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Another problem with the criminology justification is there is no way to 
definitively measure the burdens and benefits of armed carriage. Certainly, there 
have been a number of instances where an armed citizen repelled an attacker or 
thwarted a crime from occurring,553 but there have also been instances where an 
armed citizen needlessly employed deadly force in disproportion to the crime being 
committed or misused the firearm in a fit of rage.554 Perhaps the best way to describe 
the modern debate over armed carriage is in terms of armed faith. Those that 
advocate for armed carriage have faith that society is safer as more armed citizens 
enter the public concourse. This faith is encapsulated in such pro-gun political 
slogans as “more guns equal less crime”555 and the “only thing that stops a bad guy 
with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”556 But these political slogans are just that—
slogans.557 The “only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun” 
is particularly specious upon examining the statistics of mass shootings and active 
shooters. As a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report has shown, out of 
160 active shooter incidents from 2000 to 2013 only five or 3.1% were ended by 
armed individuals.558 Over four times that number or 13.1% were ended by unarmed 
individuals.559 But statistics do not to deter those that maintain armed faith or fear a 
potential attack.560 This is what makes the modern debate over the Second 
                                                           
the current evidence it is not possible to determine that there is a causal link between the 
passage of right-to-carry laws and crime rates.”). 
 553  See, e.g., The Armed Citizen, supra note 450, at 14. 
 554  See e.g., Ingrid Kelley, Customer with CPL Shoots at Shoplifting Suspect at Home 
Depot, FOX 2 DETROIT (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.fox2detroit.com/news/local-
news/30725284-story; Kristin Weber, Florida Man Killed in Front of Family After Road 
Rage, WLTX 19 (July 24, 2015), http://www.wltx.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/24/florida-
man-killed-in-front-of-family-after-road-rage/30635217/.  
 555  See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Violent Crime, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1997, 
at 26. 
 556  See, e.g., David Nakamura & Tom Hamburger, Put Armed Police in Every School, 
NRA Urges, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/put-
armed-police-officers-in-every-school-nra-head-says/2012/12/21/9ac7d4ae-4b8b-11e2-9a42-
d1ce6d0ed278_story.html (emphasis added). 
 557  See, e.g., Joshua Gillin & Amy Sherman, Is Violent Crime Lower in States with Open 
Carry?, POLITIFACT FL. (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2015/oct/09/matt-gaetz/violent-crime-lower-
states-open-carry/; Clifton B. Parker, Right-to-Carry Gun Laws Linked to Increase in Violent 
Crime, Stanford Research Shows, STAN. NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/november/donohue-guns-study-111414.html. 
 558  J. PETE BLAIR & KATHERINE SCHWEIT, A STUDY OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013, FBI & TEX. ST. U. 11 (Sept. 16, 2013),  
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-incidents/a-study-
of-active-shooter-incidents-in-the-u.s.-2000-2013. 
 559  Id. 
 560  Take for instance the findings in a survey conducted immediately after the San 
Bernardino, California terrorist attack. When survey participants were asked whether the 
United States should enact stricter gun control or encourage more people to carry guns legally, 
a forty-seven percent majority responded that the United States should encourage more people 
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Amendment rather unique.561 It is built on political and ideological convictions more 
so than concrete data. 
IV. WHY THE HISTORY OF THE LAW AND ARMED CARRIAGE MATTERS 
In Parts I through III the history of the law and armed carriage was unpacked and 
detailed. What it reveals is the act of carrying dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse has long been subject to some form of regulation. It originated out of the 
English common law, was statutorily codified in the Statute of Northampton, and 
subsequently transformed based on changes in American demography, criminology, 
and technology. Thus as American society transformed so, too, did laws touching 
upon armed carriage. This is an overlooked aspect of the history pertaining to law 
and armed carriage.562   
                                                           
to carry guns legally, compared to forty-two percent minority in favor of stricter gun control 
measures. Gary Langer, Most Now Oppose an Assault Weapons Band; Doubts About Stopping 
a Lone Wolf Run High, ABC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/now-
oppose-assault-weapons-ban-doubts-stopping-lone/story?id=35778846. Whether the survey 
participants were made aware of the FBI’s active shooter statistics is unknown. It should be 
noted, however, that the answers were largely divided according to political and ideological 
affiliations. Republicans and conservatives were more inclined to support encouraging armed 
carriage than Democrats and liberals. Id. This political and ideological divide was also 
reflected in a survey that asked Americans to list their biggest concern. While most 
Republicans and conservatives (sixty percent) listed being a victim of a terrorist attack, most 
Democrats and liberals listed being a victim of gun violence. See Mark Murray, Public Split 
On Biggest Worry—Terrorism vs. Gun Violence, NBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2015), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/public-split-biggest-worry-terrorism-vs-gun-
violence-n475086. This political and ideological divide over gun control and safety measures 
has become common in the wake of D.C. v. Heller. See Rich Morin, The Demographics and 
Politics of Gun-Owning Households, PEW RES. CTR. (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/15/the-demographics-and-politics-of-gun-
owning-households/ (showing Republicans are twice as likely as Democrats to have firearms 
in their homes); Charles, supra note 2, at 1156-65. 
 561  The statistics pertaining to deaths by gun violence are especially telling when it comes 
to armed faith and fear of potential attack. As it stands today, annual firearm deaths in the 
United States exceed that of motor vehicles. See Dan Diamond, More Young Americans Now 
Die From Guns Than Cars, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2015/08/26/americas-gun-violence-problem-in-
three-charts/. Additionally, firearms kill four times as many people in the United States 
annually than military members have died fighting the Global War on Terror. See Honor the 
Fallen, MIL. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015), http://thefallen.militarytimes.com/ (tallying 6,841 fallen 
military service members as of December 17, 2015). Even more telling is a comparison 
between annual firearm deaths and the total number of terrorist related deaths. Excluding the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, less than 500 United States citizens have been killed by 
terrorist related acts across the globe, which is less than two percent of annual firearm deaths. 
See Julia Jones & Eve Bower, American Deaths in Terrorism vs. Gun Violence in One Graph, 
CNN (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/02/us/oregon-shooting-terrorism-gun-
violence/. 
 562  Changes in firearm technology are generally overlooked in contributing to this legal 
transformation and the evolution of firearm regulations. In the late eighteenth century, a 
trained late marksman could fire a rifle or musket no more than three times in a minute with 
an effective firing distance of 200 yards, and a pistol was only effective at close range. See 
Charles, supra note 38, at 47, and accompanying footnotes. By the late nineteenth century, 
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For five centuries, armed carriage in the public concourse was at the license of 
government officials, to include compulsory arms bearing in the militia and the hue 
and cry.563 It was not until the Antebellum Era that conflicting legal viewpoints 
developed. Southern courts developed a legal standard that distinguished between 
the open and concealed carriage of dangerous weapons, which was a reflection of the 
South’s culture of slavery and preserving individual honor.564 Meanwhile, in the 
North, where the Statute of Northampton’s legal tenets influenced the Massachusetts 
Model, the ability to arm oneself defensively in the public concourse was extremely 
limited.565 The legal standard embraced by the northern courts was that the 
government retained broad police powers to ban the carrying of dangerous weapons 
in public so long as there was an affirmative legal defense available when there was 
a clear and tangible threat to one’s person, family, or property.566   
But as the United States progressed into the Reconstruction Era the 
interpretational divide separating the North and South began to diminish.567 This 
shift in the law and armed carriage can be seen in state Second Amendment 
analogues adopted from 1868 to the turn of the twentieth century. The constitutions 
of Georgia, Texas, Tennessee, Missouri, Colorado, North Carolina, Louisiana, 
Idaho, Montana, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Utah each adopted an express proviso 
reinforcing the legislature’s police power to regulate armed carriage, particularly 
concealed weapons.568 Additionally, cities, towns, and municipalities from across the 
United States adopted a variety of regulations pertaining to armed carriage, some of 
which required a permit to go armed in public.569 This consensus of regulating the 
act of going armed in public with dangerous weapons was cemented following the 
Supreme Court’s 1886 decision in Presser v. Illinois,570 where the Court upheld the 
power of states to prohibit individuals from carrying weapons in public under the 
guise they constituted as the militia.571   
                                                           
with the advent of firearms such as the six-shot revolver and repeating rifle, the lethality, 
firing range, and rounds per minute far exceeded their eighteenth century predecessors. The 
increased lethality of firearms was on full display during the Civil War and may have 
facilitated the growth of firearm restrictions in the late nineteenth century. See “[Truncated 
Title],” MEMPHIS DAILY APPEAL, Feb. 17, 1882, at 2. A similar lethality disparity presents 
itself upon comparing twenty-first century firearms with their late nineteenth century 
predecessors. Today’s firearms hold thirty round ammunition clips, travel great distances, and 
discharge piercing or tumbling rounds, and within just a minute a shooter can easily discharge 
sixty rounds per minute. For the history of firearms technology in general, see SMITHSONIAN, 
FIREARMS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY (2014). 
 563  See supra pp. 378-400. 
 564  See supra pp. 408-31. 
 565  See supra pp. 423-31. 
 566  See supra pp. 401-31. 
 567  See supra pp. 401-31. 
 568  See Volokh, supra note 546, at 211-14. 
 569  See supra notes 149, 150 & 245. 
 570  116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 571  In the words of John Marshall Harlan, who was one of the Supreme Court Justices that 
decided the case: 
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The early twentieth century carried forward the late nineteenth century’s view of 
the law and armed carriage. Of course, not everyone living in the early twentieth 
century prescribed to this view,572 but the overwhelming majority of courts and legal 
commentators, as well as gun advocacy organizations, acknowledged that state and 
local governments retained the authority to restrict the carrying of dangerous 
weapons in the public concourse.573 As NRA Executive Vice-President Milton A. 
Reckord wrote in 1927, “pistol and revolver traffic should be controlled . . . by 
controlling the dealer and placing certain restrictions upon the sale of revolvers and 
pistols and by licensing those who carry a pistol.”574  
While gun advocacy groups by and large did not object to armed carriage 
licenses or claim them to be unconstitutional,575 they firmly believed that armed 
                                                           
  The militia is composed of the people outside of the regular forces, and every man 
is of the militia according to the law of the state in which he lives… 
  The particular object of [the Second Amendment] . . . was to make it certain that the 
Congress of the United States should never have it in its power to say to any state, 
“[y]ou shall have no regular trained militia with arms in their hands.”  
  This militia, as contradistinguished from regular troops, are the boys at home 
around their local government, attached as they ought to be to their home and to their 
local government, and therefore ready if emergency requires to defend that home 
government against a government outside. Therefore, the fathers said that is necessary 
to the freedom of the people, to the security of the people, and therefore an act of 
Congress which should say that no state should have any militia, should have no 
troops with guns in their hands, is a nullity. . . .That was the provision of the Bill of 
Rights, “And the right to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”   
  Well, there was a statute in the state of Kentucky which punished a man for carrying 
concealed deadly weapons. A man carried a pistol, and he was tried and fined under 
the statute for carrying concealed deadly weapons. And he said, “[u]nder the 
Constitution of the United States, as well as the Constitution of Kentucky, I have a 
right to bear arms.” “No,” says the court. “It is the militia that may bear arms, and 
you, going around here among your peaceful neighbors, pretending to be as 
unprotected as they are but carrying a concealed deadly weapon, that is doing 
something that the state may prevent.” 
Josh Blackman et al., Justice John Marshall Harlan: Lectures on Constitutional Law, 1897-
98, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 12, 307-09 (2013); see also Joshua H. Hudson, How to 
Put a Stop to Murder, WKLY. NEWS & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Jan. 12, 1898, at 5, (South 
Carolina Judge of the Courts of Common Pleas writing: “The arms contemplated in [the 
United States and South Carolina constitutions] are such as are to be used for the common 
defence, and not for assassination. Neither the militia in time of peace nor soldiers in time of 
war, parade, march or fight with pistols, dirks, daggers and razors dangling at their sides or 
concealed in their pockets. These are not arms used for the common defence like the shotgun, 
rifle and musket. There is no constitutional right guaranteed to the citizen to carry on the 
person, openly or concealed, pistols, dirks, daggers, razors or brass knuckles.”); supra note 
251 and accompanying text. 
 572  See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 326, at 299 (“The logical method of combatting the 
activities of the criminal class is not to disarm the law-abiding citizen…but to remove the 
present restrictions as to the carrying of weapons, and then train the citizen to their use.”). 
 573  See supra pp. 402-24. 
 574  Reckord, supra note 388, at 18.  
 575  See, e.g., The Anti Anti-Pistol Situation, supra note 332, at 29 (“We believe that [the 
Revolver Act] is the best law of its kind that we have yet come across and one that ought to be 
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citizens trained with arms could thwart criminal activity.576 But despite gun 
advocacy groups’ preference for more armed citizens in public places, they never 
called into question the constitutionality of armed carriage laws. The prevailing view 
until the late 1970s was that the “police power” permitted state and local 
governments to regulate not only the “carrying of concealed firearms,” but also “the 
carrying thereof in public places and the carrying of firearms in automobiles . . . .”577 
What makes this history so important is it confirms that modern perceptions of 
the law and armed carriage are just that—modern. Those that perceive the Second 
Amendment as guaranteeing a right to preparatory armed carriage in the public 
concourse are not resurrecting the past. They are rewriting it. The same is true of 
those that view the Second Amendment and armed carriage as essential in protecting 
other individual rights in public, whether it is freedom of speech, of the press, of 
religion, or of assembly.578 This rewriting of history can largely be attributed to the 
rise of the Standard Model Second Amendment, where its architects 
mischaracterized the Statute of Northampton as requiring the “specific intent” to 
terrify.579 This in turn promulgated the myth that by the late eighteenth century there 
were no laws regulating the peaceful carrying of firearms for self-defense or 
otherwise.580 
                                                           
on the statute books of every state in the Union that does not already possess one equally as 
good. By ‘equally as good’ we mean a law that amply protects the right of the honest citizen 
to possess and carry pistols and revolvers for the protection of his person, his loved one and 
his property while at the same time providing the police departments with ample authority and 
leeway to prevent these weapons from coming into, or remaining in, the hands of lawless or 
irresponsible persons.”); Merry Christmas—And Gun Laws, supra note 325, at 6 (“We have 
no objection to obtain a permit to carry a gun concealed, as long as a proper provision is made 
in the law to enable any honest citizen who is a member of a properly organized target-
shooting club to carry his gun to and from the target range. We do not believe that the 
necessity of a permit to carry concealed weapons with have any appreciable effect on the use 
of guns by criminals; but if the police believe that such a law will help them, we have no 
objection to its passage.”). 
 576  See, e.g., Frederick, supra note 380, at 450-51. 
 577  Glassen, supra note 492, at 22. 
 578  See supra notes 111 & 117. The view that the Second Amendment and armed carriage 
protects all other constitutional rights in private and public is based on the Standard Model’s 
flawed reading of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. See, e.g., 
Stephen P. Halbrook, Second Amendment Symposium-Panelist, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
815, 819 (2000) (“Examining Blackstone’s commentaries, we see that Blackstone had written 
that there are certain underlying manners in which the personal rights of private property, 
personal security, and personal freedom or liberty are protected. One of those rights was to 
have and use arms for self-preservation and defense. Referring to an individual right to resist 
criminal attacks, a right to be armed permits an individual to do so. He linked adjunct rights to 
the primary rights of protection of personal liberty and personal security.”). What Blackstone 
was referring to was the larger principle of lawful revolution and rebellion. See Patrick J. 
Charles, The Right of Self-Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical 
Understanding of the Anglo-American Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18, 24-
59. 
 579  See supra pp. 378-400. 
 580  See supra pp. 378-400. 
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 As it stands today, despite the breadth of evidence proving the Standard Model’s 
history as a false idol, the Model’s adherents continue to insist otherwise.581 Just 
recently, in a case challenging the District of Columbia’s “may issue” licensing 
regime on Second Amendment grounds, a group of Standard Model scholars 
presented to the District Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals that “the right to carry 
arms peaceably was always recognized” and the Statute of Northampton was no 
impediment.582 However, in making this claim the scholars continue to omit and 
ignore the historical evidence contemporaneous with Statute of Northampton’s 
enactment, the historical record of its subsequent enforcement for centuries, as well 
as all the legal commentary from Lambarde to Dalton.583  
This is quite damning from a transparency and objectivity perspective, but there 
are other historical omissions and inaccuracies within the brief. For one, the 
Standard Model scholars conflate compulsory arms bearing for militia service, 
security patrols, and the hue and cry with a right to “peaceably carry” firearms in the 
public concourse.584 The fallacy embodied by this line of historical argument is quite 
obvious.585 While the Standard Model scholars are indeed correct that late 
eighteenth-century citizens were often obligated to take part in providing security, 
they omit that such armed carriage and firing of those arms was at the license of 
government, not at the whim or discretion of individual citizens.586 This is an 
important legal and historical distinction, yet it is omitted.  
                                                           
 581  See supra pp. 378-400; see also Kopel, supra note 38, at 6-14. 
 582  Amicus Curiae Brief of Historians, supra note 47, at 6. 
 583  See supra pp. 465-73. 
 584  Amicus Curiae Brief of Historians, supra note 47, at 10-13. 
 585  See, e.g., MASS. CONST. OF 1780, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“The people have 
a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence . . . and the military shall always be 
held in exact subordination to the civil authority and governed by it.”); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (“That the people have a right to bear arms, for the 
defence of the State . . . the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed 
by the civil power.”); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20 (“That the people have a right to 
bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state: and as standing armies in time of peace, 
are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under 
strict subordination to the civil power.”); see also Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1820) 
(“the power of the State governments to legislate on the same subjects, having existed prior to 
the formation of the constitution, and not being prohibited by the instrument, it remains with 
the States, subordinate nevertheless to the paramount laws of the general government, 
operating on the same subject”); id. at 37 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“extensive as [Congress’s] 
power over the militia is, the United States are obviously intended to be made in some 
measure dependent upon the States for the aid of this species of force.”); id. at 50 (Story, J., 
dissenting) (“the power here given to Congress over the militia; is of a limited nature, and 
confined to the objects specified in these clauses; and that in all other respects, and for all 
other purposes, the militia are the subject to the control and government of the State 
authorities.”). 
 586  This Standard Model fallacy has been rebutted in a previous publication. See Charles, 
supra note 70, at 1800-07, 1822-24, 1832-38; id. at 1860 (“Just because an eighteenth century 
legislature required persons to carry arms to church for militia training, to quell slave revolts, 
and suppress Indian attacks, does not mean the founding generation perceived it to be a right 
to carry arms . . .”) (emphasis added). See also AN ACT FOR REGULATING AND GOVERNING THE 
MILITIA OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, AND FOR REPEALING ALL LAWS HERETOFORE FOR THAT 
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Given what is at stake—the extent in which the Second Amendment extends 
beyond one’s doorstep—it is unlikely Standard Model scholars or gun advocacy 
organizations will ever acknowledge their historical mischaracterization of the 
Statute of Northampton or the history of the law and armed carriage in general. The 
fact of the matter is the Standard Model and the modern Second Amendment rights 
movement thrives on the perception that Americans have always carried arms in the 
public concourse for self-defense and criminological purposes.587 For it to be any 
other way would undermine the foundation on which the Standard Model rests. It 
would ultimately concede the utility of public safety over individual liberty and the 
rule of law over individualized justice.588   
As it stands today, the history surrounding the law and armed carriage remains 
highly contested as courts continue to adjudicate the extent in which the Second 
Amendment extends beyond the home. In this author’s opinion, if history is 
dispositive in adjudicating the Second Amendment outside the home, the history of 
armed carriage laws strongly informs us that the government is within its authority 
to prohibit the preparatory carrying of dangerous weapons in public places as a 
means to both preserve the peace and prevent public injury.589 At the very least, the 
historical evidence conveys that the government retains a substantial, if not a 
compelling interest in regulating the carriage of dangerous weapons outside the 
home; that is the government should be given deference to prescribe time, place, and 
manner conditions on preparatory armed carriage, as well as prescribe reasonable 
training requirements on the obtainment of an armed carriage license. Additionally, 
the historical evidence conveys that the government retains a substantial interest in 
regulating the transportation of firearms for lawful purposes, such as from one’s 
home to business or from one’s home to the shooting range. Under this standard, the 
government would be within its police power in ensuring that firearms are 
transported safely and securely, but could not prohibit firearm transportation 
altogether, nor could the government place an undue burden on the transportation of 
firearms.   
                                                           
PURPOSE § 36 (1793) (“Whereas the good citizens of this State, are often injured by the 
discharge of single guns . . . no commissioned officer, or private, shall unnecessarily fire a 
musket, or single gun, in any public road, or near any house, or near the place of parade . . . 
unless embodied under the command of some officers”); AN ACT FOR FORMING AND 
REGULATING THE MILITIA WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS…FOR THAT 
PURPOSE 15 (1781) (“That no Soldier . . . shall unnecessarily discharge his Firelock from and 
after his appearing . . . on a Training or Muster-Day, without the express Order or License of 
his Superior Officer.”). 
 587  See, e.g., Robert Dowlut, A Right to Self-Defense Against Criminals and Despots, 8 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (1997); Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment 
Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339 (2009); see also 
Wayne La Pierre, Speech Before Conservative Political Action Conference, CPAC (Mar. 6, 
2014), at 14:08-14:17, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsBMuZrcdDk (stating twenty-
first century gun owners are “exactly what our Founding Fathers were and envisioned us to 
always be”). 
 588  For more on the Founding generations view on life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness 
and the rule of law, see Charles, supra note 33, at 490-517. 
 589  See CHARLES, supra note 36, at 138-43; Charles, supra note 38, at 54-55; Charles, 
supra note 48, at 1834-35. 
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Ultimately these issues will have to be decided at the Supreme Court and it 
remains uncertain what role, if any, the history of the law and armed carriage will 
play. If history matters the Court will once again have to navigate through copious 
amounts of data, much like it did in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. 
City of Chicago. In the process the Court will have to weigh and consider two very 
different versions of history, as well as determine what eras of history are important 
to determining the extent the Second Amendment extends beyond one’s doorstep. If 
the Court finds the Anglo-American origins dispositive it will have to choose 
whether to continue down the Standard Model path or acknowledge a historical 
narrative that does not fit quite as neatly into Heller and McDonald’s narrative. If the 
Court finds the nineteenth century dipositive it will have to choose between the 
contrasting Antebellum Era and Reconstruction Era, as well as northern and southern 
attitudes on armed carriage. If the Court finds the twentieth century at all important it 
will have to determine how important, if at all, the shift from “may issue” to “shall 
issue” licensing regimes is. 
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